HOW TO THINK ABOUT CHAD: ASSESSING CHAD'S PROGRESS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000591 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID PREF EU FR US CD SUBJECT: HOW TO THINK ABOUT CHAD: ASSESSING CHAD'S PROGRESS REGARDING USG STRATEGIC GOALS FROM 2007-2009 REF: A. YAOUNDE 971 ¶B. NDJAMENA 406 NDJAMENA 00000591 001.4 OF 004 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Chad of December 2009 is not the Chad of December 2007. Much has happened in the intervening two years and the Chad's overall trajectory has generally been positive, when viewed in terms of USG bilateral and regional strategic goals. Any punctual assessment of USG policy toward Chad should be informed by appreciation of Chad's progress over the past two years across the range of U.S. strategic policy goals, which include humanitarian assistance, regional stability, democracy and good governance, human rights, and counter-terrorism/anti-extremism. Chad's progress has not been uniform in all areas and much remains to be done to satisfy all USG goals and objectives in Chad and the region. ¶2. (SBU) Chad's annus horribilis was 2008; the country's political system reached its nadir in February of that year, when armed rebel attacks, barely repulsed by the GOC, exposed at once Chad's diplomatic isolation, the weaknesses of the Chadian political system, and the vulnerability of the Deby regime. Since then, partly due to lack of alternatives and partly in response to international demands, including those of the USG, Chad has made strides in areas relevant to USG strategic interests: -- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: Chad hosts 250,000 Sudanese refugees, 110,000 IDPs, a massive humanitarian assistance operation and the UN PKO MINURCAT. -- REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY: Chad has pursued every available multilateral approach aimed at normalizing Chad-Sudan relations and ending the proxy war. Chad has reconciled with major elements of the armed rebellion and former regime opponents, including Soubiane and Goukouni. Chad has patiently pursued a bilateral track with Khartoum also aimed at normalization with Sudan and ending the proxy war. The GOC has distanced itself from JEM rebels in Chad. -- DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: The GOC has broadened its base to include senior opposition party leaders. The August 13 political and electoral reform process has progressed to where Chad is poised for credible legislative and municipal elections in 2010. President Deby has put the full weight of the GOC and his own personal prestige behind the goal of the 2010 elections. The GOC has reestablished normal relations with IFIs and improved its public revenue management and budgetary postures. The GOC has invested heavily in basic infrastructure projects and is conducting significant campaigns aimed at fighting official corruption and promoting environmental protection and food security. -- HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: While its overall human rights record remains poor (with impunity still the major problem),Chad has improved adherence to some international standards, particularly with regard to child soldiers and gender-based violence. The Chadian press is effectively free of GOC interference and criticizes the government and President Deby freely and pointedly, despite the continued existence of "Ordinance Five," an emergency measure that could limit press freedom and that has outlived whatever usefulness it may once have had. -- COUNTER-TERRORISM AND ANTI-EXTREMISM: The GOC's record on religious tolerance is excellent. Chad remains a willing and forthcoming partner in USG efforts to ensure that terrorism and extremism do not become rooted in the Sahelian region. ¶3. (SBU) Chad's generally and incrementally positive trajectory over the past two years is no accident, and the GOC deserves credit for what it has accomplished -- albeit starting from a low base line. Such progress, however NDJAMENA 00000591 002.4 OF 004 limited and incomplete, should not be taken for granted in the region, to say the least. Neighboring Cameroon, for instance. has drifted or gone backward in areas that involve USG strategic interests in that country, according to Embassy Yaounde (Ref A),which regards the country's trajectory as generally if not irretrievably retrograde. Embassy NDjamena's reporting over the past two years amply documents the incremental progress that Chad has made, as well as the many and serious deficiencies that still need be addressed in order that USG strategic goals can be more fully achieved, both bilaterally and regionally. We supply references to our past reporting below. END SUMMARY. -------------- HUMANITARIAN AND PKO ASSISTANCE: COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL (AND OUR) EFFORTS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Despite the internal political and socio-economic stresses involved, and especially over the objections of influential neighboring states, the GOC welcomed Sudanese refugees from the beginning of the Darfur crisis: Chad has never refused to accept Sudanese refugees and has never tried to return them to Sudan against their will. The GOC adapted its refugee coordination mechanism -- CNAR, established in 1996 to manage pre-Darfur refugee crises -- to the needs of the Darfur refugees. It has consistently worked closely with the international community to improve conditions of refugees and IDPs. ¶5. (SBU) Also over the objections of influential neighbors, Chad has closely cooperated with the desire of the international community to provide security for civilians in Chad, including refugees and humanitarian workers. It has welcomed two peacekeeping operations under UN mandate, the EU force EUFOR in 2008 and the UN's MINURCAT in 2009. The GOC established a new coordination mechanism, CONAFIT, to ensure effective collaboration with international peacekeeping efforts. In addition to other duties, MINURCAT trains Chadian police officers, the DIS, who provide security inside refugee camps. The GOC has recently promoted local coordination councils in Eastern Chad to conjugate the efforts of local officials, police, gendarmes, nomad patrols, sultans and village/tribal elders with those of MINURCAT and DIS to improve security for humanitarian aid workers. (References: Ndjamena 588, 542, and 539). -------------- REGIONAL SECURITY: CHAD-SUDAN -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Chad has pursued every available multilateral approach aimed at normalizing Chad-Sudan relations. Chad participated seriously in the Dakar Accord process and with AU, Libyan, and Qatari attempts to mediate between Chad and Sudan. Chad has patiently pursued a bilateral track with Khartoum also aimed at normalization and ending the proxy war through confidence-building measure to assure both sides that the other's territory will not be used by respective anti-regime rebels. In preparation for this, the GOC has distanced itself from JEM rebels in Chad, including by moving to close the primary JEM recruiting center in Chad and by pressuring JEM to join international negotiations aimed at a peaceful solution in Darfur. (References: Ndjamena 562, 536, 485, 479, 462, 466, and 447.). ¶7. (SBU) Chad has reconciled with major elements of the armed rebellion and former regime opponents. Chad's National Mediator, whose mandate involves crisis resolution and negotiation with leaders in exile, has worked assiduously to encourage return of former rebels opposed to GoC and ensuring that Chadian Diaspora and former regime opponents are reintegrated into political life. Most recently, armed rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane and former president and regime opponent Goukouni Oueddei returned to Chad and vowed to participate peacefully in efforts toward complete "national NDJAMENA 00000591 003.4 OF 004 reconciliation." The total number of returned and reconciled rebel fighters is in the three to four thousand range, significantly weakening the military effectiveness of those who remain in Sudan. (References: Ndjamena 503, 457, and 353). -------------- DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE -------------- ¶8. (SBU) ELECTIONS: Chad is now poised to hold credible legislative and municipal elections in 2010. The process of implementing the August 13, 2007 Accord has produced positive results, and many of the essential building blocks for elections are in place. On December 4 President Deby put the full weight of the GoC -- itself long broadened to include senior opposition figure -- and his own personal prestige on the line behind the goal of credible 2010 contests. The Chadians have gotten this far thanks to the willingness of their international democratic partners -- the USG, France, the EU, the UN and others -- to advise and support them, politically and financially. Continued commitment on the part of these partners will be essential to reaching the goal of credible legislative/municipal elections in 2010. ¶9. (SBU) PUBLIC REVENUE MANAGEMENT: The GOC has reestablished normal relations with IFIs and improved its public revenue management and budgetary postures. President Deby met with senior officials at both IMF and World Bank on the margins of the UNGA in September 2009. The IMF is engaged and supportive of Chad's efforts to increase control over extra-budgetary spending. Despite the GOC's poor performance under previous programs, the Fund has offered to allow Chad more time to meet targets and continues to be supportive of helping Chad achieve Highly-Indebted Poor Country debt relief. In October 2009, the World Bank announced commitment to restart development programs in Chad. ¶10. (SBU) ANTI-CORRUPTION: The Ministry of Morality is aggressively investigating many allegations of official corruption; senior GOC officials including Ministers and those close to President are detained and being questioned. There has been considerable media focus on corruption, reflecting broad public buy-in for the GOC's anti-corruption efforts. (References: Ndjamena 557 and 431). ¶11. (SBU) INFRASTRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT, FOOD SECURITY: The GOC has invested heavily in basic infrastructure projects and is conducting significant campaigns aimed at fighting deforestation, climate change, and promoting environmental protection and increasing food security. (References: Ndjamena 586, 501, 467, 461, 460, 458, 448, 441 and 424). -------------- HUMAN RIGHTS: CHILD SOLDIERS, AND GBV, PRESS FREEDOM -------------- ¶12. (SBU) While its overall human rights record remains poor (with impunity still the major problem),Chad has improved adherence to some international standards, particularly with regard to child soldiers and gender-based violence. Responding to international concerns, the GoC conducted reviews of military camps to eliminate use of child soldiers and sensitize military and law enforcement personnel to human rights standards. UNICEF, the GOC's main partner in addressing child-soldier problem, has praised GoC efforts. With assistance of UNFPA, GoC has launched recent public campaigns to address underage marriage, rape and other violence against women, FGM, sexual harassment, and exploitation of girls, and to promote keeping girls in school. (References: Chad Country Report on Human Rights, Ndjamena 576 and 362). ¶13. (SBU) Chad's press enjoys considerable de facto NDJAMENA 00000591 004.4 OF 004 freedom, and devotes much energy to free and pointed criticism of President Deby, as well as other national and international targets. Ordinance Five, an emergency measure enacted during period of rebel activity in 2008 giving the government power to restrict freedom of press related to the violent rebellion, remains on the books, although it has not been used against journalists. Draft legislation to modify or rescind Ordinance Five is pending among various Chadian Ministries. (References: Chad Country Report on Human Rights, NDjamena 576, 409, 362, and 260). -------------- COUNTER-TERRORISM AND ANTI-EXTREMISM -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The GOC's record on religious tolerance is excellent. Chad remains a willing and forthcoming partner in USG efforts to ensure that terrorism and extremism do not become rooted in the Sahelian region. The GOC strongly encourages and defends religious tolerance and pluralism among Chad's 54 percent Muslim/44 percent Christian population. (Reference: Chad Religious Freedom Report.) NIGRO