INDIA JUSTIFIES DISSENT ON NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001300 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN SUBJECT: INDIA JUSTIFIES DISSENT ON NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS REF: A. STATE 57598 ¶B. NEW DELHI 1211 ¶C. NEW DELHI 924 Classified By: CDA Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon explained to the Charge d'Affaires June 22 India's rationale for failing to support International Nuclear Fuel Bank proposals at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna June 15-16 (ref A). According to media reports, India was alone among 25 IAEA Board members (though later joined by Iran) in opposing proposed fuel assurance arrangements, thereby relegating these efforts to further "discussions and consultations." Menon affirmed that although India supported fuel banks, it viewed itself as a full participant, including possibly as a supplier. He confirmed that the Indian Mission in Vienna was right to oppose any plan that precluded India's full participation due to its status as a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Menon lamented that while the delegation was subjected to considerable pressure to support the proposals, no delegation made any serious attempt to address India's core concern or to reassure its delegation that further discussion would reverse India's exclusion on the basis of its NPT status. ¶2. (C) India's opposition was not inconsistent with its previous messages about fuel banks, though no Indian official used opportunities in advance of the Board meeting to alert us to this possible outcome. Menon had confirmed for visiting Under Secretary Burns that India supported the establishment of nuclear fuel banks and wanted to work with the U.S. to make it a reality, but he did not elaborate (ref B). Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for Disarmament and International Security Affairs Gaddam Dharmendra outlined India's views on fuel banks May 5 (ref C),stressing that India viewed itself as a supplier under any fuel bank arrangement. Dharmendra subsequently reffirmed this position June 12, adding that India did not yet have views on any particular proposal. Neither Menon nor Dharmendra used these various interactions to alert us to the seriousness of their concerns. The issue was also raised with Special Secretary Katju on the margins of a meeting with the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in Washington June 16 as the IAEA Board meeting was underway, but he failed to intervene. ¶3. (C) COMMENT: Though Indian officials could have been more forthcoming in advance of the Board meeting, India's position reflects its unwavering conviction that, as a responsible state with nuclear weapons, it should be permitted to play a role in the international nonproliferation regime commensurate with its capabilities. India rejects as a false dichotomy the choice between accepting the NPT-derived status of Non-nuclear Weapon State and its exclusion from global nonproliferation efforts, many of which it would otherwise embrace (such as fuel banks). Indian officials feel the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative -- including the IAEA Board's consensus approval of its limited safeguards and the Nuclear Suppliers Group's exception to its full scope safeguards requirement -- legitimizes its exceptional status as a responsible nuclear power in order to welcome its contribution to global nonproliferation efforts. Indian officials tend to overlook that India's status remains controversial. ¶4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: In fact, while much of the world may have decided to no longer treat India as a proliferation problem, its unique status does not yet permit it to be fully part of the solution. India does support fuel banks. But as long as it finds itself on the wrong side of a line drawn on the basis of the NPT, it may feel compelled to make common cause with those countries that likewise feel excluded -- or targeted -- by the nonproliferation regime. India is sending a message: either let us in as we are or we will be forced into opposition from the outside. END COMMENT. BURLEIGH