CHAD: MINURCAT SRSG GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NDJAMENA 000479 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C STATE ALSO FOR S/USSES NSC FOR GAVIN DOD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM SU FR LY UN AU CD SUBJECT: CHAD: MINURCAT SRSG GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ON CHAD-SUDAN NORMALIZATION AND CHAD ELECTION PROCESS REF: A. KHARTOUM 1193 ¶B. PARIS 1415 ¶C. NDJAMENA 466 ¶D. NDJAMENA 462 ¶E. NDJAMENA 458 ¶F. NDJAMENA 457 ¶G. NDJAMENA 447 ¶H. NDJAMENA 446 ¶I. NDJAMENA 444 ¶J. NDJAMENA 441 ¶K. NDJAMENA 428 NDJAMENA 00000479 001.2 OF 005 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo told Ambassador October 22 that he was "guardedly optimistic" regarding the current trend in Chad-Sudan relations, where momentum toward normalization and ending support for military proxies was building, and on Chad's election process, making "credible if not perfect" legislative and municipal elections more and more likely in 2010. Angelo thanked the Ambassador for his participation in a two-day tour of Eastern Chad by Perm-5 ambassadors the previous week, which exposed the group to progress by MINURCAT and DIS, the current state of humanitarian assistance, and the views of local GOC officials, refugees, IDPs, and local Chadian stressed populations. Angelo also touched on his own planned travel to Congo-Brazzaville and CAR next week; the complex political dynamic between Chad and CAR, including the presence of the LRA and possibly Joseph Kony himself in CAR; the current INTERPOL arrest warrant out on JEM Chief Khalil Ibrahim; and MINURCAT's desire for more U.S. military staff and liaison officers. ¶2. (SBU) Angelo has extremely sensitive political antennae and is extremely well-informed, including through his contacts within the GOC, where he is trusted and esteemed. Like the French (Ref C),he appears increasingly "bullish" on developments here, both diplomatic and domestic. We agree with Angelo that there are reasons for optimism regarding Chad-Sudan normalization: the tone and substance of Chadian rhetoric vis-a-vis Sudan had changed since the Ghazi visit here, including at the highest levels, both publicly and privately; President Deby's decision to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp ought to reassure Khartoum as much as it dismayed JEM; and continued engagement by the USG, France, Libya and the UN/AU sponsors Dakar Accord Contact Group should be useful in encouraging the bilateral movement toward detente. (See Refs A-D, F, and H.) We also agree that the trend-line is favorable regarding the long-drawn-out electoral reform process, with a positive "election climate" in the air, and the real possibility of elections before mid-year 2010. (See Refs A, C, E, I and K.) -------------- CHAD-SUDAN: TRENDING TOWARD NORMALIZATION? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Angelo indicated that the UN was cautiously optimistic about the prospects for improved relations between Chad and Sudan, now that the two sides seemed to be moving from deep mistrust to efforts at mutual confidence-building. Angelo said that the sudden but welcome August decision by President Deby to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp, long a refuge, R and R point, and recruiting station for JEM fighters, had sent a powerful message to the Sudanese Government and to JEM, positive to the former, negative to the latter. The proposed move was clearly designed as a "confidence-building measure" for the GOS, and could not be taken by JEM as anything other than a shot across the bow. Angelo said that bilateral talks between N'Djamena and Khartoum over the past several months, and especially the recent visit of Dr. Ghazi to N'Djamena, was a very positive sign. A bilateral dynamic, with the two countries taking the NDJAMENA 00000479 002.2 OF 005 lead in resolving their differences, and others -- the Dakar Contact Group, the UN, the USG, the AU, etc. -- "blessing" a normalization process arrived by Chad and Sudan on terms of their own choosing, was perhaps the most workable way forward. Angelo said that there was interest in Brazzaville and perhaps Libya in reviving the Dakar Accord Contact Group to encourage Chad-Sudan normalization: He added that he would be traveling to both capitals soon. ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador asked whether Angelo was aware of a possible "congress" or "conference" of Chadian rebels in the coming days on the Sudan side of the border. Angelo indicated that the UN was watching to see what might develop as a result of this apparent Khartoum-backed initiative, which could be linked with steps proposed for Sudan in the series of confidence-building measures laid out in the course of the October 10 Ghazi visit to N'Djamena. -------------- JEM NOT MOBILIZING IN EAST CHAD -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ambassador shared our estimation of the situation, asking whether MINURCAT had heard reports of JEM "build-up" in Eastern Chad in recent days. Angelo replied that "we keep seeing JEM figures in the East," but denied that anything that could be described as build-up was going on. The JEM had recently been "moving around Farchana, visiting people in camps." But the UN had observed no unusual concentration of JEM fighters. -------------- KHALIL IBRAHIM ON INTERPOL LIST? