CHAD/CAR: SRSG UPBEAT ON MINURCAT II DEPLOYMENT,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000071 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PREF UN EU AU PKO SU CT CD SUBJECT: CHAD/CAR: SRSG UPBEAT ON MINURCAT II DEPLOYMENT, EARLY OPERATIONS, AND TRANSITION FROM EUFOR ON MARCH 15 REF: NDJAMENA 0057 NDJAMENA 00000071 001.2 OF 003 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) SRSG Victor Angelo gave a generally positive briefing to the NDjamena Diplomatic Corps March 3 on the status of the March 15 transition of military security responsibilities from EUFOR to MINURCAT II; on MINURCAT's continued deployment; and on the PKO's current operations. All GOC-UN accords needed for the transition were signed; all EUFOR camps would revert to MINURCAT II; and a SOFA with the GOC would be signed soon. Angelo reported on the status of arrival dates for troop contingents and said that on 15 March, some 2,000 EUFOR would remain on the ground in Chad in transition mode. Angelo said he had 70 percent of his authorized civilian staff in country, including 236 UNPOLs. All authorized 850 DIS (Detachements Integres de Securites -- Chadian police and gendarmes trained and mentored by UNPOL) were deployed to forward bases. ¶2. (SBU) Angelo said that the general security situation in eastern Chad, including Abeche town, was improving as a result of MINURCAT deployment, especially DIS deployment in the camps, and better UN-GOC collaboration on security. MINURCAT was helping Chad local authorities to apprehend, try, and punish lawbreakers; DIS had already made some 81 arrests and recovered four vehicles; and DIS presence had begun to change the dynamic on "politicization" of the camps, including recruitment of under-age men. "We're seeing a change of attitude among the refugee families," Angelo said. At some camps, some rebel fighters returning to visit families were registering with the UN and handing over arms to DIS. Angelo emphasized that amidst a growing body of good news about MINURCAT II, one of his chief concerns now was the rapid depletion of the Trust Fund that financed DIS training and deployment and that was supposed to fund the good governance part of its mandate. Angelo said that he had the capability to make important strides in both DIS expansion and good governance -- judicial and prison reform, protection of human rights, etc -- but lack of adequate financing of the Trust Fund could threaten achievement of these goals. (See REFTEL.) ¶3. (SBU) We were troubled by Angelo's public disclosure of his deep concern over the depletion of the Trust Fund that financed DIS training and deployment, and that should finance projects to implement MINURCAT's mandate in the areas of human rights, prison reform, and law enforcement reform in eastern Chad. We fear that MINURCAT II's effectiveness will be limited by Trust Fund budgetary shortfalls that will undermine the effectiveness of its two "strategic instruments" -- the DIS and the good governance projects that could provide for security for cibvilians in eastern Chad after MINURCAT's eventual departure. We hope the USG, along with other donors, will step up with renewed funding for the Trust Fund, which more directly provides for the security of Darfuri refugees in Chad than the much bigger and better understood military piece of MINURCAT II. END SUMMARY. -------------- SIGNS OF PROGRESS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Angelo was generally upbeat regarding Chad developments. All GOC-UN accords needed for the transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT II were signed; all EUFOR camps would revert to MINURCAT; conversations continued for purchase of EUFOR equipment by the UN for MINURCAT II. Angelo was discussing a SOFA with the GOC, which would be signed soon. MINURCAT had hosted ICAO team to improve air traffic facilities and operations at both NDjamena and Abeche airports. The goal with the latter was to bring it up to international airport standards. ¶5. (SBU) Angelo reported on the status of arrival dates for troop contingents from Ghana and Togo, and the possibility of a Malawi contingent. On 15 March, some 2,030 EUFOR troops would remain on the ground in Chad to ensure a smooth transition to MINURCAT II, after which most would eventually leave. Plans were being finalized for the ceremonial transition, with events in NDjamena and Abeche to which the diplomatic corps would be invited, March 14-15. ¶6. (SBU) Angelo said that 70 per cent of his authorized civilian staff were in country. Of the 300 UNPOL officers authorized, some 236 were in country, deployed to all forward bases, including remote and difficult Baghai. The UN had resumed recruiting UNPOLs, and three Libyan police officers NDJAMENA 00000071 002.2 OF 003 soon would be on board. All 850 DIS individuals authorized to be part of the DIS (Detachements Integre de Securite -- Chadian police and gendarmes trained and mentored by UNPOLs) were deployed in eastern Chad in 87 vehicles, with more vehicles coming. Announcement would be made soon of the arrival of the Military Force Commander, Senegalese three-star Elhadji Kandji, expected to join an Irish two-star Deputy Commander and a Swedish Chief of Staff, whose staff officers were arriving in regular groups. -------------- TRUST FUND DEPLETION? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Angelo emphaszed that amidst a growing boduy of good news abou MINURCAT II, one of his chief concerns now was he rapid depletion of the Trust Fund that financedDIS training and deployment and that was suppose to fund the good governance part of its manate. Angelo said that he had the capability to make important strides in both DIS expansion and good governance -- judicial and prison reform, protection of human rights, etc. -- but lack of adequate financing of the Trust Fund could threaten achievement of these goals. -------------- ICC RULING -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Angelo described UN precautions regarding the expected announcement of the ICC ruling against Sudan President Bashir on March 4. Angelo said he had GOC assurances that even in the event of rebel attacks from Sudan, the DIS would not be used for national defense, but would remain deployed in camps on police duties. -------------- DAKAR ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Angelo said that scheduling conflicts had forced the postponement of the projected next meeting of the Contact Group at Khartoum February 28. The GOC had been prepared to go to Khartoum -- FORMIN Faki had cleared his schedule -- and the GOS had been ready to host the meeting, but Congo/B and Gabon FORMINs, co-chair and member, respectively, of the Contact Group, had been obliged to attend a regional ministerial meeting in Brazzaville, so Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, and Libya had agreed to a postponement of the Khartoum meeting, for which a new date had not yet been set, but which likely would be after March 15. -------------- EASTERN CHAD SECURITY SITUATION -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Angelo said that the general security situation in eastern Chad, including in Abeche town, was slowly but noticeably improving, as a result of continuing MINURCAT deployments, including deployment of DIS in the camps, and better UN-GOC collaboration on security matters. It was essential that lawbreakers be apprehended, brought to trial, and punished. MINURCAT was working with Chad local authorities to help them do this. As of last week, DIS had conducted some 900 escort patrols; in the course of their operations, DIS had made some 81 arrests and recovered four stolen vehicles. GOC disarmament sweeps had helped. In the camps, DIS presence had started to change the dynamic on recruitment of under-age men. Where before the practice was encouraged, now it was discouraged and considered unacceptable. "We're seeing a change of attitude among the refugee families," Angelo said. Even in rebellious An-Nabok camp, where the rebel presence had encouraged refugee violence against UN workers (and where operations had been suspended for months),there was a change. Some, but not all, rebel fighters returning to the camps from Sudan to visit families were registering with the UN and handing over arms to DIS on entering the camps. Angelo said that even this perhaps symbolic mark of respect for GOC and UN authority was a hopeful sign. Later on, when MINURCAT was fully deployed and fully functional, it would move more vigorously to disarm and "de-politicize" the camps, Angelo predicted. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (SBU) We were troubled by Angelo's semi-public disclosure of his deep concern over the depletion of the NDJAMENA 00000071 003.2 OF 003 Trust Fund that financed DIS training and deployment, and that should finance projects to implement MINURCAT's mandate in the areas of human rights, prison reform, and law enforcement reform in eastern Chad. (REFTEL details the possibilities inherent in its mandate in these capacity-building areas.) We fear that MINURCAT II's effectiveness will be limited by Trust Fund budgetary shortfalls that will undermine the effectiveness of its two "strategic instruments" -- the DIS and the good governance projects that could provide for security for civilians in eastern Chad after MINURCAT's eventual departure. We hope the USG, along with other donors, will step up with renewed funding for the Trust Fund, which actually more directly provides for the security of Darfuri refugees in Chad than the much bigger and better understood military piece of MINURCAT II and that have the possibility of doing so even after MINURCAT has departed eastern Chad. NIGRO