CHAD/DOHA: THE IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT HERE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000054 E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV KPKO UN AU CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD/DOHA: THE IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT HERE REF: A. KHARTOUM 226 ¶B. KHARTOUM 212 ¶C. KHARTOUM 117 Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Ndjamena salutes Embassy Khartoum's intelligent and thoroughgoing analysis of the Doha Agreement (REF A),with which we by and large concur. We have a slightly different take on some of its Chad-related features. We doubt that both the Deby regime and the Chad rebels can both be losers as a result of Doha. We think that the Doha Process might offer the Deby regime some attractive outcomes, in the shorter and longer terms, depending on how future developments affect the regime's relations with the GOS, the JEM, and the Chad rebels. We agree that this might be the right moment for the USG to re-engage with the Chadian rebels, with a refined message and perhaps even the offer to observe any talks. We have urged the GOC to join the Doha Process by participating in the next round of talks at least as an observer, by ending its material support for JEM, and by encouraging other Sudanese rebel groups in Chad to join the Process. We have also urged the GOC to meet apparent Chad rebel offers to talk by proposing a concrete venue for talks without preconditions, perhaps with international observers, which might include the U.S. among others. The GOC responded by insisting that Bassole provide it with an invitation to observe the next Doha session, and agreed to consult with us on modalities for GOC-Chad rebel talks. We support requesting that Bassole offer an invitation to the GoC for the next Doha Round. We will speak with the Foreign Minister tomorrow along these lines. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Winners and Losers: Embassy Ndjamena salutes Embassy Khartoum's intelligent and thoroughgoing analysis of the Doha Agreement (REF A),with which we by and large concur. We have a slightly different take on some of its Chad-related features. It is hard for us to understand, for instance, how the Doha Agreement can be bad both for the GOC and the Chad rebels at the same time, as REF A concludes. Theirs is a zero-sum game, at least at this point: if the rebels stand to lose by the Agreement, the GOC stands to gain, and vice versa. For instance, if JEM and the GOS agree to a durable cease-fire or to ending hostilities altogether as they continue along the Doha Process, then at a minimum Deby saves money, because this would lessen JEM's need for support from him. (We believe that the GOC gives more limited support to other Sudanese rebel groups, like the SLM and NMRD, so it could continue to stoke anti-GOS rebel action if it liked, even if it ended such support to JEM.) ¶3. (C) The same logic holds for GOS reducing or ending support for Chad rebels, or moving to use them internally in some way. Such a shift would give Deby respite in the lead-up to the onset of the next rainy season this summer, which will itself push the possibility of a military confrontation in Chad even further down the road. (Even so, we should do not ignore the possibility that Deby might reckon that he would be better off dealing with the Chadian rebels this year, after his recent expensive military buildup, rather than waiting until next year when declines in oil revenues may reduce his military spending abilities.) ¶4. (C ) Deby's Preferred Outcomes: We believe that several conceivable outcomes would be attractive or acceptable to Deby, such as destruction of the rebels as a fighting force by his army, or a GOS decision for any reason to end support for the Chad rebels, or continued division within the rebel ranks sufficient to retard or prevent united and coordinated rebel attacks on Chadian government forces. But looking beyond such short- and medium-term fixes, we judge that an end-state in which JEM effectively ruled in Darfur would eliminate the potential for the region to serve as a base for Chad rebels and would put a Deby ally in charge of his sensitive and strategic eastern border. ¶5. (C) GOC and Chad Rebels: We agree with Embassy Khartoum that the Doha Agreement could/could weaken the Chadian rebels. Such a development might lead to renewed interest among the rebels and the GOC for talks. We do not know where such talks might lead, but as REF B correctly notes, the time that the GOC and the rebels spend talking gives the GOC respite, which is useful to Deby and might increase disarray within rebel ranks, as talks would give the rebel chieftains an additional opportunity to jockey for position. ¶6. (C) Time for Talks: For these reasons, we believe that now is the right time for the USG to re-engage with the rebels, and to push hard for GoC-rebel talks. Both Chadian FM Moussa Faki Mahamat and Deputy FM Djidda Moussa Outman have insisted to us in recent meetings that the GoC is ready to talk to the rebel groups, including the new URF coalition, either on the basis of the Sirte Accords of October 2007, or on some other basis, but without preconditions. Ambassador Nigro, in informing the GoC of apparent Chadian rebel interest in talks (as indicated in the letter contained in REF B),made clear that an expression of willingness on Ndjamena's part to engage in talks without preconditions would increase pressure on the Chadian rebels to deliver on their stated desire to appear at the negotiating table. ¶7. (C) GoC to Next Doha Round? We support Embassy Khartoum's REF A recommendations Five, "Praise the Chadian Role," and Eight, "Engage with the French," both of which make good sense from our standpoint here. The Chadian government has indeed expressed support for the outcome of the recent Doha round, repeating its view that Chad's own problems ) both internal and with its neighbor to the east ) will be hard to fix absent resolution of the Darfur crisis. The Chadians chronicle the story of Chad's efforts, as friend, facilitator and more lately victim of the Darfur turbulence, including its hosting of negotiations before they were moved to Abuja in 2006. The Chadians claim that they have expelled Sudanese rebels conducting political activities here, and of course deny that they give any but the most limited hospitality to Sudanese rebels, on condition that these individuals do not engage in political activities. ¶8. (C) When we talked to the Deputy FORMIN today to give him our take on the Doha Agreement, he drew our attention to the GOC's facilitation of Bassole's meeting with JEM's Khalil Ibrahim in Ndjamena just before the two departed for Doha, as well as the GOC's support for Bassole in separate meetings at that time. The Deputy FORMIN came near to demanding that Chad be given an invitation to observe the next Doha session. ¶9. (C) Comment: This might be the right moment to try to move the GOC forward on both the Doha track and the Chad-rebel track. The GOC responded aggressively to our suggestion that it engage with Bassole to secure a place at least as an observer at the next Doha session. We have encouraged the GoC to convince other Sudanese rebels based here in Chad to join the Process. We continually make clear that the GOC must end support to JEM and other Sudanese rebel groups. The GOC has agreed to consult with us on modalities for GOC-Chad rebel talks. We are seeking a meeting with JEM to press it to remain committed to the agreement it signed in Doha, and with other Sudanese rebel groups to press them to engage with the Doha Process in coming sessions. We support requesting that Bassole offer an invitation to the GoC for the next Doha Round. We will speak with the Foreign Minister tomorrow along these lines. NIGRO