CHAD/JEM: FRENCH AND LIBYANS ON JEM ISSUES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000536 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR SU LY PINR ER FR CD SUBJECT: CHAD/JEM: FRENCH AND LIBYANS ON JEM ISSUES REF: A. KHARTOUM 1278 ¶B. NDJAMENA 0483 ¶C. 2008 NDJAMENA 557 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The French ambassador told us 11/14 that he had no information regarding recent or upcoming deliveries of arms to JEM in Chad and that he believed that the GOC has put Khalil Ibrahim "on a short leash," restricting his in-country travel to prevent him from getting involved in JEM armed activity in eastern Chad. The Libyan ambassador told us 11/12 that The Libyans and President Deby had been pressing JEM to leave Chad and engage in meaningful Darfur negotiations, including going to Doha, but that Chad ambassador to Libya Daoussa Deby was still involved in JEM affairs, including funneling Eritrean assistance to JEM from Tripoli. The Libyan called for increased international pressure on JEM and its supporters in Eritrea and the Gulf, to help Chad break with JEM. ¶2. (SBU) The Libyans are probably telling us what they assume we want to hear; they know that U.S. relations with Eritrea are poor; and they conveniently ignore their own support for JEM. The French Ambassador's unsurprising remarks reflect both French Chad policy and long-standing French views on JEM, as well as France's excellent sources of information here. The Libyans once claimed (Ref C) that they got Daoussa Deby re-appointed to Tripoli to remove him from the Chad/JEM equation; but now they acknowledge that Daoussa's current position may not have stopped him from keeping his hand in with JEM. ¶3. (SBU) Embassy NDjamena remains prepared to meet with Khalil or his advisors here to pass messages or seek information regarding JEM actions and plans (Ref B),whenever the Department provides guidance and talking points for further engagement with JEM. END SUMMARY. -------------- FRENCH AMB -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador talked to the French Ambassador Bruno Foucher on November 14. Foucher's key JEM-related points were: -- French Embassy has no information regarding recent or upcoming deliveries of arms to JEM in Chad; -- French Embassy believes that the GOC has put Khalil Ibrahim "on a short leash," restricting his in-country travel to prevent him from getting involved in JEM armed activity in eastern Chad. -- French Embassy is puzzled by actions of JEM representative in Paris, whose apparent antipathy to Khalil Ibrahim's leadership results in the Paris rep spreading "disinformation" designed to discredit Khalil: French Ambassador cited a recent "report" from the JEM Paris rep that JEM had received 30 vehicles from the GOC, evidence for which the French cannot find. -------------- LIBYAN AMB -------------- ¶5. Ambassador spoke to Libyan Ambassador Green Saleh Green on November 12. Green's key JEM-related points were: -- Eritrean support for JEM is at root of many problems with JEM; -- Eritrean political and material support for JEM is far greater than any Chad-related support for JEM; NDJAMENA 00000536 002 OF 002 -- Chad Ambassador to Libya (and President Deby's half-brother) Daoussa Deby is more supportive of JEM than President Deby and might be involved in transferring support from Eritrea to JEM via Tripoli, involving Eritrean Embassy there; -- Libya has been pressing President Deby to continue be tough with JEM, encourage JEM to negotiate a solution in Darfur, go to Doha, etc; -- Libya has been pressing Khartoum to negotiate seriously on Darfur; -- President Deby has been clear with Khalil Ibrahim and wants to "break" with JEM, but there are limits to how far he can go within the "Zaghawa nation;" -- President Deby needs help in getting JEM out of Chad and into negotiations; -- International pressure must be put on Asmara to stop backing JEM; -- International pressure must be exerted to stop support for JEM emanating from "Gulf States" and "Gulf Arab people. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Libyans are probably telling us what they assume we want to hear; they know that U.S. relations with Eritrea are poor; and they conveniently ignore their own support for JEM. The French Ambassador's unsurprising remarks reflect both French Chad policy and long-standing French views on JEM, as well as France's excellent sources of information here. The Libyans once claimed (Ref C) that they got Daoussa Deby re-appointed to Tripoli to remove him from the Chad/JEM equation; but now they acknowledge that Daoussa's current position may not have stopped him from keeping his hand in with JEM. ¶7. (SBU) Embassy NDjamena remains prepared to meet with Khalil or his advisors here to pass messages or seek information regarding JEM actions and plans, whenever the Department provides guidance and talking points for further engagement with JEM. END COMMENT. NIGRO