EAC -- EMBASSY N'DJAMENA -- EASTERN CHAD TRAVEL

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000533 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C STATE ALSO FOR AF/EX STATE ALSO FOR DS/IP/AF STATE ALSO FOR DS/TIA/ITA STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES STATE ALSO FOR PRM/AFR USAID FOR OFDA NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF ASEC PREL PHUM SU CD SUBJECT: EAC -- EMBASSY N'DJAMENA -- EASTERN CHAD TRAVEL REF: (A) N'DJAMENA 521; (B) N'DJAMENA 520; (C) N'DJAMENA 511; (D) N'DJAMENA 166; (E) N'DJAMENA 40 ¶1. (SBU) Ambassador convened Embassy N'Djamena's Emergency Action Committee on Thursday, 12 November, in order to discuss the evolving security situation in eastern Chad. EAC meeting was attended by ADCM, RSO, PRM, Pol/Econ, Pol/Mil, DATT, PAO, D/D, and CON. ¶2. (SBU) The area referred to as eastern Chad, comprised of the region from Abeche, the regional capital, to the Sudan border at Adre, as far north as Bahai, and as far south as Haraze, has seen a significant evolution in threats to Chadian and humanitarian organization staff. The most dangerous area at present and for the last several weeks since the end of Chad's rainy season has been the Abeche-Adre axis through Farchana, north to Guereda, south to Hadjer Hadid. The following incident list from the last ten days -- not exhaustive -- gives an indication of the situation: -- Kidnapping of an ICRC French international south of Adre; -- Spraying with AK-47 fire by men in uniform of a van belonging to the NGO Solidarite and the killing of their national driver; -- Armed attack by horse-mounted assailants against a DIS post to steal weapons; -- Five organizations suspending operations (Premieres Urgences, Mine Tech, MSF, Solidarit, ICRC); -- Attempted forced entry into the UNICEF compound in the deep field; and -- At least 6 carjackings. ¶3. (SBU) Most events have happened after dark, and involved vehicle road movements without escort, or residential compounds far from population concentrations. International staffs of humanitarian organizations are clearly the intended targets, although Chadian nationals are also victimized, especially those associated with humanitarian operations. ¶4. (SBU) In light of this evolving situation, the EAC recommended to the Chief of Mission, and he has approved, updating Post's Travel Warning for Chad, and the following revised Post policy for travel to eastern Chad, including Abeche town. The main elements of the travel policy build from Refs D and E: (A) Official travel of USG personnel subject to Chief of Mission (COM) authority to eastern Chad is prohibited without express COM authorization on advice of the EAC. (B) Authorized official travel of USG personnel subject to COM authority to eastern Chad shall be coordinated with US Embassy RSO, UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and UN partner agency security officers in Abeche and N'Djamena (MINURCAT, UNHCR, WFP, etc.) (C) Housing arrangements for authorized overnights in Abeche and "deep field" locations for USG personnel subject to COM authority shall be established at approved secure compounds on a case-by-case basis, with the object of reducing to the absolute minimum vehicle road movements. (D) Travel in the region by road is prohibited for USG personnel subject to COM authority wherever air service from approved UN or NGO aviation assets is available. (E) Where such air service in unavailable, travel in the region by road for USG personnel subject to COM authority shall be under the security constraints of the UNDSS, including required security escorts. ¶5. (SBU) EAC will reconvene as events require. NIGRO