Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NDJAMENA264
2009-06-29 17:41:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

DEBY-GRATION MEETING: DEBY WANTS TO HELP USG

Tags:  PREL MOPS ASEC AU UNAUS SU CT CD 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000264 

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF, AF/C AND S/USSES
TRIPOLI ALSO FOR A/S CARSON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS ASEC AU UNAUS SU CT CD
SUBJECT: DEBY-GRATION MEETING: DEBY WANTS TO HELP USG
ACHIEVE REGIONAL STABILITY

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SUMMARY/KEY POINTS
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000264 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF, AF/C AND S/USSES TRIPOLI ALSO FOR A/S CARSON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL -- LORD PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS ASEC AU UNAUS SU CT CD SUBJECT: DEBY-GRATION MEETING: DEBY WANTS TO HELP USG ACHIEVE REGIONAL STABILITY -------------- SUMMARY/KEY POINTS -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Meeting with Special Envoy Scott Gration June 29, Chad's President Deby Idriss Itno made the following points: -- Resolving the Darfur crisis is a key goal for Chad. -- Chad is committed to implementing the Doha agreement of May 3 and views the recent decrease in tensions in South Sudan as a positive development. -- Chad deeply distrusts Sudan in the wake of the early-May Sudan-backed rebel attacks on Eastern Chad, and in the face of continuing evidence that Sudan is supplying Chadian civilians with land mines and other military equipment, which in Deby's view could spark a civil war. -- The U.S. should keep the pressure on Sudan and not take the Bashir regime at its word. -- Lack of resolution of the situation between Sudan and Chad, coupled with significantly increasing fragility in CAR and lack of clarity on succession in Gabon, could result in a dangerously destabilized sub-Saharan region. The U.S., Europe and Arab nations should pay attention to developments and encourage negotiating processes to decrease tensions. -- Chad would cut off assistance to anti-Sudan rebels, including the JEM, and pressure the JEM to return to the negotiating table, if the GOS ceased supporting Chad rebels in Sudan, and if the U.S. strengthened its bilateral relationship with Chad. -- Deby does not intend to meet with President Bashir at the AU Summit in Tripoli, "unless Sudan shows good will and stops recruiting mercenaries." Deby does not rule out meetings at a lower level between members of the Chad and Sudan delegations. END SUMMARY. -------------- S/E GRATION URGES SEIZING THE MOMENT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Special Envoy Gration thanked President Deby for his relatively restrained response to the early-May Chadian rebel incursions in the vicinity of Am Timan, expressed appreciation for Chad's efforts to lower regional tensions and welcome refugees, and made clear that now was the time to attempt to pursue normalized relations with Sudan. Gration described the previous week's conference
in Washington to raise international support for the CPA, as well as progress on trilateral talks with the Sudanese parties over outstanding issues such as the Sudan census, North-South border demarcation and Abyei. He made clear that the leadership in Khartoum was committed to resolving differences with Chad and hoped to meet with the Chadian delegation at the AU Summit in Tripoli in the coming days. The U.S. had pressed the Sudanese to limit support for Chadian rebels and would continue to do so, Gration indicated. Chad now needed to take parallel steps to withdraw support from rebel movements, including the JEM, who were attempting to destabilize Sudan. -------------- DEBY CALLS FOR GREATER PRESSURE ON SUDAN, INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO REGIONAL CONTEXT -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Deby praised recent developments related to South Sudan and the CPA, but advised against overestimating their impact. He expressed commitment to the Doha Accord of May 3 between Chad and Sudan and urged the U.S. to continue pursuing its implementation. Regarding Darfur-specific negotiations in Doha, he noted that "some countries, for NDJAMENA 00000264 002 OF 003 example Qatar, might be too small" to bring about real progress on a conflict with the magnitude of the Darfur crisis. "Some states do not respect the Doha process," Deby continued, implying dissatisfaction with Egypt's role. Thus the U.S. needed to remain involved, in order to move things forward and keep the pressure on Sudan to fulfill its pledges. "Sudan has a lot to gain by implementing the Doha accords and not letting Darfur split off," he added. "But the Sudanese do what they want, and only listen when they want to." Asked whether he planned to meet with President Bashir at the AU Summit in Tripoli, Deby said that "nothing is on my agenda. I won't do anything with Sudan unless it shows good will and stops recruiting mercenaries who fight against Chad." ¶4. (SBU) Deby then described the "price that Chad has been paying for the misdeeds of others," in terms of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Sudan, tens of thousands from CAR, instability in refugee camps as rebel groups recruited there, attacks on MINURCAT and the Chadian national Detachement Integree de Securite (DIS) that was policing the camps, and theft by Chadian rebels of NGO and IO equipment and vehicles. With respect to the situation in CAR, Deby said, "No one is helping. Can you get President Obama to help?" Deby then noted that with Gabonese President Bongo gone, and no clear way forward on succession, that nation "might explode." Deby called for "open support" from the U.S. to prevent Chad and the Southern Sahara from being destabilized, adding that "instability is what Sudan wants." He stressed that the U.S., Europe and Arab nations should work together at the present moment for peace to try to resolve the constellation of regional problems. -------------- S/E ENCOURAGES PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) S/E Gration made clear that the U.S. shared Chad's concerns about CAR and Gabon, and that we viewed Chad as a friendly state in a troubled region making progress toward democratic transition. What was lacking in the region was trust, continued Gration. The U.S. trusted Chad. We were presently trying to build a relationship with Sudan that would allow us to negotiate bilaterally into the future. In order to increase trust between Khartoum and N'Djamena, the two sides needed to cease support for rebels across the border. Sudan had not behaved in a trustworthy manner in the wake of the signing of the May 3 Doha accord, in that the rebel attacks on Chad had begun a day later. Our mode was to verify Sudan's claims and offer trust afterward. Even amid broken promises and distrust, Chad and Sudan should look to the future and try to identify confidence-building measures. If Sudan kept its word to the U.S., our bilateral relations would develop in a positive direction. If Sudan broke its promises, we would use sticks rather than carrots. -------------- DEBY ON JEM -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Gration emphasized that the U.S. needed Chad's help in encouraging regional trust, and in particular in making sure that the Sudan rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) made itself a part of the solution and ceased military operations that were only increasing the numbers of refugees from and IDPs within Darfur. If the JEM were willing to lay down its arms and work as a political force along with other groups, there was room for it. ¶7. (SBU) Deby said that he appreciated Gration's efforts to get the GoS to cease support for Chadian rebels, and to allow those rebels who wanted to lay down their arms and return to Chad to do so without interference. But he added that "what the janjaweed used to do, the Sudanese military is now doing." Chadian civilians were being killed by land-mines provided to Chadian rebels by Sudanese armed forces, continued Deby. As for U.S. concern that Chad was sustaining the JEM, Deby asked, "Why would I use my own army to fight in NDJAMENA 00000264 003 OF 003 Sudan if the JEM answered to me?" The JEM were "close relatives" of Chad, but Chad was not training, equipping or giving them vehicles as was the case with Sudan's support to Chad rebels. Chad would cut off assistance to the anti-Sudan rebels, including the JEM, and pressure the JEM to return to the negotiating table, if the GOS would cease supporting Chad rebels in Sudan, Deby said. ¶8. (SBU) Gration acknowledged that Chad had a right to protect its people, but he reiterated that Chad also needed to take steps to reduce tensions, and this would involve reducing support for the JEM. "I trust that you will do the right thing," he said. Deby replied that he hoped he could count on President Obama to help restore peace. "I'll continue to advise JEM to stop fighting and return to the negotiating table to try to find a lasting political solution to the crisis." he offered. "Chad needs peace. We want to focus on development, not on fighting." -------------- BECHIR ON JEM -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In a preparatory session June 28 with Chadian Ambassador to the U.S. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, S/E Gration emphasized the destabilizing nature of Chad's support for the JEM, particularly now that other Sudan rebel movements appeared committed to negotiations. Gration then sketched out U.S. efforts to convince Sudan to cease support for the Chadian rebels. Bechir, who responded in a more direct manner than Deby, endorsed the notion of international border monitoring, perhaps through a joint MINURCAT-UNAMID mechanism, to make sure that rebels on both sides of the border were better contained. He then asserted that although Chad's standard line about the JEM was that the force was independent, in reality it did receive some "support" from Chad, as part of Chad's "strategy of self-defense." With Sudan having accused Chad of being a puppet of the U.S. and Israel, thus causing all Arab assistance to dry up, Chad felt very much isolated. If the U.S. really were to offer a hand to Chad, then Sudan's efforts to destabilize the nation would end and Chad would have no need for JEM. Bechir recalled that just several years before the current low in relations with Khartoum, Chad had actually fought the JEM in support of Sudan. "You are the only country that can pressure Sudan," he continued. "We need assurances from you that the U.S. will not allow Sudan to make us into a religious state. We would give up Khalil in a minute in exchange for your open support. We know him to be a bad guy." "On the other hand," said Bechir, "if we withdrew all assistance to Khalil, and we didn't have your backing, Khalil would turn against us -- he is that sort of person. Unless you promise to be there for us, I doubt that we will want to take such a risk." ¶10. (SBU) Speaking about U.S. goals for the AU Summit, Bechir offered that "we are ready to work on human rights, trafficking, all your other initiatives." He continued: "Deby is thinking about his legacy. He wants to move toward democracy, and improve Chad's reputation. We have long had help from French troops, but a show of U.S. interest -- in the form of a high-level visit to N'Djamena, or a high-level meeting in Washington -- would be worth much more to us. A C-130 full of uniforms would raise our morale. In any case, "we want strategic allies, and we are not threatening Sudan." NIGRO

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