CIVIL NUCLEAR TRADE MISSION REVEALS IMPLEMENTATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 000152 SENSITIVE SIPDIS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FOR RBOUDREAU, MGILLESPIE, TCUTLER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN SUBJECT: CIVIL NUCLEAR TRADE MISSION REVEALS IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES REF: A. NEW DELHI 141 ¶B. NEW DELHI 29 ¶C. 08 NEW DELHI 2985 ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request; please see paragraph 8. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY. A trade mission co-led by the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) and Nuclear Energy Institute explored opportunities for civil nuclear cooperation in meetings with senior political and technical officials in New Delhi January 11-14 and Mumbai January 14-16, highlighting several critical implementation issues. India will sign its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, but senior officials remained vague on when this will take place and how they plan to fill in the Agreement's blank declaration of separated facilities annex. India is ready "right away" to begin negotiating the reprocessing arrangement envisioned in Section 6(3) of the 123 Agreement, and suggested that its conclusion was a prerequisite to sealing commercial deals. Designating a counterpart to India's negotiator and signaling willingness to begin this negotiation could prevent delays harmful to the commercial prospects of U.S. firms. Indian officials affirmed their intention to ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) and agreed that it would most likely take place in the next Parliament after India's general elections, due by April. They shared that the politically complex process of reactor park site selection was underway, but that no further announcements were expected prior to the elections. Several senior officials reaffirmed India's commitment in its letter of intent to set aside at least two reactor park sites and to purchase reactors with at least 10,000 Megawatts (MWe) total generating capacity from American firms. ¶3. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED. U.S. industry representatives expressed anxiety over the uncertain and lengthy U.S. and Indian licensing requirements, which they felt put them at a competitive disadvantage and delayed meaningful commercial engagement. They also expressed concern that Indian law does not provide patent protection in the nuclear industry. Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Anil Kakodkar's statement that he felt "betrayed" by United States policy supporting a ban on enrichment and reprocessing technology (ENR) in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reminded the delegation that nonproliferation issues remain highly sensitive in the context of the emerging strategic partnership and will continue to require careful management beyond the conclusion of the 123 Agreement. END SUMMARY. Trade Mission Probes Opportunities, Reveals Challenges - - - ¶4. (SBU) Forty executives representing the U.S. civil nuclear industry visited New Delhi January 11-14 and Mumbai January 14-16 as part of a trade mission supported by the Department of Commerce and co-led by the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) and the Nuclear Energy Institute. This thematic report highlights several of the critical implementation issues raised during the delegation's visit, drawing from a dozen meetings with a variety of senior political and technical officials, including Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee; Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office Prithviraj Chavan; Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Anil Kakodkar; and Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia (full list of meetings para 19). The parallel visit of a U.S. Department of Energy team to restart the Civil Nuclear Energy working Group (CNEWG) is reported ref A. NEW DELHI 00000152 002 OF 006 Safeguards Agreement: Possibly Signed Within A Month - - - ¶5. (SBU) Indian officials agreed that the first order of business should be the signing of India's Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but they remained vague on when this would take place and how they would populate the Agreement's blank declaration of separated facilities annex. Minister Chavan echoed prior statements from the Ministry of External Affairs that India had "made very good progress" and expected to sign "very shortly, even within one month's time." Indian officials have not shared with Post how they plan to ensure that India's declaration of nuclear facilities would be consistent with its 2005 Separation Plan, a prerequisite to the issuance of the U.S. Presidential certifications necessary to permit the licensing of U.S. exports mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 123 Agreement implementing legislation. Fuel Reprocessing: India Ready to Negotiate Arrangement - - - ¶6. (SBU) Indian officials made clear for the first time that India was ready "right away" to begin negotiating the reprocessing arrangement in Section 6(3) of the 123 Agreement. Chavan emphasized that "other countries do not have issues with reprocessing technology" and that India hoped to resolve this issue "as soon as you are ready." Mukherjee referred to "technical issues that require clarification." Kakodkar in particular suggested that India would not conclude commercial contracts with U.S. firms without first agreeing to