Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NDJAMENA132
2009-04-16 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD/SUDAN BORDER VIOLENCE? INDICATORS NEGATIVE

Tags:  ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU CD 
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VZCZCXRO2578
RR RUEHBZ
DE RUEHNJ #0132/01 1061420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161420Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6861
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0599
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0212
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0040
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000132 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S, AF/C
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON
STATE PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN BORDER VIOLENCE? INDICATORS NEGATIVE
ON THE CHAD SIDE

REF: A. NIGRO-ASQUINO TELCON 04/17

B. KHARTOUM 0525

NDJAMENA 00000132 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000132

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S, AF/C
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON
STATE PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN BORDER VIOLENCE? INDICATORS NEGATIVE
ON THE CHAD SIDE

REF: A. NIGRO-ASQUINO TELCON 04/17

B. KHARTOUM 0525

NDJAMENA 00000132 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) We do not see indications of impending Chad military
offensive against Chad rebels based in Sudan at this time,
notwithstanding claims made by interlocutors in conversations
reported in REFTEL. In the interests of providing
perspective to addressees, as well as of correcting factual
errors made by interlocutors, we offer a number of comments
on statements reported in REFTEL.


2. (C) We are not predicting that things will not get violent
along the border at some point: We are saying only that we
have no indications here, as well as from the Chadian side of
the Chad-Sudan border, of an impending Chad military
preemptive or preventive attack, nor of impending rebel
attacks in strength.


3. (C) We have coordinated this message with Embassy
Khartoum. END SUMMARY.

--------------
OUR PERSPECTIVE
--------------


4. The View From Here:

-- There is right now no/no indication here of any impending
military offensive by the GOC. That does not mean that there
will not be one, only that none of the signals we would
expect have been detected. For instance, if the Chadians
were to attack Chad rebels in Sudan preemptively, they would
use air assets first: There is now no/no indication of
preparations to use those assets offensively. There is no
extraordinary activity at military and intelligence HQs here.
There has been no general mobilization or redeployment of
Chad military units recently.

-- Our current analysis of the situation is generally shared
by the GOC, the French, the MINURCAT military structure, and
UNDSS.

-- We do not pretend to predict what the GOC will do if it
perceives an imminent attack from Chad rebels in Sudan, and
we would not rule out such a preemptive attack. The GOC has
said publicly and privately that if Chad rebels attack the
ANT will go in hot pursuit of them into Sudan if it can. We
do not doubt this.

-- The Chad military is much stronger military vis-a-vis the
Chad rebels than formerly. But a preemptive attack into
Sudan would open it up to response from Sudanese armed
forces, which a very different matter entirely. The Chad
military is not ready for this contingency.

-- We do not credit rebel claims that their fighters number
10,000. Credible low estimates put rebel strength around
3,000; less credible high estimates run to around 6,000. We
estimate that the number of rebel vehicles, in some ways more
important than numbers of fighters, at 400. That would mean
25 of any 10,000 fighters to each vehicle, tight even by
Chadian standards.

-- We do not credit rebel claims of new-found unity among
famously fractious rebel commanders. The best information we
have demonstrates continued deep divisions among the rebel
formations, each ethnically based and loyal (this is a
relative term) to a tribal leader.

--------------

NDJAMENA 00000132 002.3 OF 002


DATA POINTS
--------------


5. What We Know:

-- There is no/no movement of Chadians into Cameroon aside
from normal commercial traffic, as interlocutor alleged in
REFTEL,para 3.

-- There is no/no way that 10,000 Chad rebels could be inside
Chad without the GOC, MINURCAT, UNDSS, French military and we
knowing about it. There might be some rebel presence in the
Modeina "pocket" but that is not the area that the
interlocutor identified. The Modeina "pocket" itself, where
Chad rebels do often establish a small presence, could not
physically hold thousands of troops and hundreds of vehicles.

-- Hajar al Marfein, the area the interlocutor identified as
the area of massive Chad rebel presence, is not "just across
the border from El Geneina in West Darfur," as the
interlocutor described it. Hajar Al Marfein is an area in
the triangle region of Sudan, Chad and CAR, GEOCORD 11 10'
00" N 022 57' 00" E. The town of Adre, which hosts the
Chadian military main base in Eastern Chad, is just west of
El Geneina.


6. Tripoli minimize considered.
NIGRO

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