CHAD ELECTIONS UNLIKELY BEFORE 2010

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000070 SENSITIVE SIPDIS LONDON FOR POL: LORD PARIS FOR POL: D'ELIA AND KANEDA ADDIS ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF EU FR AU CD SUBJECT: CHAD ELECTIONS UNLIKELY BEFORE 2010 NDJAMENA 00000070 001.2 OF 003 ======= SUMMARY ======= ¶1. (SBU) Parliamentary and local elections in Chad are unlikely to be held until the first half of 2010, but the Chadian parties to the electoral reform process and Chad's key international partners remain committed to working towards credible elections as agreed in the 2007 August 13 Accord. Although not specifically mandated by the August 13 Accord between the Government, the pro-government majority party coalition, and the opposition minority party coalition, the goal was for credible elections for parliament and local government this year. Many factors have slowed progress toward the 2009 goal, including the rebel attacks of February and June 2008, the glacial process of working through complex issues according to the canons of Chadian political culture, and maneuvering for political advantage among the three sides and for personal interest within the three parties. ¶2. (SBU) But the Chadian parties to the Accord, as well as its international sponsors and supporters -- the European Union, France, Germany, the UN, the Francophonie, and the African Union -- are still committed to the continued implementation of the electoral reform process in the hope that the pace of progress will increase and permit legislative and communal polling no later than mid-2010. The August 13 Accord, though flawed and subject to delay both from objective factors and from foot-dragging, is still the best vehicle available for advancing a democratic agenda in Chad. The USG should stay solidly in step with our partners, both Chadian and international, to support the electoral reform process and ensure the first round of elections in early 2010. We believe that continued USG financial assistance to the general census, and also, if possible, to the electoral census, will be the most convincing demonstration of our commitment to accompany Chad along the (dusty, pot-holed, and largely unpaved) road toward better governance and democratic political practice. END SUMMARY. ================================ BACKGROUND: THE AUGUST 13 ACCORD ================================ ¶3. (U) In 2004, despite expectations that he was prepared to step down, Chadian President Idriss Deby used his majority support in Parliament to pass a law to amend the constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. In 2005, a referendum approved the amendment and Deby ran successfully for his third five-year tem. Most of the the political opposition parties responded by boycotting the May 2006 presidential polls, thereby calling into question the election,s credibility. At about the same time, key members of Deby's inner circle and fellow members of his Zaghawa ethnic group deserted him to join the ranks of armed Chadian rebel groups based in - and supported by ) Sudan, bent on his violent overthrow. Beset by internal political unrest and active armed rebel groups based in Sudan, President Deby agreed to negotiate with the political opposition and his own majority party coalition in talks brokered by the European Union. Months of negotiations, funded and facilitated by the EU, French, and Germans, led to the signing of the August 13 Accord in Ndjamena in 2007. ¶4. (U) The August 13 Accord laid out a roadmap toward the goal of credible communal and legislative elections in 2009 and equally credible presidential elections in 2011. The Accord called for a new electoral code, an independent electoral commission, two national censuses, one "demographic" and the another "electoral," as well as a series of political and administrative reforms to increase democratic space and foster a political climate conducive to credible election outcomes. In order to implement the Accord, an electoral reform committee (Comite de Suivi et d'Appui) was established, composed of equal numbers of voting members from the MPS majority and the CPDC opposition party coalitions, and non-voting government representatives in an advisory capacity. ===================== WAR DISRUPTS PROGRESS ===================== ¶5. (U) From August 2007 until February 2008, implementation of the Accord was painfully slow. The Committee was formed and adopted a set of working procedures. Discussions began on all of the various issues to be addressed. But progress stopped dead in late February 2008, when rebels attacked N,Djamena and battled Deby's troops in the streets. This NDJAMENA 00000070 002.2 OF 003 attack and its aftermath disrupted political and administrative operations, and the government was not fully functional for weeks, as retreating rebels and local looters vandalized government buildings, private businesses, and homes alike, destroying infrastructure, archives and records. What is more, the opposition CPDC suspended its participation in the Committee,s work, in protest over heavy-handed GOC repression in the wake of the attack. Among other actions, the government arrested and detained opposition leaders, including Lol Mahamat Choa, the Committee,s head. The CPDC returned to the Committee in May, after an independent Commission of Inquiry investigated the February events and issued a report detailing the abuses committed by GOC security forces. ==================================== VESTED INTERESTS AND LACK OF URGENCY ==================================== ¶6. (SBU) When the Committee resumed its work in May, progress on implementation of the Accord was slow and difficult, due to maneuvering for political and personal advantage by the three sides. For example, upon receiving draft laws to establish the electoral commission and the electoral code from the Committee, the National Assembly changed the text before approving the laws - even though half the voting members of the Committee are majority party members who could have incorporated the majority's wishes into the original text. These changes prompted objections by the opposition members of the Committee, further delaying implementation of the laws. ================================ LAWS NOT THE ONLY STICKING POINT ================================ ¶7. (U) In addition to finalizing the legal framework for the elections and establishing an electoral commission, other key pre-election tasks remain incomplete. The August 13 Accord require both a general census and an electoral census conducted with biometric measures to deter fraud. Both censuses are behind schedule due to delays in acquiring equipment and reduced efficiency during the rainy season, the head of the Census Bureau told the press last week, and could not be completed to set the stage for elections before 2010. ¶8. (SBU) The Committee itself moved slowly in response to the opposition's latest objections. When the opposition members on the Committee complained in mid-January 2009, the session was suspended - and did not resume for five weeks. When the Committee finally reconvened in late February, it decided to form a panel to examine the issue and report back to the full Committee, despite the urging of observers, including the European Union, the Africa Union, France, and Germany, to act more quickly. The Committee,s leisurely operational pace reflected as always the canons of Chad,s political culture. A week later, the panel reported to the full Committee that it was deadlocked. Attempts by the French, German, and EU diplomatic observers to resolve the stalemate were not immediately successful. ================ WHAT'S THE RUSH? ================ ¶9. (SBU) All three parties to the Accord have found reasons to drag their feet in this process. The GOC and President Deby are in no hurry for the planned elections and have not pushed the electoral reform process forcefully because he is in the Palace and his party controls Parliament. Also, he can justify his action ) or lack of it ) to the need for the Executive to concentrate on defense of the country against clear and present threats from Sudan-based nd Khartoum-supported Chad rebels. The rebel grups, in fact, did obligingly attack again in fore in June 2008, but were contained by the Chadian army and defeated in eastern Chad, whence they retreated into Sudan. Despite the signature of a bilateral Peace Accord in Dakar in March 2008, Chad-Sudan relations remained tense, and worsened when Chad-based Sudanese rebels attacked Khartoum in May. The MPS majority party coalition likewise is in no hurry to go to elections. It already controls Parliament and makes the laws. Its Parliamentary deputies enjoy all the perquisites of power, including their handsome salaries and benefits. It is confident of winning the planned elections, but is agnostic on the actual date of those elections. Finally, the CPDC minority coalition also does not always feel the urgency of NDJAMENA 00000070 003.2 OF 003 progress toward elections that it believes it will lose in any case. Meanwhile its deputies receive their salaries and benefits until that election takes place. It should be noted that all members of the Committee itself receive an additional emolument, which they will lose when elections happen, an additional motive for restraint on their part. ==================================== EU, FRENCH STILL SUPPORT THE PROCESS ==================================== ¶10. (SBU) Given the state of affairs and based on prior experience with the Chadian parties, the European Union and the French, who have been the most active and concrete supporters of the process, recently have started to admit privately that Chad will not hold elections in 2009. But they are unwilling to give up on the August 13 Accord process itself and will continue to work with and support the Chadian parties on the road to communal and legislative elections in the first half of 2010. Other international supporters of the process ) Germany, the UN, the AU, the Francophonie, all agree with the EU and French on this. ======= COMMENT ======= ¶11. (SBU) It is unfortunate that communal and legislative elections look to be delayed until 2010. But it is good that progress toward them continues, though more slowly than we would like. The August 13 Accord is still the best vehicle available for advancing a democratic agenda in Chad. The USG should stay solidly in step with our partners, both Chadian and international, to support and encourage the electoral reform process and to ensure the first round of elections in early 2010. We believe that continued USG financial assistance to the general census, and also, if possible, to the electoral census, will be the most convincing demonstration of our commitment to accompany Chad along the (dusty, pot-holed, and largely unpaved) road toward better governance and democratic political practice. As we wait for the Committee to hear from its panel, we will remain in contact with other observers to consider a coordinated response when and if the Government of Chad announces elections will not take place this year. END COMMENT. NIGRO