C-130 AIRCRAFT FOR CHAD: EMBASSY NDJAMENA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000540 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES STATE FOR AF/RSA DOD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019 TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV ECON PREF PTER EFIN SU LY CD SUBJECT: C-130 AIRCRAFT FOR CHAD: EMBASSY NDJAMENA PERSPECTIVE REF: A. AFFO/WYCOFF-NDJ EMAIL 11/13 ¶B. AFC/MCKEEL-NDJ EMAIL 11/10 Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR, FOR 1.4 (B) and (D) -------------- EMBASSY SUPPORTS SALE -------------- ¶1. (C) Embassy N'Djamena supports USG assistance to help Chad meet its legitimate needs for military air transport along the lines proposed Ref B, namely the package of C-130Rs, C-130Fs, and maintenance services at a cost of about USD 115 million. The visit here of an interagency assessment team, as requested by the Government of Chad, would facilitate sharing of technical information regarding Chadian Air Force capacity and C-130R aircraft capabilities. -------------- LEGITIMATE CIVIL AND MILITARY NEEDS -------------- ¶2. (C) Embassy NDjamena believes that provision of such non-combat military transport aircraft to the GOC would meet legitimate Chadian needs, both civilian and military. Regarding civilian needs, these military transport aircraft could (and we believe would) be utilized by the Government of Chad to provide vital services to civilian populations, especially in Chad's remote and isolated northern and eastern regions, where travel by road is difficult and at times impossible. Medical, educational, and other services could be provided to civilian populations otherwise excluded from such services. ¶3. (C) Regarding legitimate military needs, military transport aircraft could help Chad defend its eastern frontier against rebel attacks, enable Chad to cooperate more effectively with international peacekeeping operations to ensure the security of civilians in eastern Chad, and provide a lift capability for eventual counter-terrorist operations in Chad's vast, ungoverned, or under-governed Saharan spaces. -------------- GOC ABILITY TO PAY -------------- ¶4. (C) Embassy NDjamena believes that the GOC may well be able to afford the proposed air transport package, depending on how payment is spread over time. Although the GOC's public revenues were down sharply in 2009 because of lower crude oil prices, the GOC and the IMF have agreed on a 2010 budget that calls for revenues of USD 1.3 billion and ;expenditure of USD 1.6 billion. Because about 75 percent of Chad public revenues come from oil revenue, this budget is consonant with oil revenues in 2010 of USD 800-900 million, which we believe to be reasonable estimates, depending on the world price of crude oil in 2010. Consultation between the GOC and the IMF on how the cost of these aircraft might be accommodated in the 2010 and subsequent cycles would contribute to USG ability to approve the sale. (By way of comparison, we note that the GOC earned about USD 1.2 billion in 2008 from oil revenues and looks to earn about 500-550 million in 2009 from oil.) -------------- MOVING THE GOC FORWARD IN THE RIGHT DIRECTIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) Embassy N'Djamena believes that providing assistance to the GOC to purchase military air transport reinforces broader USG goals in Chad and in the region by encouraging the GOC to continue to make progress regarding international humanitarian assistance and international peacekeeping efforts in eastern Chad; regarding Chad-Sudan detente and ending of the bilateral "proxy war" as a precondition to restoring regional stability by resolving the Darfur crisis; regarding the internal political reform and electoral reform process, aimed at credible legislative elections in 2010; regarding good governance and human rights in the areas of anti-corruption and TIP issues, including child soldiers. NDJAMENA 00000540 002 OF 003 -------------- GOC SUPPORT FOR USG SUDAN POLICY -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOC has been helpful to USG goals in Sudan and the region by: -- Cooperating actively and effectively with the massive humanitarian effort on behalf of Sudanese refugees and Chadian IDPs in eastern Chad, for which the USG finances nearly half of all humanitarian activities; -- Cooperating actively and effectively with the both the 2007-09 EU PKO and the current UN PKO MINURCAT charged with protecting civilians in eastern Chad; -- Cooperating actively and effectively with all international efforts to improve Chad-Sudan relations: UN, AU, Dakar Accord, Libyan, Qatari efforts, etc; -- Pursuing a bilateral path to detente with Sudan based on the Chad-Sudan 2006 Protocol, including ending the Chad-Sudan so-called "proxy war" and offering to the Sudanese carte blanche to visit eastern Chad to confirm that no bases exist there for Sudanese rebels; -- Supporting SE Gration's Darfur peace efforts by encouraging Sudanese rebels, especially JEM rebels, to enter serious negotiations with other Darfur groups aimed at peace in the region; -------------- GOC PROGRESS ON USG DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE GOALS -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOC has made progress on a range of good governance and human rights issues, including: -- Progress toward credible legislative and local elections in 2010, according to the criteria of the August 13 Accord on political and electoral reform: Census results have been published; an Independent Electoral Commission has been created; the Electoral Reform Committee is conducting nation-wide civic education campaign; President Deby has publicly committed to elections in 2010, etc; -- Progress toward national reconciliation with return of ex-rebel leader Soubiane and hundreds of his fighters and the definitive return of former President and regime opponent Goukouni Oueddei, both of whom pledged to remain engaged in GOC's political reconciliation efforts; -- Progress on the Child Soldiers issue, with all captured rebel child soldiers handed over to UNICEF and GOC engaged with UNICEF and MINURCAT to identify child soldiers in Chad Government forces, including visits to military camps and training facilities; -- Progress on public revenue management, with relations normalized with the World Bank and agreement with the IMF on a staff-monitored program and a 2010 budget; -- Renewed efforts to investigate and prosecute allegations of official corruption, including among the highest levels of the political class. -------------- GOC READINESS TO RESTART COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION -------------- ¶8. (C) The GOC is poised to restart counter-terrorism military assistance cooperation, including transferring the CT battalions to a new chain-of-command structure and even replacing the Joint Chief of staff, at USG behest. By ensuring the CT battalions did not participate in the normal Chadian military's eastern border rotations and a majority of other defense related tasks since training ended in January 2008 the GOC has ensured that the CT battalions were ready to NDJAMENA 00000540 003 OF 003 begin training with US forces upon their return. ¶9. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO