Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NDJAMENA259
2009-06-26 16:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:
EU SPECIAL ENVOY PURSUES GOC-REBEL DIALOGUE
VZCZCXRO1100 OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHNJ #0259/01 1771639 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 261639Z JUN 09 ZDK MULTIPLE FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7043 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000259
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES - SE GRATION
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF SU LY EU CD
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL ENVOY PURSUES GOC-REBEL DIALOGUE
NDJAMENA 00000259 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sue Bremner for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4
(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000259
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES - SE GRATION
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF SU LY EU CD
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL ENVOY PURSUES GOC-REBEL DIALOGUE
NDJAMENA 00000259 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sue Bremner for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4
(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The EU,s Special Envoy for Africa, Ambassador Georg
Lennkh, updated Charge June 26 on his recent efforts to bring
the GOC and Chadian rebel groups together to discuss peaceful
resolution of their differences. Lennkh said that at least
some rebels seemed amenable to meeting with the GOC, and at
least one prominent GOC politician, Infrastructure Minister
Younousmi, had expressed interest in Lennkh's efforts.
Lennkh acknowledged that a strong push would be necessary to
bring the GOC to the table formally. The Special Envoy
stressed that the negotiating initiative was his own for the
time being, but he added that the EU Presidency (both the
current Czech leadership and the incoming Swedes) were aware
and supportive of it, that that some EU capitals -- including
Paris, where Bruno Joubert was on board -- wished him well
and might be inclined to formalize the activity. END
SUMMARY.
--------------
REBELS SEEM WILLING TO MEET GOC
--------------
2. (C) Ambassador Lennkh said that he had met recently in
Geneva with representatives of some of Chad's rebel groups --
in specific, those associated with the United Forces of
Resistance (UFR) -- and that another meeting was scheduled in
ten days. He noted that differences among the rebels were
marked, with some more inclined to consider returning home
and others more inclined to hold out. Lennkh said that the
URF seemed amenable to face-to-face discussions with the GOC,
but what their negotiating position would be remained to be
seen. He acknowledged that the GOC would likely need grand
gestures -- such as public renunciation of Sudanese support
on the part of the rebels, complemented by a parallel
statement from Sudan that Khartoum was not (no longer) the
rebels' backer -- to entice the GOC to appear for
negotiations.
--------------
SOME IN GOC OPEN TO DIALOGUE
--------------
3. (C) As for the GOC, Lennkh said he thought that some
officials were beginning to sense that the international
community, including the U.S. and France, felt the time had
come to negotiate. Lennkh, who met with Prime Minister
Youssouf Saleh Abbas and Minster of Infrastructure Adoum
Younousmi June 25, described Younousmi as open to sitting
down with the rebels, whereas Abbas was cautious in his
reactions to Lennkh's initiative. Lennkh noted that French
Presidential Advisor Bruno Joubert was enough of an
enthusiast that he had raised the need for dialogue with
Chadian President Deby. Lennkh conceded that the GOC
negotiating position, outlined in the October 2007 Sirte
Accord, signed with the rebel groups, was well known. But he
said that thought that the Sirte Accord "lacked real
authority," given that its implementation had been handed to
Libya and Sudan.
--------------
INFORMAL EFFORTS
--------------
4. (C) Lennkh underscored that his efforts at this stage
were on his own initiative, but he added that he had kept the
EU Presidency informed of his actions, and said he believe he
had the tacit approval of many in the EU officialdom. Lennkh
made clear that the EU would be supportive of making his
dialogue a formal process, hosted by an EU country, if it
seemed destined to take off. Charge noted that the USG had
proposed similar initiatives to the GOC on several occasions,
and that we would support anything that worked. She added
that with the EU, or an EU official such as Lennkh, in the
driver's seat, the initiative would have much more
credibility than it would if it were spearheaded, for
example, by private citizens. Lennkh asked to speak with S/E
Scott Gration when the latter was in N'Djamena June 27, but
NDJAMENA 00000259 002.4 OF 002
upon learning that he himself would leave before the S/E's
arrival, Lennkh agreed to seek an appointment with Gration in
Tripoli. Charge strongly recommended that Lennkh also speak
with AF A/S Johnnie Carson in Tripoli.