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Angelo asked whether the U.S. had reason to believe Khalil Ibrahim had been placed on an INTERPOL list of those wanted for terrorism. Ambassador said he would try to determine what the reality was in this and what implications it might have for the USG and the GOC. (Septel.) Ambassador said that we had found Khalil to be in quite a defensive mood when we saw him earlier in the week. Angelo offered that Khalil seemed bitter toward both UN/AU Negotiator Djibril Bassole and S/USSES General Scott Gration, which Ambassador confirmed, saying it was further indication of JEM loss of confidence, despite the organization's continued rhetorical bravura. -------------- ELECTORAL PROCESS: CREDIBLE ELECTIONS POSSIBLE IN 2010 -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Angelo said that he was encouraged by what he called "electoral climate change" in Chad, as long-awaited legislative and municipal elections seemed more likely to be held in 2010. Angelo cited the appointment of a new Chief of Joint Military Staff, a veteran and prestigious Southerner, as a move by Deby to attract Southern Chadian voters. He termed ongoing civic improvement projects in N'Djamena as essentially good electoral politics, for which Deby was picking up some popular support. Ambassador added that an increased sense of safety among populations who had for too long been victimized by rebel activity would also likely increase Deby's electoral chances, citing a soon-to-be-published USAID risk-assessment. ¶8. (SBU) Angelo stressed that the UN believed Deby was serious in his determination to hold elections in 2010 and 2011, and that some cabinet changes should be expected in the near term, not only to make room for homeward-bound rebels but also to "put more Southerners in charge" so as to cultivate votes among the group least likely to be enthusiastic about another Deby term. The opposition had had a strategy session the previous day to try to select from NDJAMENA 00000479 003.2 OF 005 many self-appointed leaders, among whom was Saleh Kebzabo, who claimed to have been invited to Am Jarras for a Ramadan audience with the President and offered the Prime Ministership, which he had declined. Current Prime Minister Abbas was "hanging on," offered Angelo, because he was doing a good job and the IC liked him. In general terms, said Angelo, the UN was supportive of elections and wanted to encourage the GoC to move ahead, without placing "so many demands on the project that IC involvement becomes a source of tension." -------------- SRSG TRAVEL TO CONGO/B AND LIBYA -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Angelo said that he had been invited by Congo-Brazzaville President Sassou-Nguesso to visit that nation October 23, ostensibly to discuss his desire to revive the Dakar Accord Contact Group Process, but also, Angelo surmised, to cultivate him as part of an effort to assert himself as "first among equals" of Central African leaders, replacing deceased Gabon "Big Man" Omar Bongo and preempting or marginalizing Biya of Cameroon, who (Angelo added) was seen by many as an obstacle to regional integration. Angelo noted that he would travel to Libya (the other co-chair of the Dakar Process) the week of November 2 to continue pursuing how the international community might formally "bless" an improvement in relations between Chad and Sudan. -------------- CAR ISSUES: SRSG GOING TO BANGUI -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Angelo indicated that he planned to travel from Brazzaville to Bangui October 24, in order to try to gain a better understanding of the complex situation there, particularly with respect to the possibility of elections in April 2010. In Angelo's view, a constitutional requirement to hold a vote as scheduled might exist, even though statements had been made about postponing elections. Angelo said he had been discussing the UN's role in CAR national elections, which seemed to involve increasing security in advance of a vote, with his counterpart, SRSG Sahle-Work Zewde of BONUCA, who had been in Chad earlier in the week. He made clear that he looked forward to seeing Ambassador Cook in Bangui. -------------- CAR ISSUES: LRA, KONY IN CAR? -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Referring to reports that the LRA and possibly Jospeh Kony had taken up residence in ungoverned spaces in