GOC AIR ACTION VS. REBELS IN SUDAN BORDER AREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000292 SIPDIS KHARTOUM FOR SE GRATION STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS SU LY CD SUBJECT: GOC AIR ACTION VS. REBELS IN SUDAN BORDER AREA REFLECTS LEGITIMATE DEFENSE POSTURE REF: A. PRESS REPORTS 7/16-7/17 ¶B. NDJAMENA 185 ¶C. NDJAMENA 175 ¶D. NDJAMENA 170 ¶E. NDJAMENA 165 Classified By: P/E: ATOMAZSEWICZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- GOC MILITARY ACTION IN EASTERN CHAD -------------- ¶1. (SBU) GOC military aircraft carried out operations from their Abeche base July 16. It is not yet confirmed if these operations were carried out inside Chad or across the border in Sudan. French diplomats and MINURCAT officials report that the GOC moved two SU-25 aircraft to Abeche on July 15 and that those aircraft were out for more than one hour July ¶16. There is a possibility that yesterday's action is part of a larger plan to surveil the border against any mischief-making Chad rebels caught inside Chad by rainy season mud. -------------- CONFLICTING GOC VERSIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) GOC officials have given us conflicting versions of yesterday's events: Some have said that the action was directed at Chad rebels in Sudan, unspecified Chad rebels near the Sudanese border town of Am Dukun, across from Chadian border town, Tissi; according to other and more specific government sources, the ANT took advantage of the presence of rebel fighters on Chadian territory near the border town of Tissi to attack rebels associated with Adam Yacoub's faction of the UFR, who infiltrated Chadian territory but did not conduct an actual attack. Because there was no attack, as opposed to previous rebel incursions into Chad, the ANT will not engage in hot pursuit. MINURCAT officials also believe that yesterday's strike was aimed at Chad rebels inside Chad near Tissi. One MINURCAT military advisor told us that so far the recent Chad air actions are confined to reconnaissance missions. ¶3. (SBU) If the GOC took action inside Sudan, the GOC air-strike or strikes were aimed at Chad rebel concentration or concentrations inside Sudan but close enough to the Chad-Sudan border to constitute a perceived threat to Chad. The GOC has often publicly stated its policy not/not to permit concentrations of Chad rebels in Sudan to threaten Chadian security. -------------- CONTEXT -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The air action, whatever its nature, comes in the context of a major attack on Chad by Chad rebels in May, Chadian response in defeating rebel attackers and pursuing the remnants back into Sudan and using both air and ground forces against them also in May, continued low-intensity skirmishing along the border between Chad military and Chad rebels, and Chad military patrolling the border including movement across the border for tactical reasons. -------------- LEGITIMATE DEFENSE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) We believe that continued Chad military actions in eastern Chad have been and are strategically defensive and tactically limited in nature, aimed at Chad rebel targets, not Sudanese civilian or military ones. Chad has been the object of Chad rebel attacks from Sudan for the past several years which renders legitimate Chad's proportional preemptive military action in defense of its territory and people. ¶6. (SBU) Instability in eastern Chad caused by the constant threat of rebel attacks is the single most important obstacle to the achievement of USG goals in Chad and the region: It complicates international efforts for peace in Darfur, NDJAMENA 00000292 002 OF 002 undermines humanitarian efforts to assist massive refuge and IDP populations in eastern Chad and international peacekeeping efforts to protect them, threatens to destabilize CAR even further, forces the GOC to concentrate on defense spending to the detriment of investing in economic and social development and retards Chad's increasingly serious progress toward democracy and good governance through political reforms and credible elections. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (SBU) We believe that the GOC continues to follow a responsible course of action in pursuing a restrained and prudent but vigilant and active military posture vis-a-vis the Chad rebels as well as continuing to cooperate with international efforts, including USG efforts, to normalize its relations with Sudan and to reconcile with those Chad rebels who seek reentry into Chadian society and national political life. ¶8. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO