CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE: FORMIN FAKI TO LEAD CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000617 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF MARR MASS SU CD SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE: FORMIN FAKI TO LEAD CHAD DELEGATION TO KHARTOUM DEC 24 REF: A. NDJAMENA 601 ¶B. LONDON 2820 ¶C. NDJAMENA 591 ¶D. NDJAMENA 586 Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- FAKI TO KHARTOUM -------------- ¶1. (C) Chad FORMIN Faki will lead a Chad delegation to Khartoum December 24, as the next step in the ongoing bilateral detente process, Chad AMB to Washington Bechir told Ambassador and DCM December 23 that he and the MFA Military Advisor would accompany FORMIN Faki, as would the Governors of Chad's four regions that border Darfur. The visit would therefore be a serious, working visit, not a matter of protocol and empty rhetoric, as far as the GOC was concerned, Bechir said. -------------- PURSUING DETENTE -------------- ¶2. (C) Bechir said that the trip was aimed at verifying that the GOS had duly "cantoned" most Chad rebels in Sudan far enough from the border to allay GOC fears of imminent attack (which the GOC believes that the GOS has in fact done). The GOC delegation would also deliver the message that, while cantoning was a good first step in ending the "proxy war" between the two neighbors, the GOC expected the GOS to tell its Chad rebel clients that this was "the beginning of the end for them as armed rebels." The GOC expected the GOS to insist that its clients choose between peaceful reentry into Chad, or giving up arms and staying in Sudan, or moving elsewhere. Bechir said that the GOC had "excellent sources of information" among the Chad rebels in Sudan, "right to the very top," so that the GOC would know when the GOS was telling it the truth or not. So far, Bechir said, the GOS has been telling the Chad rebels that its cantoning of them and its dealing with the GOC were just "temporary measures." Such double-dealing could not continue, Bechir asserted. -------------- THE GOC AND JEM -------------- ¶3. (C) Bechir said that the GOC for its part had been telling its "proxy war" client, the JEM, that the JEM's only future role was as a peaceful part of a negotiated solution to the Darfur crisis, and that eventually, when Chad-Sudan relations were normalized, the JEM would no longer be tolerated as an armed group in Chad. ¶4. (C) If satisfied that the GOS was doing its bit in good faith, i.e., ceasing to arm and equip its Chad rebel clients and preparing them for "demobilization" as an armed rebellion, the GOC would take action to "evict" JEM and proceed to further verification measures, including border monitoring, joint patrolling with Sudanese forces, etc. Bechir reiterated that Chad had been patient, and that it remained "willing to go step by verifiable step" with the Sudanese. ¶5. (C) Bechir said that the GOC had been distancing itself from JEM for some time, which the JEM did not appreciate and which could be the source of threats to regime stability and to President Deby personally. "We are prepared to close the file on the JEM," Bechir said, "but we have to be very careful about when and how." The Deby-JEM relationship was very complex, Bechir stated, recalling how the GOC's military operations against the JEM in 2003-2204 had caused deep resentment with the Deby family and clan, as well as the wider Zaghawa ethnic group, which had resulted in attempts on the President's life. Bechir said that when the moment for Deby to break definitively with JEM came, the President had to be "prepared for war, because the JEM will fight us, and NDJAMENA 00000617 002 OF 002 they will have allies inside Chad." Even so, Bechir asserted, Deby remained prepared to continue to take the risk entailed in "kicking the JEM out of Chad," but only if he could be sure that the GOS had equally definitively ended the Chad rebellion inside Sudan. "If Sudan can still play the Chad rebel card," Bechir concluded, "then we cannot afford not to be able to play the JEM card." -------------- USG AND BORDER MONITORING -------------- ¶6. (C) Bechir asked whether the U.S. would be able to assist with monitoring of the Chad-Sudan border, along the lines discussed with General Gration last summer, if the two sides reached agreement that a monitoring mission was in order. President Deby "had been expecting" the U.S. administration to show an interest in border monitoring, given the high priority Washington seemed to place on resolution of Sudan's problems. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) That the Chadians are going to Khartoum is very good news and demonstrates Chadian commitment to normalized relations. Bechir's comments on Deby-JEM relationship confirm our own analysis of the complexity of their ties and the danger that intra-Zaghawa conflict poses for Deby and the GOC. We recall SE Gration's exploration of a possible USG role in border monitoring in discussions here with the GOC, the French, and MINURCAT; we think the USG should consider ways it might, perhaps along with other international partners, play a role in border monitoring to verify the end of the "proxy war" -- long been a key USG goal in the region. ¶8. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO