CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE: FORMIN FAKI TO LEAD CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000617

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF MARR MASS SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE: FORMIN FAKI TO LEAD CHAD
DELEGATION TO KHARTOUM DEC 24

REF: A. NDJAMENA 601

B. LONDON 2820

C. NDJAMENA 591

D. NDJAMENA 586

Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

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FAKI TO KHARTOUM
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1. (C) Chad FORMIN Faki will lead a Chad delegation to
Khartoum December 24, as the next step in the ongoing
bilateral detente process, Chad AMB to Washington Bechir told
Ambassador and DCM December 23 that he and the MFA Military
Advisor would accompany FORMIN Faki, as would the Governors
of Chad's four regions that border Darfur. The visit would
therefore be a serious, working visit, not a matter of
protocol and empty rhetoric, as far as the GOC was concerned,
Bechir said.

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PURSUING DETENTE
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2. (C) Bechir said that the trip was aimed at verifying that
the GOS had duly "cantoned" most Chad rebels in Sudan far
enough from the border to allay GOC fears of imminent attack
(which the GOC believes that the GOS has in fact done). The
GOC delegation would also deliver the message that, while
cantoning was a good first step in ending the "proxy war"
between the two neighbors, the GOC expected the GOS to tell
its Chad rebel clients that this was "the beginning of the
end for them as armed rebels." The GOC expected the GOS to
insist that its clients choose between peaceful reentry into
Chad, or giving up arms and staying in Sudan, or moving
elsewhere. Bechir said that the GOC had "excellent sources of
information" among the Chad rebels in Sudan, "right to the
very top," so that the GOC would know when the GOS was
telling it the truth or not. So far, Bechir said, the GOS
has been telling the Chad rebels that its cantoning of them
and its dealing with the GOC were just "temporary measures."
Such double-dealing could not continue, Bechir asserted.

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THE GOC AND JEM
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3. (C) Bechir said that the GOC for its part had been
telling its "proxy war" client, the JEM, that the JEM's only
future role was as a peaceful part of a negotiated solution
to the Darfur crisis, and that eventually, when Chad-Sudan
relations were normalized, the JEM would no longer be
tolerated as an armed group in Chad.


4. (C) If satisfied that the GOS was doing its bit in good
faith, i.e., ceasing to arm and equip its Chad rebel clients
and preparing them for "demobilization" as an armed
rebellion, the GOC would take action to "evict" JEM and
proceed to further verification measures, including border
monitoring, joint patrolling with Sudanese forces, etc.
Bechir reiterated that Chad had been patient, and that it
remained "willing to go step by verifiable step" with the
Sudanese.


5. (C) Bechir said that the GOC had been distancing itself
from JEM for some time, which the JEM did not appreciate and
which could be the source of threats to regime stability and
to President Deby personally. "We are prepared to close the
file on the JEM," Bechir said, "but we have to be very
careful about when and how." The Deby-JEM relationship was
very complex, Bechir stated, recalling how the GOC's military
operations against the JEM in 2003-2204 had caused deep
resentment with the Deby family and clan, as well as the
wider Zaghawa ethnic group, which had resulted in attempts on
the President's life. Bechir said that when the moment for
Deby to break definitively with JEM came, the President had
to be "prepared for war, because the JEM will fight us, and

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they will have allies inside Chad." Even so, Bechir
asserted, Deby remained prepared to continue to take the risk
entailed in "kicking the JEM out of Chad," but only if he
could be sure that the GOS had equally definitively ended the
Chad rebellion inside Sudan. "If Sudan can still play the
Chad rebel card," Bechir concluded, "then we cannot afford
not to be able to play the JEM card."

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USG AND BORDER
MONITORING
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6. (C) Bechir asked whether the U.S. would be able to
assist with monitoring of the Chad-Sudan border, along the
lines discussed with General Gration last summer, if the two
sides reached agreement that a monitoring mission was in
order. President Deby "had been expecting" the U.S.
administration to show an interest in border monitoring,
given the high priority Washington seemed to place on
resolution of Sudan's problems.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) That the Chadians are going to Khartoum is very good
news and demonstrates Chadian commitment to normalized
relations. Bechir's comments on Deby-JEM relationship
confirm our own analysis of the complexity of their ties and
the danger that intra-Zaghawa conflict poses for Deby and the
GOC. We recall SE Gration's exploration of a possible USG
role in border monitoring in discussions here with the GOC,
the French, and MINURCAT; we think the USG should consider
ways it might, perhaps along with other international
partners, play a role in border monitoring to verify the end
of the "proxy war" -- long been a key USG goal in the region.


8. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO