U.S. Policy, the Reform Agenda, and Impact of President

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 000407 SIPDIS SENSITIVE FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL 02/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KE SUBJECT: U.S. Policy, the Reform Agenda, and Impact of President Obama's Election Ref: (A) Nairobi 391 (B) Nairobi 284 (C) Nairobi 285 (D) 08 Nairobi 2851 (E) Nairobi 90 (F) 08 Nairobi 2768 (G) Nairobi 255 and previous Classified by: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary. This message discusses the status of the reform agenda agreed to by the coalition government, the central U.S. role to ensure its full implementation, and specific steps we are taking. The election of President Obama, viewed here as a "son of Kenya," has greatly enhanced already strong U.S. leverage. The relatively slow pace of implementation of the reform agenda, coupled with revelations of serious corruption, have caused many Kenyans to become increasingly skeptical of the coalition government. However, while much remains to be accomplished, significant progress has been made on the reform agenda (the constitutional review process is moving forward, for example). Implementing the reform agenda means tackling the culture of impunity which has prevailed in Kenya since independence and bringing about fundamental change. This will not be an easy process. With strong U.S. engagement to support the reform agenda (directly with the President and Prime Minister, and with civil society, the private sector, religious groups, and the media) there are reasonable prospects Kenya will stay on the democratic path. End summary. -------------- The Daunting Reform Agenda -------------- ¶2. (C) As Kenyans approach the February 28 first anniversary of the formation of the grand coalition government, a national debate is underway about the fate of the reform agenda to which the coalition government committed itself. The United States played a major role in pushing for formation of the coalition government, and we have a strong interest in seeing the reform agenda fully implemented. The coalition government was the political solution to the electoral crisis, without which Kenya would have descended into prolonged violence in a way which would have exacerbated already strong ethnic tensions. The creation of the coalition government kept Kenya on the democratic path. ¶3. (C) The watershed crisis starkly revealed the underlying unresolved issues which have plagued Kenya since independence, particularly the culture of impunity that has fostered rampant corruption and undermined the rule of law; inequitable distribution of wealth; ethnic tension; and lack of coherent land policy, among other issues. The coalition government committed itself - through a mediation process led by Kofi Annan and the African Eminent Persons, and strongly supported by us -- to a far-reaching reform agenda to address these and other issues. Civil society and the private sector provided important and influential input and impetus into development of the reform agenda through the mediation process led by Kofi Annan and the eminent persons, with the U.S. strongly supporting. The reform agenda embraces: constitutional revision; establishment of a new independent electoral commission; holding accountable those involved in post-election violence; fighting corruption; addressing ethnic tensions; police reform; land reform; judicial reform; and a range of other provisions. ¶4. (C) The heart of the reform agenda includes: revising the constitution, culminating in a national referendum on a new constitution, hopefully by the end of 2009; the disbanding of the tainted electoral commission and establishment of a truly independent commission; tackling corruption; addressing ethnic tensions; and holding accountable those involved in post-election violence either through creation of a Special Tribunal in Kenya or by turning over the list of suspects (held by Kofi Annan) to the International Criminal Court (ICC). ¶5. (C) Some progress has been made, but without sustained and focused pressure from within Kenya and from Kenya's international partners, particularly the U.S., the reform process could falter, threatening renewed instability. Kenyans' expectations were very high - perhaps unrealistically high -- that the coalition government would bring about significant change quickly, and many Kenyans are frustrated with the mixed results so far. (We should keep in mind that, following the agreement to form the coalition government on Feb. 28 last year, it took another two months to form the cabinet, so the coalition government is less than a year old.) On the positive side, the Parliament has named a panel of experts to examine the constitution and make recommendations for significant revisions. The objective is to develop a consensus version but, if that cannot be achieved, contentious items may be put to a separate line-item vote NAIROBI 00000407 002 OF 005 in the constitutional referendum. Kenyans understand that constitutional provisions to divide power between the President and Prime Minister, and provisions for devolution of authority to local levels, are essential to mitigate ethnic tensions (since winner-take-all politics has been a key source of ethnic competition and tension; every election in Kenya's history has been characterized by a degree of violence). Parliament is also in the final stages of naming an interim independent electoral commission to oversee the referendum. ¶6. (C) Though not an exhaustive list, other reform steps that have been undertaken include: the discredited Electoral Commission was disbanded, and efforts are underway to set up a new interim electoral commission. Legislation to establish a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission has been passed. The Prime Minister's office is assuming greater stature, with the PM chairing Cabinet Sub-Committee meetings, and presiding over a new Parliamentary question time. The Political Parties Act has been implemented. Significant long-pending legislation of interest to the U.S. has been passed, including an Anti-Counterfeiting law and a Bio-Safety (GMO) law. -------------- Accountability and the Culture of Impunity -------------- ¶7. (C) The most contentious issue is how to hold accountable those suspected of involvement in post-electoral violence. The Waki commission formed to investigate the violence developed a confidential list of 10 senior figures suspected of having organized and funded the violence; the list has been entrusted to Kofi Annan. Kofi Annan, the chief mediator in the negotiations that resulted in the reform agenda, has urged Kenyans to set up a credible local Special Tribunal, and has made clear that, if this is not done, he will turn the list over to the ICC for investigation and prosecution. Many Kenyans have indicated they prefer action by the ICC, since they do not believe that a credible Special Tribunal can be set up in Kenya, given the culture of impunity. Annan and the Commission anticipated this problem, and there is a provision for international prosecutors and judges to be part of the Tribunal. Although President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga have lobbied for a Special Tribunal, in a vote heavily colored by ethnic considerations, Parliament recently rejected formation of the Tribunal. A loose coalition of political kingpin ethnic group leaders in the Parliament, supporting figures believed to be on the list, defeated the constitutional amendment to set up the Tribunal. Those opposing the Special Tribunal know what ordinary Kenyans do not understand: that the ICC would likely take years to investigate even a couple of the cases and that this delay would favor those suspected to be on the list, and who do not want to see the swifter action that would likely occur under a Special Tribunal. Following the negative Parliamentary vote, Kofi Annan told the Ambassador he strongly favors reopening the debate and persuading Parliament to agree to set up of a Special Tribunal in Kenya. He has given the coalition government more time (exact time unspecified) to win Parliamentary agreement, or he will send the matter to The Hague. -------------- Corruption and Skepticism -------------- ¶8. (C) Against the backdrop of relatively slow progress on the reform agenda, Kenyans have been buffeted by a series of media reports about multiple cases of alleged major corruption (septel),two of which have had a direct and immediate impact on Kenyans. The first concerns diversion of petroleum, which left Kenyans facing severe fuel shortages. The second, and more serious case, involves allegations of illegal -- or at least unethical -- allocations of maize stocks by the National Cereals Board. This scandal comes at a time when Kenyans are facing real shortages of their staple white maize (due to a combination of reduced cultivation due to the post-election violence, poor rains, the high price of fertilizer, rising world food prices, and the high local 26 percent inflation on commodities, all in the context of outdated statist policies and corruption). Kenyans are long-suffering, but the hunger is real in the slums surrounding Nairobi and in outlying areas, and it is remarkable that Kenya has not yet experienced the type of food riots seen in so many other countries along the Equator. ¶9. (C) The intersection of the relatively slow pace of implementation of the reform agenda and the perception of unabated corruption have caused popular support for the coalition government to drop from a high of 80 percent to about 66 percent, according to recent polls. While the issues Kenyans are concerned about are real, the media - after having played a highly constructive role during the crisis - has reverted to a more sensationalist mode, playing on the dashed hopes of many who want to believe that the time for real and meaningful change has finally come. This, coupled with those who insist on seeing the glass as half empty, has created a cynical mood NAIROBI 00000407 003 OF 005 