the reprocessing arrangement. He described the commercial and reprocessing negotiations as "interlocking" and that he hoped the negotiations could take place in parallel. In order to prevent the reprocessing negotiation from dragging on and delaying commercial opportunities, Kakodkar said he had been "keen to put a timeline in the 123 Agreement" and he was now "ready and anxious to start that process right away." (Section 6(3) requires that consultations on arrangements and procedures begin within six months of a request by either Party and be concluded within one year.) ¶7. (SBU) Kakodkar elaborated on his red-lines for the reprocessing arrangement negotiation based on his conviction about the importance of reprocessing. "If Uranium and derivatives are covered by IAEA safeguards, fine; but if you say we must ask permission to reprocess, that will be problematic," he said. Kakodkar felt strongly that indefinite storage of spent fuel was "not an option in India" because it was "not sustainable from an energy point of view, in terms of credible waste management, or on security grounds." Kakodkar concluded that he was "100 percent certain that the whole world will move to support reprocessing," and said he looked forward to the day when India and the U.S. could collaborate on reprocessing research. Apart from reprocessing, Kakodkar said provision of a lifetime fuel stockpile would be a key component of reactor contracts. These arrangements must be "robust," "prevent obstruction," and be "guided by 123 Agreement." Kakodkar also said fuel supply contracts must permit the manufacture of fuel in India. ¶8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: India's interest in commencing the reprocessing arrangement negotiations was muddled in the exchange of diplomatic notes that brought the 123 Agreement into force on December 6, 2008. A second Indian diplomatic note dated December 6 designated Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for External Affairs Gitesh Sarma, an assistant secretary-level foreign ministry official posted to NEW DELHI 00000152 003 OF 006 the Department of Atomic Energy in Mumbai, as "the nodal point for the Administrative Arrangement to be established for the effective implementation of the provisions of the Agreement, pursuant to Article 17," but the note said nothing about the Reprocessing Arrangement described in Section 6(3). Post requests that the Department designate Sarma's counterpart and indicate willingness to begin negotiating the Section 6(3) arrangements at the earliest opportunity so as not to delay the commercial prospects of U.S. firms. Liability Convention: To Parliament After Elections - - - ¶9. (SBU) Indian officials expressed their intention to ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) to provide the liability protection required by U.S. firms to do business in India, and seemed to agree that it would most likely be done in the next Parliament after elections due in April-May. Adoption of the Convention requires an extensive inter-agency review followed by Cabinet and then parliamentary approval. Mukherjee said the inter-ministerial consultations had been completed and he saw "no difficulties getting the legislation passed." He did not indicate a timeline, saying only that ratification would have to wait for Parliament to act. (He appeared to have abandoned the idea of implementing the Convention "administratively," as reported ref B.) Ahluwalia was less familiar with the issue, but responded positively to the suggestion that India needed the Convention to have the widest possible choices among foreign vendors to meet its ambitious nuclear power generation goals and Indian private industry needed it to participate in the global civil nuclear market. At Ahluwalia's request, a USIBC delegation member gave him a one-page brief on the Convention and its advantages for India. Ahluwalia seemed keen to advocate for early adoption of the Convention. ¶10. (SBU) Chavan and Kakodkar each said India's work toward a liability regime had pre-dated the July 2005 joint statement launching the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative with the United States, stemming from the Indian government's realization that civil nuclear power would be required to fuel India's rapid growth and that achieving its goal of a three-stage Thorium cycle would be "too big for laboratory development" and would have to be implemented "in the commercial domain." They likewise agreed that the draft legislation to implement the Convention was "in the advanced stage," according to Chavan, and "almost complete," according to Kakodkar. Chavan shared that major bills usually go to committees first, so Parliament probably does not have sufficient time to enact the measure in the upcoming abridged February 12-26 session which is mainly aimed at passing a temporary budget measure (a "vote of account") to allow the government to function until the new Parliament convenes after the election. The options of dispensing with committees and going straight to the floor of Parliament or taking direct executive action were "theoretically possible, but practically difficult." Therefore, he did not expect Parliament to take action prior to elections that must be held by April. He stressed, however, that Cabinet approval would constitute "a major task achieved," since a commitment by the Cabinet was usually not undone, even by successive governments. ¶11. (SBU) Kakodkar stressed that he understood the importance of the