Constitutional Debate 4: Prospects for Compromise

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002539 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE SUBJECT: Constitutional Debate 4: Prospects for Compromise REF: NAIROBI 2514; NAIROBI 2287 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael E. Ranneberger, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: This cable is part four of a five part series on the contentious issues and political landscape surrounding the debate on Kenya's Harmonized Draft Constitution. Cable one provided a snapshot of the outstanding contentious issues in the draft constitution: executive authority, devolution, judicial reform, and the Kadhi's courts. Cable two analyzed the influential voices, political position, and strategy of President Kibaki's Party for National Unity (PNU) in respect to the draft; an analysis of Prime Minister Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) followed in cable three. This cable reports on the efforts of moderates, both within and outside of the two major parties to broker a compromise between hardline ODM and PNU positions. Cable five assesses the dynamics of public opinion and special interest groups in the context of the upcoming national referendum on the draft constitution. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: Although the hardline positions of the PNU and ODM are stalling negotiations, moderate voices in both camps as well as the Parliamentary Caucus on Reforms have proposed a number of compromise positions that, with sufficient outside pressure, could be acceptable to both sides. This cable outlines the proposals-which are all variations on a hybrid Presidential / Parliamentary system of government-and details the political challenges which must be overcome if compromise is to be achieved. End summary. ¶3. (C) The hardline positions of President Kibaki's Party for National Unity (PNU) and Prime Minister Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) are seemingly irreconcilable, at least in the minds of party stalwarts. Both sides have powerful incentives, rooted in their histories and constituencies, to refuse negotiation and seek a victory on their own terms; whether it is ODM's plan to force the unamended draft through Parliament or PNU's scheme to either amend it in committee or defeat it in the referendum (for more on the respective party strategies please see cables two and three). Ironically, Odinga nor PNU supporters are overly concerned that the draft might fail, as both sides believe that they have a chance to capture the imperial presidency under the current system. ¶4. (C) Within both camps, however, there are voices which are pushing for compromise and some recognition by the principals that a failure to pass the draft constitution in some form could lead to a public backlash detrimental to both parties' interests. In October a national survey found that 81% of Kenyans are dissatisfied with the coalition government's handling of constitutional reform-if either side is perceived to block legitimate reforms, they run the risk of voter anger at the polls in 2012. PARTY FOR NATIONAL UNITY -------------- ¶5. (C) Of the two sides, President Kibaki's PNU faces the most public pressure to reach a compromise on the draft. It was Kibaki's decision in 2002 to renege on an agreement to support the broadly popular "Bomas Draft" constitution that helped to form the ODM as an opposition movement. The President's move to unilaterally rewrite the Bomas draft to strengthen the Presidency was rejected in a 2005 referendum following a "no" campaign by ODM. A move to alter the draft in committee unilaterally risks a public outcry, and the PNU's ability to mobilize a successful rejectionist campaign should an unamended draft move to the referendum is questionable. If the party is believed to be protecting Kibaki's powers and his Kikuyu ethnic group at the expense of national interest, it risks not just a defeat in the referendum but dim prospects for the general election in 2012. ¶6. (C) Reflecting this reality, members of PNU's negotiating teams have indicated that they would accept a compromise in which the president is given powers to appoint a number of key ministers-defense, internal security, and foreign affairs are NAIROBI 00002539 002 OF 003 mentioned as a minimal list, with other sources suggesting that the president appoint up to half the cabinet as is currently the case under the National Accord. ODM negotiators have raised concerns that such a plan would result in a cabinet with divided loyalties, but some appear open to ceding a limited number of ministries to the president. ¶7. (C) The PNU is very concerned about the issue of representation (see cable2). If ODM negotiators agreed to the inclusion of a "one-man-one-vote" clause equalizing population between constituencies (which would mean more Parliamentary constituencies for densely populated Central province, PNU's base),PNU leaders would be reassured that their supporters would be adequately represented in any future government. Such a concession by the ODM would be a strong incentive for the PNU to adopt a flexible approach on the issue of executive powers. ORANGE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT -------------- - ¶8. (C) Although the ODM team does not face the same public perils as the PNU, the party probably does not have the votes to block amendments to the draft in the Parliamentary Select Committee, and its approval rating (currently 44 percent) is not strong enough to guarantee a referendum win (see cable five for further analysis of the referendum). ODM negotiators have pursued a strategy of refusing PNU compromise offers while placing false reports in the press about the good prospects for a deal, ostensibly to pressure the PNU team to fold. In recent days, however, PNU negotiators report that the ODM is demonstrating a renewed commitment to reaching a compromise (possibly in response to U.S. pressure) though the ODM team has not yet agreed to offer any compromises. ¶9. (C) ODM would likely agree to cede a limited number of key ministerial appointments to the president, but will resist demands that the President appoint half or more of the cabinet. Of concern to the ODM are guarantees that cabinet ministers will follow directives from the prime minister. Though the National Accord gives Odinga the power to coordinate government activities, in practice ministries headed by PNU appointees often disregard the PM's orders. Odinga's team will also seek to protect plans to devolve resources and decision making for local affairs to county governments, but is likely willing to agree on a compromise system of representation that weighs both population density and geography in drawing constituency boundaries. A mixed member proportional system, where voter cast ballots for local members of parliament as well as the party they would like to occupy the prime minister's office, has been discussed in some circles as a mutually advantageous compromise. REFORM CAUCUS SEEKING A VOICE -------------- - ¶10. (C) The recently-formed Parliamentary Caucus on Reforms (Ref B),formed with U.S. encouragement, is holding daily discussion sessions on the draft constitution with a group of approximately 40 MPs, including PNU and ODM members. Though not represented on the two committees mandated by the PNU and ODM to reach consensus, caucus leaders report that they have reached agreement on a position that largely reflects the current draft but with some additional powers for the president. The caucus position would give the president powers to convene the cabinet, dissolve the government and remove the prime minister, and would require that the PM and president consult and agree on key national decisions. ¶11. (C) Although it is noteworthy that the newly-established caucus has managed to reach a compromise position given its diverse membership, it lacks the political influence necessary to compel the two sides to reach an agreement. Caucus leaders are planning a series of public rallies in January to build momentum for their proposed compromise draft. However, as a nascent movement the NAIROBI 00002539 003 OF 003 caucus will face both public obscurity and popular hostility towards Parliamentarians in attempting to mobilize rallies. Similarly, though the caucus could potentially mobilize as many as 60 votes out of 224 in Parliament, only one member of the crucial PSC (which may amend the draft before it goes to the floor) is allied to the caucus. ¶12. (C) Comment: From post's perspective, it is clear that a compromise acceptable to both the PNU and ODM is within reach. The challenge lies in convincing both sides that a compromise is in their interests, and that a moderate rather than hardline strategy is best for their political future. As Kofi Annan commented during his recent visit, relentless pressure on the part of the international community has borne fruit and must be maintained through this critical period. In addition to our private engagement, post will continue to amplify the voices of Kenyan citizens who are calling upon their leaders to make concessions which are painful to both sides but in the best interests of the nation. End comment. RANNEBERGER