SOMALIA - ASSISTING THE TFG WITH THEIR OUTREACH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000624 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND ACTING A/S CARTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2034 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PTER SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ASSISTING THE TFG WITH THEIR OUTREACH REF: NAIROBI 594 Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Robert Patterson for reasons 1.4( b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Post continues working to assist the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in developing and implementing its media strategy, and the TFG remains very willing to receive any help offered. Indeed, President Sharif repeated a request for assistance during his March 19 dinner with Ambassador Ranneberger (reftel). In the course of President Sharif's recent visit to Nairobi, we met with his Chief of Staff and other staffers and reiterated our offer to assist. Recent mixed messages sent on AMISOM, and the TFG,s response to an Osama Bin Laden tape, suggest that there is much to do on the media front. End summary. -------------- Gaffes Demonstrate Need for Assistance -------------- ¶2. (C) As President Sharif noted to Ambassador Ranneberger during their March 19 dinner (reftel),the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is aware of the importance of a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy and has asked Post to assist in developing and implementing such a strategy. Immediately after President Sharif was elected, we met with his staffers in Djibouti and presented an outline of ways in which the USG could assist in their effort to develop an outreach strategy. We had a follow-on meeting in Nairobi on March 19 with Sharif's Chief of Staff, Hassan Sheikh Ali Moalim, and Abdirisak Aden, formerly an advisor to Sharif and now Director for External Relations for the TFG's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Note: the TFG use the title "Director" to mean a person who is in charge of a particular ministry's interaction with other TFG ministries. End note.) Moalim stated that Sharif had designated Hassan Abdi Hayle as TFG spokesman, but said that Hayle is not ready to make a full-fledged announcement about his title and functions. ¶3. (C) In the meantime, the TFG continues to struggle with presenting a unified front in the media. For example, during the March 19 meeting, which took place several hours after the release of Osama Bin Laden's taped threat to Sharif, both Moalim and Aden told us in Nairobi that all elements of the TFG had agreed not to dignify the tape with a response. Only a few hours later, the Minister of Information, who was in Mogadishu, came out with a statement condemning the tape. More recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Information have made contradictory statements about the presence of AMISOM troops in Somalia. We do not believe these are malicious efforts to undermine counterparts, but simply the products of a lack of coordination among different parts of the same government. ¶4. (C) During the Djibouti and Nairobi meetings, we also offered to share our vast network of Somali media outlets when the TFG wants to reach out to stations apart from the "usual suspects." Moalim asked how to get international media to Mogadishu to see the new TFG administration in action. We offered to link the TFG with our network of international media contacts, most based in Nairobi, once the TFG has done some planning and can offer a coordinated plan for a media tour, with particular emphasis on security of the journalists. We also offered to advise, based on our interactions with Nairobi-based media, which outlets might offer the best chance at a fair portrayal of the TFG when President Sharif and other TFG principals are ready to reach out the international press again. -------------- Immediate and Longer-Term Plans -------------- ¶5. (SBU) In the near term, Post is in touch with Moalim, Aden, and the Minister of Information on a regular basis and we continue to emphasize our availability for consultation as needed. When Hayle is ready to embark more vigorously on his job, we will work with him remotely and in person to offer any advice he feels he needs. Most importantly, we will encourage the TFG to work through the decision of who - the spokesman or Minister of Information - has primary responsibility for speaking for the TFG. We are working to NAIROBI 00000624 002 OF 002 reproduce some instructional material from the Department, including the very helpful booklet, "A Responsible Press Office." We are also working to lin the TFG spokesman with the AMISOM spokesman, with whom we have an excellent relationship, so they can coordinate their outreach efforts in Mogadishu, highlighting successes of both the TFG and AMISOM. ¶6. (SBU) Longer term, we intend to feed suggested press releases and talking points to the TFG when events merit media interaction. We will also help the TFG coordinate the media tour, if conditions on the ground allow such an undertaking. We believe that as the TFG gets more comfortable, the press operations will become more refined and effective. We intend to be at the forefront of that effort. One large project we are exploring is a Digital Video Conference (DVC) setup inside Villa Somalia, which would allow President Sharif and others to do live media work from inside Mogadishu, reaching those who are not able to travel to Mogadishu but allowing him to remain in the capital. RANNEBERGER