CHAD: MINURCAT AND PERM-5 AMBASSADORS SHARE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000520 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES DECDEF FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM CASC UNSC ASEC SU CD SUBJECT: CHAD: MINURCAT AND PERM-5 AMBASSADORS SHARE GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT RISING INSECURITY IN EASTERN CHAD REF: A. N'DJAMENA 511 ¶B. N'DJAMENA 444 ¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE: See Para 16. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo told Perm-5 Ambassadors accredited to Chad on November 4 that he was deeply concerned about rising criminality in Eastern Chad, which was beyond the current ability of international or Chadian security forces to control adequately, and that humanitarian aid workers would be at greater risk during the upcoming dry season. All Perm-5 Ambassadors made clear that they intended to reconsider standing security advice for their nationals operating in the region, with a view to helping MINURCAT and civilian humanitarian organizations to make appropriate operational decisions. (Similar concerns were raised in meeting of the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) and in the SRSG's meeting with the wider diplomatic community that same day.) The Perm-5 also discussed African and Afro-Arab initiatives to resolve Darfur and Chad-Sudan tensions, and agreed that Sudan showed no sign of taking the "next step" it had committed to in the series of bilateral confidence-building measures agreed between had FORMIN Faki and Sudan envoy Ghazi in N'Djamena October 10. The Perm-5 reviewed the AU Peace and Security Council Summit in Abuja as well as the developing situation in CAR. The newly-accredited UK Ambassador to Chad (resident in Yaounde) indicated that his own ability to obtain meetings with Chadian officials seemed to be affected negatively by what the Chadians perceived as the UK's history-based "tilt" toward Sudan. ¶3. (SBU) The SRSG recognizes and the partners all agree on the nature of the threat to civilians, especially humanitarian workers, in eastern Chad, and the likelihood that it could limit materially the ability of the humanitarians to provide services to refugees and displaced persons in some areas. We applaud his realism in admitting the inadequacy of MINURCAT forces currently deployed to some sectors to ensure security there. Angelo's Head of Security was more pointed in his assessment of MINURCAT, DIS and GOC capability to ensure civilian security in eastern Chad, and he gave cogent examples. Although there is disagreement regarding the willingness of some NGOs to accept MINURCAT security services at current capability, it appears that at current strength and capability, the combined available security forces of the GoC, DIS, and MINURCAT, despite their best efforts, cannot ensure the security of civilians, especially refugees and IDPs and humanitarian workers, in eastern Chad. This could have a negative impact on the ability of humanitarian organizations, including USG partners and individual American citizens, to maintain operations because of the increased risk to themselves in coming months. ¶4. (SBU) The Embassy will continue to monitor closely the security situation in eastern Chad, and review regularly the security parameters for USG operations, USG-funded operations, and AMCITS presence there. We believe the Department should undertake immediately to discuss with the PERM-5 and with UN/DPKO in NY how best to ensure the full mandated deployment and adequate resourcing of MINURCAT to ensure that humanitarian assistance operations in eastern Chad are not threatened by growing risk to civilians, especially refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers there. END SUMMARY. -------------- INSECURITY IN EASTERN CHAD -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Victor Angelo reported that the border area, and the area around the towns of Guereda and Farchana were too unsafe for an international presence for the moment, although NDJAMENA 00000520 002 OF 004 other border areas around Goz Beida and Iriba were relatively safe. All Ambassadors expressed grave concern about evidence of rampant banditry. A "security vacuum" seemed to be taking hold in Eastern Chad, said Ambassador Foucher. "People will be killed in the dry season." Angelo attributed the deteriorating situation in part to demobilization of soldiers on both sides of the border, and also to a noteworthy increase in banditry particularly from the Sudan side, where opportunities for gaining one's livelihood other than through criminality were very limited. A recovered UN vehicle had contained a list of numerous Sudanese buyers of cannibalized car parts to whom the parts had evidently been destined. Angelo advised that he had been in Abeche the previous day to reach out to the humanitarian community and try to ensure that the best possible coordination would occur among humanitarians and MINURCAT. Ambassador Foucher offered that the DIS seemed to have made a number of brave attempts to intervene, but that neither the DIS nor MINURCAT were likely to be effective against janjaweed, which had been sighted recently in Eastern Chad. At this point, "quite understandable panic holds sway among humanitarians," said Angelo. All Ambassadors noted that they would attempt to reach out to their citizens with new security advisories in the coming weeks. ¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Foucher noted that the international community also needed to pressure the Chadian government to do what it could to increase security in the region. He asked Angelo whether MINURCAT troops were able to patrol in dangerous locations. Angelo made clear that some troops -- the Togolese and Mongolians -- were excellent, and adequately equipped for such a task. But the Ghanaians, who were based in the most dangerous site, were not up to full strength and always seemed to have an excuse as to why they could not do their jobs. With MINURCAT at only 52 per cent troop strength, problems were inevitable, said Angelo. -------------- OURE CASSONI -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Angelo told the group that UNHCR had determined that the alternate site for the Oure Cassoni refugee camp, at Bir Douan, had proven unviable because of its lack of water. Other sites were now being looked at; the GoC was insisting that the chosen site be in Ennedi Province, President Deby's home. --- CAR --- ¶8. (SBU) Angelo reported on his trip the previous week to CAR, where he said the prevailing concern had to do with the presence of both LRA fighters and approximately 800 Ugandan soldiers in the south. The Ugandans were located "not coincidentally in the vicinity of a diamond mine abandoned by a South African concern." "No one knows how many LRA are in the region," said Angelo, but their very existence could easily serve as a pretext for all manner of bad behavior on the part of others, even if they did not cause trouble themselves. ¶9. (SBU) Meanwhile, said Angelo, the Chadians had rounded up and cantoned in Southwestern Chad several hundred Chadian rebels originating in Eastern Chad and their CAR mercenary backers -- the group that had spent time at Kaga Bandoro, CAR, separate from the groups supported by the Sudanese. In Salamat Province in Southeastern Chad, an initiative was under way to increase ANT troop strength considerably in case Chadian rebels once again tried to enter Chad from "the out-of-control triangle of CAR near the Darfur border." An ANT military platform was being built up in Am Timan in case operations needed to be carried out near Tissi, one of Chad's most dangerous localities, and one where the recent population census could not be carried out for security regions. NDJAMENA 00000520 003 OF 004 -------------- INTRA-AFRICAN AND AFRO-ARAB INITIATIVES -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Participants discussed recent international efforts to resolve the Darfur and Chad-Sudan conflicts, including the November 3 visit to Chad of the Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. According to Ambassador Foucher, President Deby had agreed to a Qatari proposal that he try to "deliver" the JEM's Khalil Ibrahim to Doha for upcoming talks. Consequently, the Chadians were now pressuring France to deliver the SLA's Abdul Wahid, whom they asserted that France "controlled." The Qatari visit had also yielded a number of promises of bilateral assistance for Chad, said Foucher. Angelo advised that he had been in touch with UN/AU negotiator Bassole, and that Bassole was planning trips to London and Paris before the Darfur civil society conference in Doha later this month. ¶11. (SBU) The group also discussed the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Abuja October 29, which considered recommendations of the Mbeki panel. Angelo said that the UN found Mbeki's recommendations about the composition of the proposed hybrid criminal court interesting and potentially useful. One of the benefits of the session, according to Angelo, was that it had facilitated ad hoc discussions among African leaders about how they might encourage positive Chad-Sudan dynamics to continue. Burkina Faso wanted to be helpful, said Angelo, in part because UN/AU negotiator Djibril Bassole was from that nation. But Ouagadougou was perceived by the Deby regime as being pro-Sudan and supportive of certain Chadian opposition figures. Cote d'Ivoire also appeared to want to lend a hand, and might be easier for the Chadians to work with. Congo/Brazzaville sought to become more involved, said Angelo, describing his recent visit there; President Sassou-Nguessi was coordinating with the Libyans on some possible ways to resurrect the Dakar Group. According to Angelo, the Chadians were supportive of this and hopeful that Congo/Brazzaville and Libya could encourage the Sudanese to take the step of cantoning the Chadian rebels, promised during Sudanese Presidential Envoy Ghazi's visit to Chad in October. For the moment, the Sudanese "did not seem to be doing anything," the group agreed. Recent press reports from Khartoum suggesting that a visit by Chadian FM Faki to Khartoum was in the offing most likely amounted to Sudanese "disinformation." Victor Angelo indicated that he had himself hoped to visit Khartoum in the coming week, but the Sudanese had issued a blanket denial of flight clearances for him. ¶12. (SBU) UK Ambassador Joshi, also accredited to Cameroon, described what he believed had been accomplished during the visit last week of President Deby to Yaounde. According to Joshi, the two sides had discussed border security and improved coordination between police and customs units on either side of the border, as insecurity in that region was of growing concern to both nations. Foucher said that he had the impression Chad was trying to improve border control everywhere. A new initiative involved Chad, Nigeria and Niger (why Cameroon was absent was not clear) in a joint effort to increase security around Lake Chad, so as to stop criminal activity there. Approximately 1000 law enforcement personnel from the three nations were now deployed. The Perm-5 group agreed that President Deby had a chance to prove his worth as a regional leader during his tenure as President of CEEAC -- he is currently in Libreville on CEEAC business -- but what he would do with that position remained to be seen. -------------- UN SECURITY OFFICER COMMENTS ON FORCE CAPABILITIES -------------- NDJAMENA 00000520 004.2 OF 004 ¶13. (SBU) Similar concerns about security in the east were raised in meeting of the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) and in the SRSG's meeting with the wider diplomatic community that same day (November 4). Angelo's Head of Security, UN DSS Chief Bertrand Bourgain, provided a briefing to the IASC of his assessment of MINURCAT, DIS and GOC's ability to ensure civilian security in eastern Chad. He gave the example of the major international NGO "Premiere Urgence," having been the target of an armed residential compound invasion attempt, as well as a nearly-successful kidnapping the week of October 19, determining that security assets in the Farchana region were inadequate to provide area security for their operations, which require them to be able to react to emergency calls with no advance notice. "Premiere Urgence" subscribes to the internationally accepted humanitarian principle that armed escorts for humanitarian operations must be used only as a last resort for critical life-saving activities. Faced with the inability to operate in the area, "Premiere Urgence" chose to shut down operations in the region, and requested MINURCAT escort for the movement of its personnel, vehicles, and assets to Abeche, which MINURCAT undertook to provide November 5. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The SRSG recognizes and the partners all agree on the nature of the threat to civilians, especially humanitarian workers, in eastern Chad, and the likelihood that it could limit materially the ability of the humanitarians to provide services to refugees and displaced persons in some areas. We applaud his realism in admitting the inadequacy of MINURCAT forces currently deployed to some sectors to ensure security there. The UN DSS Chief was even more pointed in his assessment that MINURCAT and DIS forces currently are insufficient in number and insufficiently resourced in materiel and transport to provide either enough escorts for all who may need them, or to secure routes and regions through an area security presence. ¶15. (SBU) Although there is disagreement regarding the willingness of some NGOs to accept MINURCAT security services at current capability, it appears that at current strength and capability, the combined available security forces of the GoC, DIS, and MINURCAT, despite their best efforts, cannot ensure the security of civilians, especially refugees and IDPS and humanitarian workers, in eastern Chad. Humanitarian organizations, including USG partners and individual American citizens, may justifiably determine, as did Premiere Urgence, the need to reduce or suspend operations because of the increased risk to themselves in coming weeks and months. END COMMENT. -------------- ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Action Request: That the Department undertake immediately to discuss with the PERM-5 and with UN/DPKO in NY how best to ensure the full mandated deployment and adequate resourcing of MINURCAT to ensure that humanitarian assistance operations in eastern Chad are not threatened by growing risk to civilians, especially refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers there. NIGRO