among many who, after years of disappointment by successive Kenyan governments, were already predisposed to see the worst. -------------- U.S. Policy - Our Central Role -------------- ¶10. (C) The United States has a strong interest in seeing the coalition government succeed through implementation of the reform agenda. A Kenya that provides the hope of an improved standard of living and more responsible and responsive government is a Kenya that can best partner with us in the region, including on counter-terrorism and democracy-building. As I have pointed out in numerous public remarks, the reform agenda, if fully implemented, will launch a process of fundamental change and bolster democracy in Kenya. The watershed crisis has presented an opportunity that Kenyans must seize; if not, Kenya will likely experience a far more severe crisis in the lead up to or during the 2012 national elections. (During the electoral crisis last year, serious people were talking about the possibility of disintegration into civil war.) ¶11. (C) Kenya and the United States have long enjoyed a strong partnership (over $2.5 billion in public and private resources flow to Kenya from the U.S. annually),and the U.S. played a decisive role in bringing about formation of the coalition government. Kenyans are looking to the U.S. to help push forward the reform agenda. (A Gallup poll last year reported that 89 percent of Kenyans saw the role played by the U.S. as positive.) The other key outside players are Kofi Annan and Germany (which used the German coalition model to help influence development of the Kenyan coalition). The UK and EU have not yet recovered from their wrong-footed approach in response to the disputed elections, and so have very limited influence with the key players. ¶12. (C) I have repeatedly pointed out to the Kenyan people that, while the U.S. played a key role in helping to resolve the crisis, we could not have done so if the Kenyan people themselves had not put pressure on their leaders to end the crisis. Encouraged by our forthright position articulated at the time of the disputed election, a loose coalition of civil society, religious leaders, the private sector, the media, and ordinary Kenyans spoke out as never before to make clear they wanted Kibaki and Odinga to achieve a political solution. The violence of the crisis shocked Kibaki and Odinga, but it was the peaceful pressure coming from the majority of Kenyans that influenced them to see beyond the vested interests of their hard-core inner circles and negotiate a deal. Following resolution of the crisis, Kenyans were exhausted and they understandably relaxed, perhaps with exaggerated expectations of what the coalition government could and would achieve. ¶13. (C) Kibaki and Odinga are old school politicians, no doubt, but they were genuinely taken aback by the severity of the crisis that threatened to tear the country apart; as a result, they understand and acknowledge the necessity for reforms. However, their horizons for change are constrained by vested interests, limited by their respective political agendas, and hobbled by their long political backgrounds and upbringing. The Parliament which was elected last year is buffeted by these same factors as well as ethnic considerations, and has thus far not lived up to expectations to help drive the reform agenda. (U.S.-sponsored live coverage of Parliament, which began in recent months, may help energize the Members, since Kenyans watch the coverage and are starting to comment about the Members' lackluster performance and pursuit of narrow personal agendas.) -------------- U.S. Policy and Actions -------------- ¶14. (C) There is no viable alternative to the coalition government, but it must be pressed to carry through with implementation of the reform agenda; otherwise Kenya is unlikely to make it peacefully through the elections in 2012. The stalled efforts to set up the Special Tribunal coupled with reports of corruption have provided wake-up calls to Kibaki and Odinga, and to the Kenyan people. We are pursuing concerted, well-coordinated efforts to change the incentive structure to increase the cost of "business as usual," while encouraging implementation of the reform agenda. -- Through vigorous public diplomacy in Nairobi and around the country I am urging the coalition leaders to accelerate reform efforts and tackle corruption. I am encouraging them to get the Special Tribunal bill back on track by consulting with Parliamentarians and civil society to address their legitimate concerns so that the Tribunal will be credible to Kenyans. -- I am in close touch with Kibaki and Odinga to press them to move forward on the reform agenda, including through decisive steps NAIROBI 00000407 004 OF 005 against corruption, and I am making clear that they have our strong support to do so in the face of vested interests. -- I am in regular contact with Kofi Annan to coordinate efforts. Annan recently told me that he welcomes our efforts and sees the U.S. role as crucial. -- We are intensifying engagement with key civil society leaders, religious groups, the private sector, and the media to encourage them, in effect, to reconstitute the loose coalition that exerted the pressure to help resolve last year's crisis in order to push for full implementation of the reform agenda. -- We are engaging with Parliamentarians to emphasize the role they must play to support implementation of the reform agenda. -- Through USAID programs, including the Office of Transition Initiatives, and a range of other activities including military-supported civic action programs, we are supporting efforts to promote national reconciliation and to ease ethnic tensions. -- As laid out in the Mission Strategic Plan and Mission reporting, we have strong democracy and governance programs aimed at promoting transparency and fighting corruption. ¶15. (C) I believe that concerted actions by us and the range of Kenyan actors who want to see change stands a good chance of bring about implementation of the reform agenda. There can be no moving back after having crossed such a major watershed last year. While progress has been made, we must not downplay the large challenges ahead. Moving ahead with the reform agenda challenges the culture of impunity which has prevailed in Kenya for 45 years, and thus almost all political actors are compromised to one degree or another. Fundamental change will not be achieved overnight. Still, Kibaki and Odinga have logical reasons for wanting to get results: there have been some indications that Kibaki may be rising at least a bit above his ethnic Kikuyu agenda, and may be at least somewhat concerned about leaving a credible legacy. Odinga wants to gain popular support for his anticipated presidential bid in 2012. Parliamentarians are under greater scrutiny by the Kenyan people, and this will probably influence them to act constructively. ¶16. (C) If the reform agenda does not move forward over the next several months, we should consider exerting greater pressure. None is more effective than the threat of taking away visas (potentially applicable under 212F if we can document involvement in corruption, and other provisions relating to participation in violence and human rights abuses). Continued U.S. engagement with Kibaki and Odinga at the most senior levels will also be important. We have many points of leverage. I have made clear to both Kibaki and Odinga that the AGOA forum scheduled for August in Kenya, and a trade and investment mission that Odinga wants to lead to the U.S. in April, will only be successful if greater progress has been made on the reform agenda and against corruption before then, and I have laid out in detail what needs to be accomplished -------------- --- President Obama's Election Enhances Our Leverage -------------- --- ¶17. (C) Finally, and very importantly, I want to highlight the impact of President Obama's election on Kenya. Kenyans view the President as a "son of Kenya," and they are inspired by his story. Many commentators have emphasized the way he has inspired young people here. It is impossible to overestimate his popularity across the country. I have been calling attention to the speech which then Senator Obama gave when he visited Kenya in August 2006, when he focused on the twin problems of corruption and ethnic politics, themes he echoed in his inaugural address. His election greatly enhances U.S. influence and leverage in Kenya. Kibaki and Odinga fully understand this, and virtually compete to see who can best attach himself to the theme of change and renewal. They and all the other actors in Kenya, as well as ordinary Kenyans, are more eager than ever before to hear our views, to address our concerns, and to take nto account our suggestions. -------------- Prospects for Progress -------------- ¶18. (C) The role the U.S. played to help resolve the electoral crisis was a good example of exercising smart, soft power. We must continue to play that role to push forward the reform agenda. In doing so, we will help ensure a more stable democratic future for Kenya. Major U.S. interests are at stake, given Kenya's key role in promoting stability in this strategically important region (working closely with us on Sudan, Somalia, and against terrorism). We can best advance our interests by encouraging the Kenyan people to press NAIROBI 00000407 005 OF 005 peacefully for reform. While the litany of what has not been done and remains to be done can be easily articulated, we should not lose sight of what has been achieved (as discussed above),despite significant obstacles. I see the glass as half full. If we stay closely engaged and nurture and support those progressive forces pushing for reform (including civil society, the private sector, religious groups, media),and help the Kenyan people themselves (especially the youth) articulate their demands constructively, it is possible for Kenya to stay on a stable democratic path in a way that will strengthen institutions, ensure the rule of law, and build long-term prosperity. RANNEBERGER