WHAT THE USG EXPECTS FROM CHAD: PEACE IN DARFUR,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000283 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID PHUM SU LY QA CD SUBJECT: WHAT THE USG EXPECTS FROM CHAD: PEACE IN DARFUR, NO ARMS TO JEM, AND RECONCILIATION WITH CHAD REBELS REF: A. NDJAMENA 264 ¶B. NDJAMENA 111 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Ambassador told Chad FORMIN Faki July 10 that The Secretary's willingness to meet with him was primarily a function of the centrality of he Darfur crisis to USG policyin the region; that she would be interested to hear from him how Chad could best play an active and positive role in restoring peace to Darfur; and that she would expect him to outline steps Chad was taking to normalize relations with Sudan by ending military support to Sudanese rebels, especially JEM, and to reconcile with Chadian rebels. Ambassador told Faki that on bilateral issues, The Secretary would appreciate his briefing on Chad's progress on credible elections in 2010, in improving its human rights and TIP posture, and in improving its management of public revenues and relations with the IMF and World Bank. Faki said that Chad President Deby had convoked JEM head Khalil Ibrahim to pressure him to cooperate with SE Gration's Darfur peace effort; that he had been negotiating intensely and successfully with Chad rebel leaders; that President Deby was committed to credible elections, preparations for which were advanced; that Chad was working seriously to improve its human rights and TIP stances; and that Chad and the IMF had just agreed to a program aimed at poverty reduction and debt relief. ¶2. (SBU) The U.S. should continue to leverage the Chadian desire for U.S. political and diplomatic support to achieve the end of the Chad-Sudan proxy war, with Chad's key an end to its military support of JEM. Deby pressure on Khalil to seek peace through serious negotiations and cooperation with mediators, including SE Gration, was good news, as was Faki's report of progress toward reconciliation with key Chad rebel leaders like Soubiane and Idriss. The GOC continues to make slow but steady progress toward legislative and local elections now scheduled for early 2010; has strengthened laws related to trafficking issues and investigated claims of trafficking; and reached agreement with the IMF and normalized relations with the World Bank. The U.S. should try to help NDjamena and Riyadh normalize relations with the return of a Saudi Ambassador to Chad, as we have suggested before (Ref B),because normalization of Saudi-Chadian relations would reinforce Chad's diplomatic standing among Arab League nations, as well as providing vital consular services to Chad citizens. END SUMMARY. -------------- NORMALIZE CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Nigro told Chad Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat July 10 that The Secretary's willingness to meet with him strongly reflected the centrality of the Darfur crisis to USG policy goals in the region. Ambassador outlined SE Gration's strategy to end the proxy war between Chad and Sudan -- Sudanese agreement to canton Chad rebel groups in two locations, including one location removed from the Chad-Sudan border, and gather rebel chiefs in Khartoum; verification teams with international participation to confirm those actions; then Chad to take similar actions on Sudanese rebel groups, to be similarly verified; then both Chad and Sudan to move to disarm and demobilize all rebel groups. Ambassador underscored that it was imperative for the GOC to understand that it must demonstrate a commitment to end its military and logistical support for the JEM. ¶4. (SBU) Faki said that Deby had convoked JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim to NDjamena this weekend to personally pressure Khalil into accepting a cease-fire with the Government of Sudan and including other Darfuri movements in the negotiation process. Khalil must "make his positions more flexible and move resolutely towards peace," Faki emphasized, "and cooperate with Qatari, Egyptian, and Libyan efforts" as well as with the USG. Faki himself expressed frustration with JEM, characterizing its demands as "not realistic" and its refusal to sign a cease-fire as "illogical." NDJAMENA 00000283 002 OF 003 -------------- RECONCILE WITH CHA REBELS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ambassador stated that Chad must continue to reach out to Chad rebels to negotiate their return to Chad peacefully; must not reject serious overtures from the rebels; and should consult with EU on its initiative to reconcile the GOC and the rebel groups. Faki stated that the GOC had been reaching out to major rebel leaders and was in negotiations with several, including Ahmat Soubiane and Mahamt Idriss, a chief lieutenant of Mahamat Nouri. Faki noted that Soubiane's and Nouri's were two of the most politically consequential rebel groups. Faki said that Soubiane had traveled to Tripoli to negotiate his return with GOC officials on the sidelines of the AU summit. Faki said that Idriss had just called him to discuss the return of elements of Nouri's group, as well. Faki underscored that all efforts, whether involving JEM, Sudan, or Chadian rebels, will require international pressure to keep the parties committed. -------------- CONTINUING USG ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ambassador made clear that Chad would need to make progress on several fronts to ensure continued USG support. The USG wanted to see the GOC continue political reform that would enable credible local and national elections in 2010. We also wanted to see the GOC responsibly managing public revenues, especially in support of social and economic development, in concert with the IFIs. The USG also expected Chad to demonstrate substantive progress on human rights and trafficking in persons issues. Faki highlighted that the nearly completed census and the upcoming elections were among the GOC's top priorities, along with passing the revised budget and other laws. The FORMIN stated that USG cooperation outside of Chad's oil sector was not as robust as the GOC wished, counting that Chad's strategic location, concern about terrorism, myriad of development challenges, and impending parliamentary and presidential elections augured for increased USG assistance. More than dollars, however, Faki emphasized that the GOC looked to the USG for sustained political and diplomatic support, internally and internationally. Faki noted that he was also seeking meetings with Senator Kerry and NSC Michelle Gavin while in Washington. -------------- PLANS TO VISIT RIYADH -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The FORMIN added that he would go directly to Riyadh following with Washington trip, with the main goal of convincing the SARG to reopen its embassy in NDjamena He regretted that following the death of embassy family members during the February 2008 rebel attack, the SARG withdrew its personnel and shuttered the mission here. Faki stated that over 6,000 Chadian annually travel to Saudi for business or the Hajj and Saudi diplomatic and consular services in NDjamena were vital. -------------- FAKI BIO INFO -------------- ¶8. (SBU) FORMIN Faki, like President Deby, is an ethnic Zaghawa born in the Zaghawa heartland of Biltine in eastern Chad. He has been in government service, with increasingly responsible positions, almost continuously since Deby took power in 1990. He was Deby's Cabinet Chief of Staff from 1999-2002; managed Deby's 2001 presidential campaign; served as Minister of Public Works and Transportation; and was Prime Minister from 2004-2006. He has been Foreign Minister since April 2008. Faki is an experienced political figure with ambitions to match his abilities. His tenure as FORMIN has been an active one, which much travel and intense diplomatic efforts, both bilateral and regional. NDJAMENA 00000283 003 OF 003 -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The GOC continues to seek as its priority U.S. political and diplomatic support, rather than financial or military support, although the Chadians would like those latter forms of assistance as well. The U.S. should continue to leverage that Chadian goal to achieve the end of the Chad-Sudan proxy war with Chad's contribution being an end to its military support of JEM. That Deby was convoking Khalil to pressure him to seek peace through serious negotiations and cooperation with mediators, including SE Gration, was good news, as was Faki's reporting on continuing progress toward reconciliation with key Chad rebel leaders like Soubiane and Idriss. The GOC continues to make slow but steady progress toward legislative and local elections now scheduled for early 2010: if credible, they would be the first such elections in Chad's history. The GOC has taken action to strengthen laws related to trafficking issues and to investigate claims of trafficking. The agreement with the IMF and normalized relations with the World Bank create an opportunity for the GOC to benefit from international assistance. The U.S. should try to help NDjamena and Riyadh normalize relations with the return of a Saudi Ambassador to Chad, as we have suggested before (Ref B),because normalization of Saudi-Chadian relations would reinforce Chad's diplomatic standing among Arab League nations, as well as providing vital consular services to Chad citizens. ¶10. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO