INDIAN AF-PAK ENGAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001722 SIPDIS E.O. 12958:DECL:08/10/2019 TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL PTER PINS EAID MASS IN SUBJECT: INDIAN AF-PAK ENGAGEMENT REF: State 81259 Classified by Ambassador Tim Roemer for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: When Ambassador Holbrooke visits New Delhi, his GOI interlocutors - National Security Advisor Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Rao, and Special Afghanistan Representative Lambah - will be eager to discuss India's USD 1.2 billion dollar assistance program in Afghanistan. They will likely reiterate India's interest in increasing police and military assistance to Afghanistan. Our overall strategy on Indian engagement in Afghanistan should be to encourage greater coordination on all levels to avoid duplicative, contradictory, and incompatible approaches and methods between Indian assistance/training and that provided by the USG, NATO, and other international partners. Ambassador Holbrooke's interlocutors will likely express pessimism on prospects for a near-term thaw in India-Pakistan relations, and will ask for continued USG pressure on Pakistan to match CT rhetoric with deeds. Domestic political fallout over PM Singh's July meeting with Pakistani PM Gilani and a widespread perception of lingering Pakistani bad faith in cracking down on terror directed at India combine to make resumption of the "composite dialogue" difficult for the Singh government, though contacts between Indian and Pakistani officials are continuing. End Summary. Urge More Coordination on Afghan Assistance -------------- ¶2. (C) India is proud of its ongoing "development partnership" with post-Taliban Afghanistan that began in late 2001, and the GOI claims that the sum of its performed and pledged assistance to date totals USD 1.2 billion. When Ambassador Holbrooke visits New Delhi, he should express appreciation for India's efforts, but should also advocate increased coordination of Indian aid with the USG and other international partners in order to maximize assistance impact and eliminate duplicative efforts. Rather than ask India to provide major additional civilian assistance at this time, he should seek greater coordination so as to make existing assistance more complementary. India has also expressed interest in increasing military training and assistance, and in providing training for Afghan police. India will likely move forward in providing this assistance, with or without our blessing. As with civilian assistance, the USG should thus urge India to coordinate military/police assistance with us and NATO partners to avoid contradictory approaches as we pursue a common goal of increasing Afghan security capacity. We think the Indians will be amenable to all such coordination. Civilian Assistance -------------- ¶3. (SBU) India's civilian aid is channeled into three main areas: infrastructure development, capacity building, and humanitarian aid. MEA officials tell us the GOI relies heavily on Afghan government input when devising project scope and location, and virtually all Indian aid is administered by Afghan ministries or international organizations. The showpiece of Indian infrastructure assistance is a completed 218km road from Delaram, a town in Nimruz province near the northwestern corner of Helmand, to Zaranj on the Iranian border that was built to link up with a road running from the Iranian port of Chahbahar (thus reducing land-locked Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistani ports). A slickly-produced GOI brochure on India's aid to Afghanistan notes that Indians and Afghans were killed in terrorist attacks on road construction crews, thus highlighting the shared sacrifice of both countries. In addition, India is currently working on a hydroelectric dam in Herat province as well as other power generation/transmission projects; has refurbished telecommunications infrastructure equipment in eleven provinces; and is constructing the new Afghan parliament building. ¶4. (SBU) In order to develop Afghan human resource capacity, India provides 675 annual Indian university scholarships to Afghan students. It also places 20 Indian technical advisors in key Afghan ministries and provides short-term training in India to 675 Afghan civil servants. As an example of possible coordination, we suggest that we work with India to expand an existing regional energy program in which the USG funds 250 Afghan engineers to train in India (we could also expand the program to include water specialists). India's humanitarian assistance focuses on food aid, supplying high-protein biscuits to 2 million Afghan school children daily that are distributed by the World Food Program. During a January 2009 visit to Delhi by Afghan President Karzai, Prime Minister Singh announced with considerable fanfare a gift to Afghanistan of 250,000 metric tons of Indian wheat. Nearly nine months later, the wheat remains undelivered. USG attempts to persuade Pakistan to allow shipment of the wheat through Pakistan have foundered, while the Indians and Afghans have not come to terms on the threshold issue of who will pay transportation costs, regardless of whether the wheat is shipped through Pakistan or Iran, in spite of USG efforts to broker an agreement. Another area of increased coordination could be discussing the feasibility of a pilot program between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that would ease transit through Pakistan of Afghan dried fruit and nuts to a potentially large Indian market. NEW DELHI 00001722 002 OF 003 Police/Military Assistance -------------- ¶5. (C) In an April 8 meeting with Ambassador Holbrooke, Indian NSA Narayanan stated that India was interested in providing training for the Afghan police. Although the Indians are aware of USG misgivings regarding such training, Indian interlocutors may raise the issue again. MEA officials tell us they have discussed with Afghan officials the possibility of training Afghan police women and bomb disposal specialists, but no large-scale training has yet taken place. Since it appears likely that such training will eventually take place, we should urge coordination with the USG and NATO partners so as to maximize efficiency and prevent contradictory training approaches. Another type of training that Indians are well-qualified to offer is professional leadership training to mid-level police officers, a critical element in overall police force development that would complement existing efforts. ¶6. (C) India is also intent on increasing its military assistance to Afghanistan. India currently provides a variety of training to approximately 100 ANA personnel and that number is expected to rise. India has offered its Advanced Light Helicopter to Afghanistan as well as pilot training to the new Afghan air force. The GOI has provided cars and trucks to the Afghan military. Once again, we should encourage coordination to better ensure harmony with US/NATO training and assistance. Testy Times in India-Pak Relations -------------- ¶7. (C) Events in recent weeks have combined to deepen Indian antipathy and suspicion toward Pakistan, and may give Prime Minister Singh additional pause to reflect upon the domestic political costs he will incur if he continues to be forward-leaning on resumption of the "composite dialogue" with Pakistan. Fallout over a joint statement that came out of Singh's July 16 Sharm al-Sheikh meeting with Pakistani PM Gilani has provided a headache for his government, a godsend for his political opponents, and fodder for India's chattering classes. Even more significantly for Singh, his position at Sharm met with significant dissent from some within the ruling coalition, including heavyweights like Finance Minister Mukherjee. Congress boss Sonia Gandhi appeared content to let the Singh bash-fest play out for several days before she cut off criticism from Congress cadres, and even then some Congress MPs were hesitant to back up Singh. He and key GOI officials were grilled relentlessly by the opposition in Parliament over joint statement language that "action on terrorism should not be linked" to the India-Pak dialogue, as well as a cryptic line stating that "Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Baluchistan." Looking to rebound from their party's poor showing in May national elections, BJP leaders (joined by numerous media commentators) seized upon the joint statement to support their claim of Singh's weakness and ineptitude in dealing with Pakistan and to accuse Singh of kowtowing to USG pressure. MEA officials have conceded privately to us that inclusion of the reference to Baluchistan was ill-advised; MEA Af-Pak Joint Secretary TCA Raghavan ascribed it to the PM's being "very tired" in Sharm. ¶8. (C) While divulging that contacts between Indian and Pakistani officials are continuing (for example, mQtings at the Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary level are expected to take place on the margins of UNGA),MEA's Raghavan told us that the major obstacle to resumption of "meaningful dialogue" is Pakistan's unwillingness to "take responsibility" for terror against India by cracking down on perpetrators of past attacks and preventing future attacks. Raghavan declined to spell out more specific expectations of the GOP, noting that articulation of such demands by India would mean Pakistan would never fulfill them. Recent events have hardened a widespread public perception of Pakistani bad faith in this regard. The detailed July 20 court confession by Mumbai terror suspect Ajmal Kasab confirmed oft-stated Indian assertion that the November 2008 Mumbai attacks were planned in Pakistan and perpetrated by Pakistani nationals. Indians were outraged by an August 3 Pakistani court decision to adjourn indefinitely the case of LeT/JuD leader Hafiz Saeed. ¶9. (C) Even positive steps by Pakistan, such as the detention of an additional suspect in the Mumbai attacks, Jamil Ahmed, have been undercut by subsequent public statements by Pakistan that dossiers provided by the Indian government purporting to establish Saeed's involvement in terror attacks against India were scanty and legally inadmissible. The widely shared perception here is that Pakistan has taken few steps on its own to investigate the links between LeT/JuD leader Saeed and Mumbai attack suspects who have been arrested by Pakistani authorities. Furthermore, many Indians assert that these steps - meager and superficial at best, to the Indian eye - were taken only because Pakistani national Kasab survived the attack, thus making it impossible for Islamabad to issue its standard blanket denial of any connection to Pakistan. ¶10. (U) Embassy coordinator for Af-Pak issues and point of contact for Ambassador Holbrooke's upcoming visit to India is Political NEW DELHI 00001722 003 OF 003 Officer John Rath. His contact details are as follows: email - rathjt@state.gov ; office telephone -(91)(11)2419-8657 and cell phone-(91)9910-890-106. ROEMER