MINURCAT RISING: REINFORCED UN PKO REPLACES EUFOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000097 SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON PARIS FOR POL - DELIA AND KANEDA LONDON FOR POL - LORD ADDIS PASS TO USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MASS MARR UN PKO SU LY CD SUBJECT: MINURCAT RISING: REINFORCED UN PKO REPLACES EUFOR IN CHAD, SRSG BRIEFS ON STATUS AND DARFUR REFUGEE SITUATION REF: A. A. USUN 0281 ¶B. B. NDJAMENA 0057 NDJAMENA 00000097 001.2 OF 003 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The EU PKO EUFOR, one of two PKOs authorized by UNSC 1778, stood down March 15, transferring its authority to provide security to civilians in Eastern Chad and Northeastern CAR to the UN's MINURCAT, whose mandate was enhanced to include such a role by UNSC 1861. Many of EUFOR's EU-member and other troops were re-hatted to MINURCAT March 15 and will continue for varying lengths of time in the UN PKO, as new troop contingents are folded into MINURCAT. SRSG victor Angelo's planning for the transition appears likely to obviate any security gap in eastern Chad as the UN assesses its ability to absorb more refugees if Khartoum's post-ICC indictment actions provoke Darfur IDPs to cross into Chad. The SRSG has stressed to diplomats here that MINURCAT's mandate under UNSC 1861 is virtually identical to the combined mandate of EUFOR and MINURCAT under UNSC 1778, with the addition in 1861 of "benchmarks" to assess MINURCAT's performance and give the SRSG observer status in the Dakar Accord. Angelo has also emphasized that he is keen to implement the "civilian" aspects of the mandate -- in the areas of human rights, including use of child soldiers, and reform and strengthening of the judicial and penal systems in eastern Chad, which will complement the deployment of UN-trained Chadian police and gendarmes to provide security inside the refugee camps and IDP sites. The SRSG underlines that progress on the civilian side will depend on adequate funding of the Trust Fund that provides money for the civilian projects and activities. ¶2. (SBU) Transfer of Authority ceremonies went well on the ground here, and MINURCAT II has begun to take control of the role, personnel, and facilities of EUFOR. The SRSG's plan for the gradual departure of major EUFOR troop contributors France and Poland, who will not stay in MINURCAT, appears sensible and viable. SRSG Angelo's ability to plan, organize, and negotiate with the GOC will be of key importance if the situation in Darfur results in significant new refugee flows into Chad. The USG should be prepared to assist him if negotiations with the GOC for more sites and refugees become necessary. END SUMMARY. -------------- EUFOR STANDS DOWN -------------- ¶3. Ambassador attended ceremonies in N'Djamena (March 14) and Abeche (March 15) to mark the Transfer of Authority from EUFOR to MINURCAT March 15. UN PKO Chief Alain LeRoi and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner were the leading visiting EU and UN officials taking part. The EU PKO EUFOR, one of two PKOs authorized by UNSC 1778, stood down March 15 and its authority to provide security to civilians in Eastern Chad and Northeastern CAR was transferred to MINURCAT, whose mandate was enhanced to include that role by UNSC 1861. Many of EUFOR's troops were re-hatted to MINURCAT March 15 and will continue for varying lengths of time in the UN PKO, as new troop contingents are folded into MINURCAT. SRSG Victor Angelo's planning for the transition appears likely to obviate any security gap in eastern Chad as the UN assesses its ability to absorb more refugees if Khartoum's post-ICC indictment actions provoke Darfur IDPs to cross into Chad. -------------- MINURCAT II STANDS UP -------------- ¶4. (U) SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member ambassadors resident in Chad March 18 on the nascent MINURCAT's operational status and planning. (COMs of U.S., France, Libya, China, and Russia comprise the group, which meets with the SRSG bi-weeekly.) He stressed that MINURCAT's mandate under UNSC 1861 was virtually identical to the combined NDJAMENA 00000097 002.2 OF 003 mandate of EUFOR and MINURCAT under UNSC 1778. Exceptions were the addition in UNSC 1861 of "benchmarks" to assess MINURCAT's performance of its responsibilities, and the granting of observer status to the SRSG in the Dakar Accord implementation process between Chad and Sudan. Angelo stressed also that he was keen to implement the "civilian" aspects of the mandate -- in the areas of human rights, including use of child soldiers, and reform and strengthening of the judicial and penal systems in eastern Chad, which would complement the deployment of UN-trained Chadian police and gendarmes to provide security inside the refugee camps and IDP sites. The SRSG underlined that progress on the civilian side depended on adequate funding of the Trust Fund that provides oney for civilian projects and activities. -------------- COUNTING THE TROOPS -------------- ¶5. The Current Lineup: As of March 18, MINURCAT's military strength is some 4,890 out of a total authorized 5,200. That includes 780 French, 400 Irish, 400 Polish, 160 Russians, 120 HQs staff, 100 Austrians, 100 Finns, and 40 Croats. ¶6. In the Pipeline: En route are: 850 Nepalese, 800 Ghanaians, 500 Togolese, 300 Malawians, 150-200 Uruguayans, 50 Egyptians, and 40 Bangladeshis. Requests have been made to China, Libya, and Namibia for small specialized units -- logistics, medical, and transport specialties. ¶7. The force structure will change over time, as countries like France and Poland withdraw their troops as troops in the pipeline arrive and deploy. French troops will be out of MINURCAT by September, but France will continue to provide logistical and transportation support to MINURCAT from EFT (Elements Francais au Tchad) based bilaterally here. -------------- HOW IT WILL BE DEPLOYED -------------- ¶8. MINURCAT Deployments: -- Northern Sector: With bases at Iriba and Bahai: Currently manned by Poles and Croats, who will cede to troops from Malawi on the latter's arrival. -- Central Sector: With bases at Farchana and Guereda: Currently manned by the French, who will cede to Ghanaian troops on arrival. -- Southern Sector: With base at Goz Beida: Currently manned by the Irish and Finns, who will continue in MINURCAT. -- Central African Republic: With base at Birao: Currently French, who will cede to Togolese. -- Headquarters and Strategic Reserve: With base in Abeche: Nepalese, Togolese, Austrians, Russians, Norwegians, and Bangladeshis. -------------- U.S. MILADS ARRIVE -------------- ¶9. (U) Two U.S. military officers, an Army and an Air Force lieutenant colonel, assigned as Military Advisors to MINURCAT's Headquarters Staff, arrived here March 18. One is scheduled to do intelligence analysis in the HQ in N'Djamena and the other will assist in operations at Abeche airport. -------------- DIS AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS -------------- ¶10. SRSG Angelo reported that all 850 members of the Detachement Integre de Securite (DIS),Chadian police and gendarmerie officers trained by the UN, were now deployed in refugee camps in eastern Chad. The GOC had agreed to arm all of them with side arms in the coming week. The SRSG reported that the GOC was reviewing the structure and performance of its own specially-created agency for liaison between the GOC NDJAMENA 00000097 003.2 OF 003 and EUFOR and MINURCAT, called the National Committee on International Forces in Chad (CONAFIT). The goal was to make CONAFIT more streamlined and more efficient. The SRSG said that MINURCAT elements would have a weekly coordination meeting with GOC elements -- CONAFIT, Chad military commanders, Chad police and gendarmerie commanders, local GOC officials. MINURCAT would also hold weekly meetings with the INGOs active in eastern Chad, alternately in Abeche and N'Djamena. The SRSG said that the general agreement between MINURCAT and the GOC would soon be supplemented by a Status of Forces agreement (SOFA) to take into account MINURCAT's new military security role and personnel. -------------- MORE DARFUR REFUGEES TO CHAD? -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The SRSG said that as the senior UN official in Chad now, he was reviewing the situation in Darfur, especially if Khartoum's recent expulsion of INGOs and possible negative actions regarding security of Darfur IDPs were to motivate more Darfuris to cross the border into Chad. Right now, the UN was not seeing too much movement of IDPs, but it was early still. What movement among IDPs the UN was seeing was north-south movement, rather than east-west movement. That was positive, as was the fact that IDPs in Darfur are generally not located near the Chadian border, which made eventual IDP decisions to cross the border more studied ones. The SRSG said that UN agencies in Chad had estimated that they could accommodate up to 50,000 more Darfur refugees if necessary, with existing stocks in existing locations. After that, negotiations with the GOC for more sites and more refugee acceptances would be necessary. Such negotiations, he noted, were never easy. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The Transfer of Authority ceremonies went well on the ground here, and MINURCAT II has begun to take control of the role, personnel, and facilities of EUFOR. The SRSG's plan for gradual departure of major EUFOR troop contributors who will not stay in MINURCAT (France and Poland) appears sensible and viable, obviating any security gap. SRSG Angelo's ability to plan, organize, and negotiate with the GOC will be of key importance if the situation in Darfur results in the arrival of significant new numbers of refugees from Darfur into Chad. The USG should be prepared to assist him if negotiations with the GOC for more sites and refugees becomes necessary. ¶13. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. NIGRO