FOR FORMIN FAKI MTGS: ADDITIONAL INPUT

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000287 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES NSC FOR GAVIN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV SU LY CD SUBJECT: FOR FORMIN FAKI MTGS: ADDITIONAL INPUT REF: NDJAMENA 283 ¶1. (SBU) This message offers information and views that might be helpful to the Department in preparing for Chad FORMIN Faki's meetings in Washington, in addition to reftel. -------------- CHAD-SUDAN AND CHAD/JEM -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Faki told us July 9 that President Deby had convoked JEM chief Khalil Ibrahim to N'Djamena with the intention of pressuring him into accepting a cease-fire with the Government of Sudan and including other Darfuri movements in the negotiation process. Khalil must "make his positions more flexible and move resolutely towards peace," Faki emphasized, "and cooperate with Qatari, Egyptian, and Libyan efforts," as well as with SE Gration's efforts. Faki himself expressed frustration with JEM, characterizing its demands as "not realistic" and its refusal to sign a cease-fire as "illogical." ¶3. (SBU) Faki undoubtedly would have been present at the Deby-Khalil meeting, if in fact it occurred. (Faki left for DC before we could get a readout from him.) The Department should seek a full readout from Faki on the Deby-Khalil meeting, either in the course of his meeting with The Secretary or during one of his other meetings. The Department could use Ambassador Bechir to ensure that we will be very interested in this readout. ¶4. (SBU) As we see it, consequential Deby pressure on Khalil to engage in serious negotiations with Khartoum, through active cooperation with SE Gration's mediation efforts and the mediation efforts of Libya, Qatar, and others is the reciprocal "confidence-building" action by Chad to respond to Sudanese-proposed actions to canton Chad rebels in Sudan and convoke Chad rebel leaders to Khartoum, actions to be verified multilaterally. Chad does not exert the same kind of control over Sudanese rebels, especially JEM, that Sudan exerts over Chad rebels. Deby has his ways of "persuading" Khalil that could be effective if applied effectively and consistently and the results with JEM that Deby can offer should not be dismissed. ¶5. (SBU) We think that The Secretary should demand of Faki that the Government of Chad and President Deby himself continue to pressure Khalil Ibrahim and JEM to cooperate with Darfur mediation efforts -- including the addition of other Darfuri movements at the negotiating table -- and to pursue its goals peacefully as a movement and not as a militia. -------------- USG COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN DARFUR -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In his meeting with The Secretary, Chad FORMIN Faki may make a bid for greater USG involvement in normalizing Chad-Sudan relations. Faki may use the analogy of the USG role in the Navaisha talks that led to the CPA as a model for USG involvement in the search for peace in Darfur, to which normalization of Chad-Sudan relations would be a pre-condition. He may argue that only the USG is in a position to press all the parties to reach and accord and that only the USG has the clout to "guarantee" that the sides live up to their commitments. ¶7. (SBU) We think that Faki's possible demarche can quite logically be met with the response that SE Gration's nomination as Presidential Envoy for Sudan and his very active personal diplomacy exemplify the USG's commitment to peace in Darfur. -------------- THINGS ARE LOOKING UP FOR CHAD -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The GOC has been enjoying a pretty good run the past few months. Besides decisively defeating attacking rebels in early May, Chad claims to have welcomed over 1,500 ex-rebels back to the country, reflecting disenchantment among the rank and file. Faki updated us July 9 on serious GOC negotiations with two significant rebel leaders, Ahmat Soubiane of the FSR and Mahamat Idriss of the UFDD, and expressed confidence that these talks could end with both men returning to Chad. The possibilities for proper legislative and local elections in early 2010 improved with the successful June completion of the census, the parliamentary passage of enabling legislation, and the nomination of government and opposition party leaders to the Independent Electoral Commission's membership. ¶9. (SBU) Chad seemed poised to put its public-financial house in order with a budget that the IMF and World Bank judged credible and viable, and that formed the basis for Chad and the IMF to agree on a staff-managed program for the next six months. There is anecdotal evidence that business activity in Chad is set to grow through the rest of this year despite the international economic situation and the price of petroleum, Chad's prime public-revenue source. The GOC has assembled an inter-ministerial team (with which we are cooperating closely) to act on USG recommendations to avoid looming TIP sanctions by us. NIGRO