Northeastern CAR, Angelo stressed that the Chadians were increasingly concerned about CAR in general. They did not necessarily believe that Kony would attempt to enter Chad, but they were nervous that their operational capabilities in Salamat Province were insufficient to deter major trouble from the south. The LRA was highly mobile and used to living simply for long periods in the brush, so their staying power was relatively great, said Angelo. -------------- CAR ISSUES: CHAD-CAR RELATIONS/TENSIONS -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The Chadians were also worried about military tensions in the vicinity of Chad's southwestern border with CAR, Angelo noted. The Chadian rebel group Rally of Positive Forces, hailing originally from Eastern Chad, had settled in the vicinity of the Northwestern CAR town of Kaga Bandoro. Although the leader, Baba Lade, had been arrested in CAR, a new leader seemed to have emerged, was heavily armed, and NDJAMENA 00000479 004.2 OF 005 apparently had plans for preying on populations on both sides of the border. To compound the situation, a rogue ANT general, Djibrine Dassert, had been raiding CAR villages from the Chadian side of the border. We noted that the Chadian Defense Minister had traveled to CAR recently, and that a CAR delegation had been in N'Djamena the previous day for meetings with PM Youssef Saleh Abbas, but said we did not have details. (NOTE: The CAR media report that a General Ramadane has replaced Baba Lade, but state that they cannot verify the permanence of this posting. END NOTE.) -------------- OURE CASSONI: MOVING THE CAMP NO EASY MATTER FOR PKO AND HUMANITARIANS -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Angelo said that there was no doubt about the positive political implications of President Deby's personal decision to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp away from the border, which sent clear signals to Khartoum (positive) and to JEM (negative),although it presented practical logistical challenges for MINURCAT and the humanitarian effort. Angelo noted that the location in Bir Douan proposed by the GoC as an alternate to the present refugee camp site at Oure Cassoni was presenting significant practical challenges, including that there might not be enough water to sustain the camp's population. MINURCAT was supportive of moving the camp in order to disrupt JEM operations -- so long as a suitable alternate site could be found. Bir Douan did not look to be such a site. Angelo asked for U.S. support in trying to convince the Chadian side to accept the realities of the situation; Ambassador agreed to help. (NOTE: Refcoords met separately October 20 with UNHCR Deputy ResRep Michele Manca di Nissa, who stated that the hydrological studies described in Ref G were not showing adequate water for sustained supply to 28,000 people. Manca added that UNHCR was still formulating its report, hoping to make clear that the relocation of Oure Cassoni within the same general area would be unsustainable, and suggesting areas with greater potential, including Fada or the area around Iriba. END NOTE.) -------------- NEW HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP STRONG AND ACTIVE -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Angelo said he was encouraged by the arrival of an experienced new WFP Program head, Jean-Luc Siblot, given that the food security situation in Chad would likely become quite challenging in the coming months due to an expected bad harvest. Angelo also termed incoming UNHCR ResRep Stefano Severe and UNDP ResRep Michele Falavigna "proactive and enterprising." The UN's new IV/AIDS Coordinator was also impressive, with th result that had the strongest team in quite som time in Chad. -------------- HUMNITARIANS AND SECURITY IN EASTERN CHAD -------------- ¶15. (SBU) According to Angeo, coordination between UN agencies and the GO community had improved over time, but humanitarians were still far too prone to taking unnecessary risks in an extremely dangerous environment, and then complaining that the UN had been remiss in not protecting them. He asked for USG support in alerting U.S. citizens among the humanitarian community to the need to coordinate closely with MINURCAT, and to avoid launching forth unescorted into regions (e.g., the vicinity of Guereda) where trouble was likely. -------------- ANGELO SEEKS MORE U.S. MILOFFS -------------- NDJAMENA 00000479 005.2 OF 005 ¶16. (SBU) Angelo also recalled his request that the U.S. provide more military staff and liaison officers to MINURCAT, adding that he had left the UNGA with the impression that these would be forthcoming in the December-January timeframe. We told him that we believed the USG was ready to send six more such officers, and that we hoped that they would arrive in the first quarter of 2010. ¶17. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO