CHAD UPDATE: FM FAKI'S MAY 9 REPLY TO U.S.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000163 SIPDIS SENSITIVE KHARTOUM FOR SE GRATION STATE FOR AF/C, AF/USSES, S/ES-O, DS/CC, DS/IP/AF, DS/OSAC, CA/OSC/ASC NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON LONDON FOR POL -- LORD PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MOPS ASEC PREL PREF SU UN AU LY FR CASC CD SUBJECT: CHAD UPDATE: FM FAKI'S MAY 9 REPLY TO U.S. DEMARCHE, GOC POINTS FOR DIPLOMATIC CORPS REF: NDJAMENA 156 AND PREVIOUS NDJAMENA 00000163 001.2 OF 002 This message is Sensitive but Unclassified. Not for Internet dissemination. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Ambassador Nigro issued a demarche to FM Moussa Faki Mahamat May 9 to discourage GoC hot pursuit of remaining Chadian rebels into Sudan; to remind the GoC of the moral high ground that Ndjamena occupied at present; to describe SE Gration's efforts to convince the Sudanese government to disarm Chadian rebels fleeing into Sudan; and to press the GoC not to forsake opportunities for diplomatic resolution of bilateral differences with Khartoum, including by participating in a Contact Group meeting as foreseen in the Dakar Accord. Faki indicated that the GoC was considering next steps, but was not convinced that mediation through Afro-Arab channels would bring about improvements in the situation. He promised to stay in touch as GoC thinking evolved and expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts thus far, but made clear that continued GoC participation in attempts to normalize relations with Sudan was no longer a given. End summary. -------------- DEMARCHE TO FAKI -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador and DCM called on FM Moussa Faki Mahamat May 9 to congratulate the GoC for its decisive military action against Chadian rebels May 6-7; to express regret for loss of life; to recall the Department's public condemnation of the Chadian rebel attacks and our efforts toward a UNSC Chairman's statement along the same lines; to urge Chad to avoid engaging in hot pursuit into Sudan as it sought to restore order in eastern Chad; to describe SE Scott Gration's efforts to convince the Sudanese government to disarm and seize the armed vehicles of Chadian rebels who attempted to return to Sudan; to accept an invitation to attend an early Contact Group meeting; and to demonstrate leadership in efforts to pursue peace and renewed negotiations. ¶3. (SBU) Faki expressed thanks to the U.S. for our recent public statements condemning the rebel attacks on Chad and for the activities of SE Gration, but he emphasized that the GoC was not convinced that mediation through the Dakar Process would bear fruit. "We have concluded that negotiating with Sudan will be hard, if not impossible, for the time being," said Faki. He then drew attention to "obstructionism" in New York on the part of the Chinese and Libyan delegations with respect to the May 8 Chairman's Statement about Chad-Sudan tensions. Faki noted that he had called in the Chinese Ambassador, and that "China had its regional interests, which were well known," as a partial explanation for its unhelpful stance at the UN. Libya's position was particularly disappointing to Chad, as it rendered unlikely the possibility of successful African mediation. "The Dakar Accord is now one year old, and Sudan has never respected it," Faki offered, adding that Chad's flexibility was perceived by Sudan as weakness. The Arab League's support for Sudan as an "Arab" state made mediation under those auspices problematic, he continued. ¶4. (SBU) Chad had not decided what course to pursue, indicated Faki, but it thought that perhaps mediation with the help of the UN, U.S. or EU might be a way forward. Still, GoC participation in attempts to normalize relations with Sudan was not a given, he emphasized. Chad could not tolerate further Sudanese destabilization inside Chadian borders, nor should the GoS's inability to regulate the NDJAMENA 00000163 002.2 OF 002 situation in Darfur and South Sudan be accepted by the international community. Chadian rebels were still being recruited in Sudan, and rebel movements were still being supplied with arms and vehicles, said Faki. Chad wanted to protect Sudanese citizens seeking refuge in Chad, but the rebel presence in the region was making this very difficult. ¶5. (SBU) Faki promised to tell President Deby of the U.S. approach and made clear that he would consult with us on next steps. He reiterated that "I can't anticipate what we will do, but the cup is now running over." Ambassador again urged prudence and restraint, pointing out that as the international community absorbed the impact of recent events, increased support would no doubt emerge, so long as Chad exercised patience. -------------- CONVOCATION OF DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Our call on Faki followed his convocation of the diplomatic, IO and NGO community May 8 to describe Chadian military victories at Am-Dam and Haouish May 6 and 7. Faki emphasized that Chad had been attacked by forces originating in Sudan whose intention was to overthrow democratic institutions in Chad. He indicated that the GoC had inflicted heavy casualties but was still engaged in mopping-up operations. He castigated Sudan's duplicity toward Chad and the IC, its violation of the Tripoli, Riyadh and Dakar Agreements, and its rejection of the just-signed Doha Accord. Faki praised French, U.S. and Senegalese statements with respect to the conflict, quoting extensively from the Department spokesman's comments of May 7. He urged greater international attention to Chad-Sudan tensions and asked nations to work in the UNSC and AU to try to identify ways to resolve the conflict. -------------- FRANCE-CHAD -------------- ¶7. (SBU) French President Sarkozy called Deby the evening of May 7 and urged Chad not to carry the war into Sudan. French Ambassador Bruno Foucher talked to Faki twice May 9 to press for a policy of restraint and patience. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The change in Chad's diplomatic and military strategy presaged by Faki would be considerable. We will analyze its potential impact septel. ¶9. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO