MAKING CHAD A PART OF THE SOLUTION IN DARFUR: AN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000111 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR SE GRATION, AF/FO, AF/C, AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM PTER MASS LY SU CT CD SUBJECT: MAKING CHAD A PART OF THE SOLUTION IN DARFUR: AN ACTION PLAN FOR POSITIVE OUTCOMES IN THE REGION REF: A. 1. NDJAMENA 103 ¶B. 2. NDJAMENA 102 ¶C. 3. NDJAMENA 100 ¶D. 4. NDJAMENA 98 ¶E. 5. NDJAMENA 97 This message is Sensitive but Unclassified. Not for Internet dissemination. ¶1. This is an action message: See para 5 and subsequent. -------------- CHAD MOST AFFECTED BY DARFUR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Besides Sudan itself, Chad is the country most affected by the Darfur Crisis. Virtually all Darfuri refugees are in Chad, which also hosts a vast humanitarian assistance effort and a UN PKO, MINURCAT. Darfur-created tensions between Chad and Sudan have degenerated into a proxy war that has made Chad prey to Sudan-sponsored Chadian rebels. These groups regularly attack, reaching Ndjamena twice in the past three years, nearly overturning the government, and causing havoc, taking innocent lives and destroying infrastructure across the country. The GOC's security needs have led to high defense spending, reduced funding for social and economic development, and far less attention to elections and government reform than we would like. -------------- GOC SEEKS USG ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Government of Chad is obsessed with the regional nature of the Darfur crisis and seeks to engage with the USG to resolve Darfur-created instability. The GOC is eager to see the results of the USG's review of Sudan policy, and keen to work with us as we implement policies that address problems in Sudan as well as in Chad. Chadian officials hope for U.S. support for, and more active involvement in, UN, AU and OIC efforts to manage the Darfur crisis and improve Chad-Sudan relations. They would like existing Afro-Arab efforts to include initiatives not only to reconcile Sudanese rebels with the GoS but also to end Sudanese financial and material support to Chadian rebels. Domestically, the threat from Sudan discourages and undermines efforts by many, including the current Prime Minister, to toward better governance, democratic elections, and official transparency. Chadian officials will need considerable encouragement and assistance to move toward elections on schedule, to take concrete steps to restore relations with IFIs, and to conduct institution-building and development of the public sector and economy. MINURCAT's "civilian" mandate to promote human rights and spur judicial and penal reform now join robust EU and French efforts to promote better and more effective governance. -------------- U.S. INTERESTS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The USG's humanitarian interests in Darfur are obvious. Our interests in Chad derive from the nation's proximity to and implication in the Darfur situation. The USG already invests heavily in Chad: In 2009, we will spend approximately USD 125 million to assist refugees and IDPs, and upwards of USD 150 million on MINURCAT. Chad thus already serves as a platform for carrying out our regional stabilization goals. But the current platform is unstable and could tip in a negative direction if we do not shore it up. We should keep in mind the extreme fragility of the Chadian state, one of the weakest in the world. Preventing Chad from moving toward failing- or failed-state status is a legitimate aim of USG policy, and merits greater attention. We believe that we can use our presence here more effectively by undertaking some if not all of the additional steps outlined below. -------------- AN ACTION PLAN FOR REGIONAL PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION IN DARFUR -------------- ¶5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: That the U.S. consider enhancing Darfur policy options by taking actions vis-a-vis Chad and the GOC, in the areas of Diplomacy, Democracy/Good Governance, Counterterrorism Cooperation, and Security NDJAMENA 00000111 002 OF 003 Assistance, and by reinforcing Embassy Ndjamena's ability to implement USG policy here, outlined in paras 6-10 below. -------------- DIPLOMACY -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The USG could: -- Re-Designate SE as "Special Envoy for Sudan and Eastern Chad" or "Special Envoy for Sudan, Eastern Chad, and Northeastern CAR"; -- Arrange an early visit to Chad by SE Gration; -- Arrange an early visit to Chad by an AF Bureau senior official; -- Provide an early invitation to a senior Chadian leader to visit Washington, with assurances of appropriately high-level meetings; -- Encourage the UK to establish its (planned) diplomatic presence here; -- Encourage Turkey to establish its (planned) diplomatic mission here ASAP; -- Encourage the Saudis to reopen their Embassy here; -- Consult more closely with the French and EU on Chad; -- Consult with the Libyans and the Qataris on their efforts toward Chad-Sudan reconciliation; -- Increase USG support to MINURCAT by: Assigning more U.S. military advisers to MINURCAT; assigning U.S. police officers to UNPOL; and contributing to the Trust Fund for civil affairs projects. -------------- DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The USG could: -- Increase USG assistance to the 2010 election process; -- Review the USG approach to Chad's relations with the IFIs, with a view to encouraging each side to better meet the other's expectations; -- Facilitate meetings in Washington for the Chadian Finance Minister and senior officials from Treasury; -- Consider USG technical assistance to Chad in the area of public finance and resource management; -- Consider deploying a G/TIP TDY team to Chad to provide advice on resolving trafficking issues, with the aim of avoiding sanctions. -------------- COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The USG could: -- Restart military-to-military CT cooperation under TSCTP, and reinforce that point with a visit by AFRICOM CG Ward. (Restarting TSCTP cooperation is already in train, but will be facilitated by resolving Leahy Vetting procedural issues.) -- Reinforce ongoing civilian CT cooperation, including by visits here by senior S/CT and/or ICITAP leaders. (This also will be facilitated by resolution of Leahy Vetting procedural issues.) -------------- SECURITY ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The USG could: -- Increase funding for IMET and FMS programs; -- Seek a U.S.-produced alternative to C-130Js for Chad. NDJAMENA 00000111 003 OF 003 -------------- U.S. RESOURCES IN COUNTRY -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The USG could: -- Assign Long-term TDY Reporting Officer to Embassy Ndamena dedicated to the situation in Darfur and Eastern Chad. -- Deploy an S/CRS Team to Chad. -- Ensure increased USAID/OFDA TDY presence in country. -- Provide increased travel funding so Embassy Officers could make working visits to Khartoum, Tripoli, Paris and Brussels. NIGRO