Convention, observing, "It is clear the world is converging on the Supplementary Convention as the global liability standard." He believed the next Parliament would act on the law and dismissed political concerns, saying the 123 Agreement debate has created "a clear national consensus NEW DELHI 00000152 004 OF 006 on nuclear power." Kakodkar rejected suggestions that India might implement an intermediary measure, saying decisively, "Our law will be 100 percent consistent with the Convention." (COMMENT: Some NPCIL officials and Indian industry representatives suggested that the government may implement intermediary measures to address liability not fully consistent with the Convention, which caused some alarm among U.S. industry representatives, but this possibility was not confirmed by senior Indian officials.) Like the reprocessing arrangement, Kakodkar again stressed his hope that the lack of the Convention would not be a "constraining factor" for U.S. industry in the short term and that India's work on the Convention should move in parallel with commercial contract negotiations. (Delegation members expressed concern to the Indian officials that they may have difficulty engaging in contract negotiations without the Convention in place.) ¶12. (SBU) Chavan also elaborated on other upcoming business before Parliament related to civil nuclear cooperation. The government is planning amendments to India's Atomic Energy Act to grant more autonomy to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). The government is also preparing legislation to permit a private sector firm to take a minority stake in the nuclear generation business in joint ventures with public companies, such as the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) and the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC). He explained that private firms, including fully-owned foreign firms, would not be required to enter into a joint venture for manufacturing or construction in the nuclear industry, but that this new rule would permit Indian private firms to take an equity stake in the power generation and management business. Site Selection: Will Honor Letter of Intent - - - ¶13. (SBU) Indian officials were clear that although exploratory work on new reactor sites is complete, the process of site selection and allocation is a politically complex and that no new reactor sites would be announced or allocated prior to the next elections. Mukerjee gave away nothing, saying only that the selection process was "underway." Chavan recalled that the government had announced Jaitapur, Maharashtra as the latest site, and that "shortly we will seek necessary clearances and announce new sites." He added that the government was looking at multiple sites and he could not say whether they would be announced one at a time or all at once. (France is widely rumored to have a lock on the Jaitapur site.) Chavan shared that "Everything has been done to select the sites; we are collecting and analyzing the information." He revealed there was "intense competition among states" to host reactor park sites. Kakodkar said the site selection process was a "technical as well as political process," and that he was unable to discuss it. He concluded, "What is clear is you will have two sites." ¶14. (SBU) Kakodkar and Chavan each reaffirmed the September 10, 2008 letter of intent from Foreign Secretary Menon to Under Secretary Burns committing India to set aside at least two reactor park sites and to purchase reactors with at least 10,000 MWe total generating capacity from U.S. firms. Chavan said, "We stand by the letter of intent and see a major role for the U.S. industry in India's program." In response to concern about level playing field and first-mover advantage of the Russians and French, Chavan replied, "We will not let U.S. interests suffer; the letter of intent commitment will be fully met." Kakodkar said, "We have no problem honoring the letter of intent commitment of 10,000 MWe because our requirements are so large." India had interests in "diverse NEW DELHI 00000152 005 OF 006 technologies," according to Kakodkar, so the U.S. "need not be concerned that we are talking with different countries." Kakodkar cautioned, however, that the "only condition is that you must be able to generate energy at competitive rates because under the Indian system nuclear power must compete with the alternative sources on a unit cost basis." (Kakodkar also stressed this point to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Dale Klein, ref C.) He argued that the "best strategy is to team up with Indian firms, which produce cheaper than some global competitors and can satisfy all requirements except the ability to make large forgings." He concluded, "Without Indian partnerships, I'm pretty certain you will find it difficult to compete on price here." Anxieties About Licensing and Patent Protection - - - ¶15. (SBU) During the course of the visit, U.S. firms expressed a variety of concerns with U.S. and Indian licensing requirements that they felt put them at a competitive disadvantage and delayed meaningful engagement with the Indian civil nuclear market. Many firms felt the "Part 810" licensing process -- coordinated by the U.S. Department of Energy along with the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce -- was unclear and protracted. In particular, they felt the uncertainty of the licensing process in the Indian context and the time required to obtain licenses -- likely several months -- constrained