JEM-KHALIL OUTLINES STATEGY MOVING FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000060 SIPDIS LONDON FOR POL: LORD PARIS FOR POL: D'ELIA AND KANEDA KINSHASA PASS BRAZZAVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF UN AU SU CD SUBJECT: JEM-KHALIL OUTLINES STATEGY MOVING FORWARD Classified By: Ambassador Louis Nigro for reason 1.4 (d) ======= SUMMARY ======= ¶1. (C) JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim told the Ambassador February 25 that he was satisfied with the Doha Agreement and that he would return to Darfur to recruit other potential stakeholders from rebel groups, civil society, refugees, and IDPs, to form a broader JEM-led delegation for the next session, in about 45 days. He claimed that JEM was now the sole effective armed rebel force in Darfur; that the SAF was reduced to aerial operations only; and that JEM was facing off successfully against the SAF and its allies: janjaweed, militias, and Chadian rebel groups. He also said he believed Sudan's government was divided and had not fully committed to the peace process. He said he viewed Egypt and Libya as potential spoilers to the peace process and asked the US to urge them not to be destructive. Finally, he suggested that a no-fly zone would protect civilians and send an important message, because "the government of Sudan understands only force." ¶2. (C) Khalil revealed elements of what seems to be his post-Doha strategy: to form a JEM-led broad-based delegation for the next round of talks; to position JEM as the dominant military force in Darfur; to head off any attempt to weaken the Doha process; and to increase pressure on the the Sudanese government by painting it as obstructionist while the ICC indictment complicates life for the Khartoum regime. His challenge will be to engage other Darfuris - compromising if necessary - to bring together a delegation that can credibly represent not only Zaghawa Darfur rebels, but also other significant ethnic groups (especially the Fur),civil society, refugees and IDPs, and other Darfur stakeholders. If he can form such a coalition, the Sudanese government may find it more difficult to deal with its opponents by exploiting divisions among them. ¶3. (C) Implications for Chad: The GOC must be very happy with the current Darfur situation, at least as described by Khalil, and with Khalil's apparent strategy for the next few months. The GOC would benefit from a militarily strong JEM confronting the SAF and its allies, and has to be pleased to hear that JEM is bloodying Chadian rebels inside Darfur, both because that saps the rebels militarily and also because it reinforces their portrayal of Chadian rebels as mercenaries in Khartoum's pay. The GOC shares the JEM's view of the GOS as increasingly underperforming and losing control of events in Sudan and the ICC decision looms. END SUMMARY. ¶4. (C) Khalil Ibrahim, chairman of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM-Khalil),met with the Ambassador on February ¶25. Party speaker Tahir Adam El Faki, economic advisor (and Khalil's brother) Gibril Ibrahim, spokesman Ahmed Hussein Adam, and Foreign Minister Bushara Suliman Nur attended from JEM-Khalil; the DCM, poloff, and pol/miloff also sat in. ========================================== JEM to seek input from other Darfur groups ========================================== ¶5. (C) Khalil said that he was satisfied with the Doha Agreement and thanked the USG for its support of the talks. He outlined his next steps: to return to Darfur to recruit other potential stakeholders from rebel groups, civil society, refugees, and IDPs, to form a broader JEM-led delegation for the next session, in about 45 days. He stated that JEM would use the interim period to seek consensus among the broader Darfur community, including civil society, tribal groups, politicians, IDPs and refugees, and "so-called movements." He said that JEM-Khalil would try to send an inclusive delegation -- as many as 50 people -- to the next round of Doha talks. ¶6. (C) Since the Doha agreement, Khalil said, many people in Darfur had joined JEM. His faction was ready to involve all stakeholders in Darfur, he stated. He said he hoped the next round of discussions would be between the GNU and a JEM-led coalition, within which other groups would maintain their own identity. The problem of Darfur was complex, Khalil said, with internal conflicts in both Sudan and Chad, and tensions between the governments of Chad and Sudan as each armed rebel groups to fight the other. "We need a regional peace that involves all the parties." ===================================== "The GNU just wants to play for time" NDJAMENA 00000060 002 OF 003 ===================================== ¶7. (C) The Government of National Unity (GNU) wanted a cheap agreement that would relieve international pressure on Sudanese President Bashir, Khalil said, but it was not interested in actually solving the problems in Darfur. At the moment, he stated, everyone was waiting to see whether the ICC would indict Bashir, and how news of that announcement might play out. Bashir and other key regime officials, including Nafie al Nafie, Salah Ghosh, and the Minister of Defense should all answer to the ICC, he declared; "They are practicing genocide." ¶8. (C) Sudan had continued to attack both JEM and civilians directly and through its proxy forces since the Doha Agreement was signed, Khalil said. El Faki stated that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had launched attacks against JEM on February 12, 18, 19, and 21 and continued aerial attacks. "There is no cease-fire -- they are bombing us day and night." Khalil reported that JEM was not ready for a cease-fire, because it had demanded political concessions first. It would remain on the strategic defensive, he continued, but would react and respond when attacked. Khalil stated that JEM had defeated the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its proxies, including janjaweed militia, popular militia groups, Chadian rebels, and other Darfur rebels, including Minni Minnawi's faction. "Minni has been completely disarmed." Chadian rebel groups supported by the GNU include Timan Erdimi's Zaghawa forces and Adouma Hassaballah's Ouaddai group. Khalil stated he expected the attacks to continue, as the GNU was lavishing its proxy forces with money, but that the SAF was now restricting its offensive operations to aerial attacks. ¶9. (C) Gibril Ibrahim concurred that the GNU was acting in bad faith, citing the prisoner release mandated by the Agreement. It had released only criminals and low-level JEM prisoners arrested by the GNU after the May 2008 JEM attacks on Omdurman, not the key figures that JEM had expected, according to Gibril. "The releases are sending a message that the government of Sudan is not serious about peace." (Note: It is widely believed that JEM-Khalil's primary interest in the prisoners is Khalil's half-brother Abdel Aziz el-Nur Asher, arrested by the GNU and sentenced to death for his role in the attack on Omdurman. End Note.) ¶10. (C) Party Spokesman Ahmed Hussein Adam emphasized divisions within the GNU delegation to the Doha talks. He observed that although the GNU delegation included two SPLM members, only the delegates from Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) seemed engaged in the negotiations. The GNU had not taken the decisions to fully commit to the peace process, he stated. "The entire GNU must participate in the process, not just the NCP." Ahmed also speculated on divisions within the NCP; he said he thought that the security forces were a threat to the political process and opposed the Doha talks. ============================================= == Libya and Egypt are potential regional spoilers ============================================= == ¶11. (C) Khalil stated that Libya and Egypt were not happy with the Doha talks, and that they might seek to disrupt the agreement. "We aren't sure Egypt has the teeth to sabotage the process," he said, "but Libya might." He speculated that Libya might try to host a round of talk to compete with the Doha process. He asked that the USG deliver a clear message to Libya and Egypt to support the Doha process, stating "All regional players need to be on the same page." Khalil stated his faction had spoken to the Government of Chad (GOC) and that it supported the Doha process. =============== Looking forward =============== ¶12. (C) The US could help the peace process, Khalil said, by convincing Bashir that peace was the best outcome. He requested additional humanitarian support for the JEM, including support for JEM schools. Finally, he made a pitch for a no-fly zone over Darfur: "A no-fly zone is a possibility to protect civilians. The Government of Sudan understands only force -- and not in the abstract, only in practice." ======= COMMENT ======= ¶13. (C) Khalil's Forward Strategy: Khalil revealed elements NDJAMENA 00000060 003 OF 003 of what appears to be his post-Doha strategy: to form a JEM-led broad-based delegation for the next round of talks; to position JEM as the dominant military force in Darfur; to head off any attempt to weaken the Doha process; and to increase pressure on the the Sudanese government by painting it as obstructionist while the ICC indictment complicates life for the Khartoum regime. Khalil's dismissal of other Darfur rebel groups as "so-called movements" indicates his intent to remain the key player in negotations with the GNU. His challenge will be to engage other Darfuris - compromising if necessary - to bring together a delegation that can credibly represent not only Zaghawa Darfur rebels, but also other significant ethnic groups (especially the Fur),civil society, refugees and IDPs, and other Darfur stakeholders. The success of his plan will depend in large part on whether he can build a coalition as effectively as he can strategize and communicate. If he can form such a coalition, the Sudanese government may find it more difficult to deal with its opponents by exploiting divisions among them. ¶14. (C) Implications for Chad: The GOC must be very happy with the current Darfur situation, at least as described by Khalil, and with Khalil's apparent strategy for the next few months. The GOC would benefit from a militarily strong JEM confronting the SAF and its allies, and has to be pleased to hear that JEM is bloodying Chadian rebels inside Darfur, both because that saps the rebels militarily and also because it reinforces their portrayal of Chadian rebels as mercenaries in Khartoum's pay. The GOC shares the JEM's view of the GOS as increasingly underperforming and losing control of events in Sudan and the ICC decision looms. END COMMENT. NIGRO