MINURCAT CHIEF DESCRIBES POST-EUFOR TROOP

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000234 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES, IO/PKO, AND PRM/AFR NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL -- LORD PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM SU CT CD SUBJECT: MINURCAT CHIEF DESCRIBES POST-EUFOR TROOP CONTRIBUTION GAPS, INCREASING CHALLENGES IN CAR REF: N'DJAMENA 223 This message is sensitive but unclassified. Not for Internet dissemination. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On June 16, UN Special Representative Victor Angelo da Silva chaired a meeting of diplomatic reps in N'Djamena to address concerns about MINURCAT's peacekeeping activities, including the inability of some contributing states to deploy fully-equipped peacekeeping contingents in a timely manner to Eastern Chad. Angelo was flanked by MINURCAT Force Commander Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji of Kenya, who described shortfalls in manpower, armaments, equipment and transport, which Kandji said were becoming particularly acute as the last EUFOR units drew down in preparation for July departure. Additional MINURCAT officials, including the Acting UNPOL Commander and the Head of the Human Rights Section, reported on activities within their purviews. Angelo noted that the security situation in CAR was rapidly reaching a point where MINURCAT would have neither the mandate nor the military capability to respond, potentially leaving 40,000 CAR IDPs without international assistance. End summary. -------------- MINURCAT PEACEKEEPING -------------- ¶2. (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo devoted much of his monthly meeting for N'Djamena's diplomatic corps to a discussion of force generation and troop contribution matters. Force Commander Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji made clear that with one-third to one-half of expected international peacekeeping units yet to be deployed, or deployed without proper equipment, MINURCAT was having to make very targeted decisions about where to conduct patrols. As the rainy season approached, peacekeepers were focused on prepositioning supplies. Beyond that task, they were making a priority of humanitarian escorts and liaison with the NGO community. A mechanism for centralized escort requests had recently been established and seemed to be functioning well, said Kandji. The arrival of Russian experts deployed to CONAFIT (Chad's own Coordination national d'appui a la force internationale) was improving MINURCAT's coordination with the GoC, and Russia's provision of helicopters had increased the UN's lift and medevac capacities (which had previously depended on two Italian-provided C-130s and additional Polish assets). ¶3. (SBU) Kandji expressed concern that some newly-arriving international peacekeeping units had appeared without force protection equipment, meaning that they were for the time being "camping in Abeche," unable to perform duties independent of property-equipped peacekeepers, some of these holdover troops from the previous EUFOR deployment. Kandji noted that ensuring the rapid deployment of the remaining one-third of MINURCAT's promised troops before the final departure of EUFOR units would require considerable pressure in New York. In the course of June, Ghanaian and Nepalese units were set to arrive, but unless they brought suitable force protection gear, they would "just take up space." ¶4. (SBU) According to MINURCAT's Administrative Section Head, the chief problem facing the UN in Chad in addition to inadequate troop deployments was the failure of an ICAO team to complete preparation of the "apron" around the airfield at Abeche. The team would arrive later in the week, he noted, so the problem appeared to be on the road to resolution. The French Ambassador offered that although EUFOR troops might appear better-equipped than some non-European newcomers to MINURCAT, the reality was that repayment and financing problems were proving so difficult for the EU to handle that the entire concept of a separate European Security and Defense Policy had come in for questioning. --- DIS --- NDJAMENA 00000234 002 OF 003 ¶5. (SBU) The Acting Commander of MINURCAT's UN Police units (responsible for advising and training the Chadian Detachement integree de securite (DIS),which provides police protection in refugee camps) reported on the visit of a New York-based assessment mission sent to advise on how to overcome start-up problems with the Chadian force. The Acting Commander indicated that the assessment team had concluded that the DIS was functioning effectively despite certain well-publicized incidents. (See reftel for the assessment team's debrief to Embassy N'Djamena.) -------------- CHILD SOLDIERS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Head of MINURCAT's Human Rights Section described initiatives to address violence against women, noting that the phenomenon had most recently been reported in significant numbers in May, at the time of the Chadian Army's victory over Chadian rebels, following which soldiers from the Armee Nationale Tchadienne (ANT) had been accused of carrying out several rapes. The UN and DIS were involved with helping victims find means to bring charges and deal with the problem of impunity, as some soldiers claimed they were immune from prosecution. ¶7. (SBU) Impunity also remained a challenge with respect to the hiring of child soldiers, said the Human Rights Section Head, particularly among JEM commanders. The ANT, for its part, had essentially stopped the practice of recruiting children, he continued, but had not yet fulfilled its promises to demobilize those who were already a part of the force. MINUCAT had active programs of "sensitization" on the subject, and had found Chad's MoD quite receptive, to the point where the MoD had agreed to set up a transition center for child soldiers in Abeche. But desire at the higher levels of the Chadian government to end use of children in combat had not yet transferred into willingness on the part of some lower-level commanders to free minors in their charge. Meanwhile, Chadian rebels seemed to be continuing to recruit children, and were suspected of making sweeps through some villages in Eastern Chad in an effort to round up youngsters and take them to Sudan for training before the seasonal rains began. Some parents seemed inclined to show support for the rebel cause by offering up their children, said the Human Rights Section Head. Additional sensitization work was clearly needed among rebel groups and sympathizers. ¶8. (SBU) As for humanitarian demining, one major project in the vicinity of Am Dam was now completed, the Human Rights Section Head noted. The EU Ambassador to Chad added that his organization was engaged in a demining project in the vicinity of Goz Beida. -------------- SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION IN CAR -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Victor Angelo concluded the meeting with a description of the precarious situation in Northern CAR, where many NGOs had suspended operations in the course of the previous several days due to security concerns. MINURCAT was far from having the military capacity to deal with the security needs of northern CAR, Angelo continued, which was now characterized by a proliferation of ethnically-based militias on both sides of the Chad-CAR border, as well as rampant banditry in CAR. MINURCAT's relations with the CARG remained good, but Bozize's long-term ability to hold onto power in Bangui was far from certain, and had evaporated in the North. Under the circumstances, MINURCAT was considering airlifting supplies to vulnerable populations along the border, 40,000 of whom were on the CAR side and 70,000 of whom were in Chad. -------------- CHAD-SUDAN BORDER MONITORING -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Charge d'affaires spoke briefly with Victor NDJAMENA 00000234 003 OF 003 Angelo about the possibility of better coordination between MINURCAT and UNAMID, including through joint surveillance of the Chad-Sudan border (an idea originally proposed in the course of the visit of U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration to Chad in May.) Angelo recommended making a proposal in New York, as he said that neither he nor UNAMID's SRSG was well-placed to approach the other about a new joint mandate. BREMNER