firms from sharing meaningful technical information and commercial proposals with potential Indian partners. Some Indian industry interlocutors privately lamented that they had little reason to engage U.S. firms until they received licenses permitting them to share information beyond what was already available in the public domain. ¶16. (SBU) Kakodkar noted that U.S. firms also had to obtain Indian licenses from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). The AERB requires firms to submit detailed proposals and that firms must already have received an export license from the country of origin -- in the case of U.S. firms, from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Thus, the AERB process cannot begin until after the Part 810 process and the NRC licenses are issued. According to Kakodkar, "Both the AERB and NRC processes are detailed and elaborate, but not identical. They will take time, but the reprocessing negotiation will take longer, so all these processes should move in parallel." (COMMENT: In practice, Kakodkar's hope that these processes can move in parallel discounts his own sequencing stipulations and fails to recognize the constraints on U.S. firms: that they cannot engage in meaningful commercial discussions until the licenses are issued or make binding commercial decisions until the liability convention is in place, and that servicing the Indian industry requires new captial investment with long lead times before the work can actually begin. In practice, while no single requirement is unduly onerous, sequencing issues constrain the prospect of advancing all of these processes in parallel and cumulatively threaten considerable delays -- perhaps years -- in the ability of U.S. industry to execute large projects in India.) ¶17. (SBU) U.S. firms also expressed concern that India's Atomic Energy Act did not recognize patents in the nuclear industry. Kakodkar confirmed that items for nuclear reactors do not receive patent protection under Indian law. He added, due to prior experiences with Tarapur, "I think this will remain until the last bit of the embargo is removed." (Note: Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for the Americas Gaitri Kumar later clarified that he was referring to restrictions on high technology exports to India.) U.S. NEW DELHI 00000152 006 OF 006 industry representatives noted that without patent protection they could not collaborate with Indian companies on developing new technology, and that they were concerned not only with protecting their own technology, but also had obligations to protect the intellectual property of their commercial partners. Kakodkar dismissed the concern, saying any item on India's control list manufactured in India required a Department of Atomic Energy license, and U.S. firms could establish confidentiality arrangements in commercial contracts between the parties. He noted that general purpose items that can be used in nuclear power plants do not receive patent protection. Kakodkar concluded that General Electric built India's first nuclear reactors and India never violated patent rights. U.S. industry representatives agreed their lawyers would explore options. Nonpro Policy: Acute Sensitivities Remain - - - ¶18. (SBU) The meeting with Kakodkar in particular was a reminder that nonproliferation remains a particularly sensitive issue in the emerging strategic partnership and that careful management will be required beyond the conclusion of the 123 Agreement. Kakodkar opened the meeting January 15 saying that he felt "betrayed" by U.S. policy supporting a global ban on enrichment and reprocessing technology (ENR) in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),saying that it looked to be "directly targeting India" by requiring signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He added, "The long term relationship we are developing is not consistent with this kind of negative development." (COMMENT: The Ministry of External Affairs has been silent on the reprocessing issue, only asking for a read-out of Suppliers Group deliberations once they are releasable to non-participating governments. It appears that while MEA may understand the U.S. position, Kakodkar felt stung by its implications for his expansive reprocessing ambitions. Differences over nonproliferation policy could continue to affect India's commercial decisions as it tests the limits of U.S. flexibility in the context of the emerging strategic partnership.) List of Meetings - - - ¶19. (SBU) This report draws from meetings with the following government officials: Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office Prithviraj Chavan (Delhi, January 13); Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee (Delhi, January 13); National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) Chairman D.K. Jain (Delhi, January 13); Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia (Delhi, January 14); Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) Chairman S.K. Jain (Delhi, January 14); Ministry of Power Secretary V.S. Sampath, Power Finance Corporation Chairman V.K. Garg, Power Grid Corporation Chairman S.K. Chaturvedi (Delhi, January 14); Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Anil Kakodkar (Delhi, January 15); A FICCI-organized roundtable with Indian Parliamantarians; and additional technical and commercial sessions with NPCIL and Indian industry. A planned meeting with senior opposition BJP leader L.K. Advani and colleagues did not take place. WHITE