5. (U) Minimize considered.
BREMNER
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES - SE GRATION
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF SU LY EU CD
SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL ENVOY PURSUES GOC-REBEL DIALOGUE
NDJAMENA 00000259 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sue Bremner for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4
(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The EU,s Special Envoy for Africa, Ambassador Georg
Lennkh, updated Charge June 26 on his recent efforts to bring
the GOC and Chadian rebel groups together to discuss peaceful
resolution of their differences. Lennkh said that at least
some rebels seemed amenable to meeting with the GOC, and at
least one prominent GOC politician, Infrastructure Minister
Younousmi, had expressed interest in Lennkh's efforts.
Lennkh acknowledged that a strong push would be necessary to
bring the GOC to the table formally. The Special Envoy
stressed that the negotiating initiative was his own for the
time being, but he added that the EU Presidency (both the
current Czech leadership and the incoming Swedes) were aware
and supportive of it, that that some EU capitals -- including
Paris, where Bruno Joubert was on board -- wished him well
and might be inclined to formalize the activity. END
SUMMARY.
--------------
REBELS SEEM WILLING TO MEET GOC
--------------
2. (C) Ambassador Lennkh said that he had met recently in
Geneva with representatives of some of Chad's rebel groups --
in specific, those associated with the United Forces of
Resistance (UFR) -- and that another meeting was scheduled in
ten days. He noted that differences among the rebels were
marked, with some more inclined to consider returning home
and others more inclined to hold out. Lennkh said that the
URF seemed amenable to face-to-face discussions with the GOC,
but what their negotiating position would be remained to be
seen. He acknowledged that the GOC would likely need grand
gestures -- such as public renunciation of Sudanese support
on the part of the rebels, complemented by a parallel
statement from Sudan that Khartoum was not (no longer) the
rebels' backer -- to entice the GOC to appear for
negotiations.
--------------
SOME IN GOC OPEN TO DIALOGUE
--------------
3. (C) As for the GOC, Lennkh said he thought that some
officials were beginning to sense that the international
community, including the U.S. and France, felt the time had
come to negotiate. Lennkh, who met with Prime Minister
Youssouf Saleh Abbas and Minster of Infrastructure Adoum
Younousmi June 25, described Younousmi as open to sitting
down with the rebels, whereas Abbas was cautious in his
reactions to Lennkh's initiative. Lennkh noted that French
Presidential Advisor Bruno Joubert was enough of an
enthusiast that he had raised the need for dialogue with
Chadian President Deby. Lennkh conceded that the GOC
negotiating position, outlined in the October 2007 Sirte
Accord, signed with the rebel groups, was well known. But he
said that thought that the Sirte Accord "lacked real
authority," given that its implementation had been handed to
Libya and Sudan.
--------------
INFORMAL EFFORTS
--------------
4. (C) Lennkh underscored that his efforts at this stage
were on his own initiative, but he added that he had kept the
EU Presidency informed of his actions, and said he believe he
had the tacit approval of many in the EU officialdom. Lennkh
made clear that the EU would be supportive of making his
dialogue a formal process, hosted by an EU country, if it
seemed destined to take off. Charge noted that the USG had
proposed similar initiatives to the GOC on several occasions,
and that we would support anything that worked. She added
that with the EU, or an EU official such as Lennkh, in the
driver's seat, the initiative would have much more
credibility than it would if it were spearheaded, for
example, by private citizens. Lennkh asked to speak with S/E
Scott Gration when the latter was in N'Djamena June 27, but
NDJAMENA 00000259 002.4 OF 002
upon learning that he himself would leave before the S/E's
arrival, Lennkh agreed to seek an appointment with Gration in
Tripoli. Charge strongly recommended that Lennkh also speak
with AF A/S Johnnie Carson in Tripoli.
5. (U) Minimize considered.
BREMNER