Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NDJAMENA163
2009-05-10 12:35:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD UPDATE: FM FAKI'S MAY 9 REPLY TO U.S.

Tags:  MOPS ASEC PREL PREF SU UN AU LY FR CASC CD 
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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101235Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6906
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0024
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0615
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0225
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY 0053
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000163 

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

KHARTOUM FOR SE GRATION
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/USSES, S/ES-O, DS/CC, DS/IP/AF, DS/OSAC,
CA/OSC/ASC
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MOPS ASEC PREL PREF SU UN AU LY FR CASC CD
SUBJECT: CHAD UPDATE: FM FAKI'S MAY 9 REPLY TO U.S.
DEMARCHE, GOC POINTS FOR DIPLOMATIC CORPS

REF: NDJAMENA 156 AND PREVIOUS

NDJAMENA 00000163 001.2 OF 002


This message is Sensitive but Unclassified. Not for Internet
dissemination.

-------
SUMMARY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000163

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

KHARTOUM FOR SE GRATION
STATE FOR AF/C, AF/USSES, S/ES-O, DS/CC, DS/IP/AF, DS/OSAC,
CA/OSC/ASC
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MOPS ASEC PREL PREF SU UN AU LY FR CASC CD
SUBJECT: CHAD UPDATE: FM FAKI'S MAY 9 REPLY TO U.S.
DEMARCHE, GOC POINTS FOR DIPLOMATIC CORPS

REF: NDJAMENA 156 AND PREVIOUS

NDJAMENA 00000163 001.2 OF 002


This message is Sensitive but Unclassified. Not for Internet
dissemination.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Ambassador Nigro issued a demarche to FM Moussa
Faki Mahamat May 9 to discourage GoC hot pursuit of remaining
Chadian rebels into Sudan; to remind the GoC of the moral
high ground that Ndjamena occupied at present; to describe SE
Gration's efforts to convince the Sudanese government to
disarm Chadian rebels fleeing into Sudan; and to press the
GoC not to forsake opportunities for diplomatic resolution of
bilateral differences with Khartoum, including by
participating in a Contact Group meeting as foreseen in the
Dakar Accord. Faki indicated that the GoC was considering
next steps, but was not convinced that mediation through
Afro-Arab channels would bring about improvements in the
situation. He promised to stay in touch as GoC thinking
evolved and expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts thus far,
but made clear that continued GoC participation in attempts
to normalize relations with Sudan was no longer a given. End
summary.

--------------
DEMARCHE TO FAKI
--------------


2. (SBU) Ambassador and DCM called on FM Moussa Faki
Mahamat May 9 to congratulate the GoC for its decisive
military action against Chadian rebels May 6-7; to express
regret for loss of life; to recall the Department's public
condemnation of the Chadian rebel attacks and our efforts
toward a UNSC Chairman's statement along the same lines; to
urge Chad to avoid engaging in hot pursuit into Sudan as it
sought to restore order in eastern Chad; to describe SE Scott
Gration's efforts to convince the Sudanese government to
disarm and seize the armed vehicles of Chadian rebels who
attempted to return to Sudan; to accept an invitation to

attend an early Contact Group meeting; and to demonstrate
leadership in efforts to pursue peace and renewed
negotiations.


3. (SBU) Faki expressed thanks to the U.S. for our recent
public statements condemning the rebel attacks on Chad and
for the activities of SE Gration, but he emphasized that the
GoC was not convinced that mediation through the Dakar
Process would bear fruit. "We have concluded that negotiating
with Sudan will be hard, if not impossible, for the time
being," said Faki. He then drew attention to
"obstructionism" in New York on the part of the Chinese and
Libyan delegations with respect to the May 8 Chairman's
Statement about Chad-Sudan tensions. Faki noted that he had
called in the Chinese Ambassador, and that "China had its
regional interests, which were well known," as a partial
explanation for its unhelpful stance at the UN. Libya's
position was particularly disappointing to Chad, as it
rendered unlikely the possibility of successful African
mediation. "The Dakar Accord is now one year old, and Sudan
has never respected it," Faki offered, adding that Chad's
flexibility was perceived by Sudan as weakness. The Arab
League's support for Sudan as an "Arab" state made mediation
under those auspices problematic, he continued.


4. (SBU) Chad had not decided what course to pursue,
indicated Faki, but it thought that perhaps mediation with
the help of the UN, U.S. or EU might be a way forward.
Still, GoC participation in attempts to normalize relations
with Sudan was not a given, he emphasized. Chad could not
tolerate further Sudanese destabilization inside Chadian
borders, nor should the GoS's inability to regulate the

NDJAMENA 00000163 002.2 OF 002


situation in Darfur and South Sudan be accepted by the
international community. Chadian rebels were still being
recruited in Sudan, and rebel movements were still being
supplied with arms and vehicles, said Faki. Chad wanted to
protect Sudanese citizens seeking refuge in Chad, but the
rebel presence in the region was making this very difficult.


5. (SBU) Faki promised to tell President Deby of the U.S.
approach and made clear that he would consult with us on next
steps. He reiterated that "I can't anticipate what we will
do, but the cup is now running over." Ambassador again urged
prudence and restraint, pointing out that as the
international community absorbed the impact of recent events,
increased support would no doubt emerge, so long as Chad
exercised patience.

--------------
CONVOCATION OF DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY
--------------


6. (SBU) Our call on Faki followed his convocation of the
diplomatic, IO and NGO community May 8 to describe Chadian
military victories at Am-Dam and Haouish May 6 and 7. Faki
emphasized that Chad had been attacked by forces originating
in Sudan whose intention was to overthrow democratic
institutions in Chad. He indicated that the GoC had
inflicted heavy casualties but was still engaged in
mopping-up operations. He castigated Sudan's duplicity
toward Chad and the IC, its violation of the Tripoli, Riyadh
and Dakar Agreements, and its rejection of the just-signed
Doha Accord. Faki praised French, U.S. and Senegalese
statements with respect to the conflict, quoting extensively
from the Department spokesman's comments of May 7. He urged
greater international attention to Chad-Sudan tensions and
asked nations to work in the UNSC and AU to try to identify
ways to resolve the conflict.

--------------
FRANCE-CHAD
--------------


7. (SBU) French President Sarkozy called Deby the evening
of May 7 and urged Chad not to carry the war into Sudan.
French Ambassador Bruno Foucher talked to Faki twice May 9 to
press for a policy of restraint and patience.

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COMMENT
--------------


8. (SBU) The change in Chad's diplomatic and military
strategy presaged by Faki would be considerable. We will
analyze its potential impact septel.


9. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO