Security Sector Assistance in Kenya: Navy Special Boat Unit

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002535 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/22 TAGS: MASS MOPS MARR KE SO EAID SUBJECT: Security Sector Assistance in Kenya: Navy Special Boat Unit Training CLASSIFIED BY: Rachel Meyers, Deputy Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D) Summary ¶1. Due to the threat of spillover effects from fighting in Somalia, the Government of Kenya views effective border control as its top national security concern. Using multiple funding sources, including 1206 funding, the United States' security sector assistance in Kenya supports the development of both land and sea border security forces to counter the threat of incursions from Somalia-based militias, some of which have ties to terrorist organizations. (See part two of this series septel on land border security.) The Government of Kenya is increasingly aware of the potential value of its naval force, not only to protect its maritime borders from Somalia-based militias and terrorist groups, but also to deal with other maritime threats, such as piracy and drug trafficking. To that end, the United States has focused on the development of the Kenyan Navy's Special Boat Unit (SBU) to patrol Kenya's border with Somalia. While this effort has been supported through multiple funding sources since 2003, a longer-term development strategy is warranted to meet our mutual national security goals. ¶2. This is the first in a two-part series of cables outlining current U.S. security sector assistance to Kenya. End Summary. Background ¶3. The Kenyan Government has long realized the security threat posed by the ongoing fighting in Somalia, including in the maritime arena. Somalia-based militias and terrorist groups such as al Shabaab and al Qaeda are known to have used maritime routes to find safehaven in Kenya and these routes could also be used to stage attacks in Kenya itself. ¶4. After a joint exercise with Kenya in 2005, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) determined that the development of a KNAV special boat capability would significantly improve the organization's effectiveness and maritime border security. To achieve this end state SOCCENT deployed a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU),approximately 20 personnel, to advise and assist KNAV to develop a Special Boat Unit (KSBU). This NSWTU has maintained a permanent presence at the KNAV base in Manda Bay since its arrival in 2004. Since then, this effort has trained over 200 Kenya Navy personnel in small craft operations through the Comprehensive Maritime Security Initiative course (CMSI). In 2008, the Department of State Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) partnered with DOD to teach the CMSI course, and expanded it to include maritime anti-terrorism awareness and skills development. This extended the course from six to 11 weeks, admitted students from law enforcement units with maritime responsibilities, and now mixes DOS ATA and U.S. Navy instructors. In October 2008, overall responsibility for this mission shifted to Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF). KSBU Operations ¶5. The Kenya Navy's (KNAV) operational focus is on controlling maritime traffic moving between Somalia and Kenya. It currently employs four 25-foot Defender class response craft to conduct patrols and interdictions along its northern coast. Operations are run out of a forward operating base in Kiunga, a small town six kilometers south of the Somalia border, and supported from larger KNAV bases in Manda bay and Mombasa. In February 2007, in response to heavy fighting in southern Somalia, KNAV conducted over 200 boardings from the Defenders in Somali coastal waters. The current employment of the KSBU consists of daily patrols along the border with Somalia to deter threats moving through Kenya's territorial waters and maintaining security for the local population. KSBU Development and Structure NAIROBI 00002535 002 OF 002 ¶6. In May 2009, the KNAV Commander stated to mission officials that official approval to form the KSBU was forthcoming and requested that SOCAF develop a plan to create an initial operational capability over the next two years. The unit would consist of up to eight seven-man Defender crews, a maintenance support cell, and a small headquarters and logistics support element. The total size will be approximately 100 personnel. Graduates of the CMSI course comprise the pool of candidates for the unit. The goal for FY10 is to train the 28 operators and six maintenance technicians required to employ the current inventory of four 25-foot Defender class response craft. SOCAF will repeat this effort in FY11 in anticipation of the delivery of an additional four craft purchased under the FY09 1206 program. KSBU Training ¶7. To develop the KSBU, graduates of the CMSI course are formed into boat crews and undergo extensive unit level training. This unit level training consists of a series of three six-week Joint Combined Exercise Program (JCET) events taught by the NSWTU in Manda Bay. Maintenance training will take place during the JCETs for operators and at the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Training School (NAVSCIATTS) for technicians. The NAVSCIATTS training is sourced through a combination of IMET (Title 22) funding and CNT (Title 10) funding and includes eight weeks of training specific to the Defender class craft. Finally, selected operators and technicians will go through an additional instructor qualification to support the SOCAF intent to transfer the entire program to the Kenya Navy Training School over the next two to three years. Comment ¶8. The Kenyan Navy's Special Boat Unit is the only military unit being developed to support Kenyan maritime security capability. By fiscal year 2011, it should be capable of deploying an initial operational capability. However, their effectiveness over the next two to five years depends on consistent, measured support from the United States as they fully integrate into Kenya's military force structure. To date, approximately $13.1 million has been spent on training and equipment related to this program. Section 1206 funding received for FY 09 of $15.3 million is a windfall for continuing to support an already large U.S. investment. However, the goal is to transition as soon as possible to a more institutionalized foreign military financing program to empower Kenyan sustainment and investment and to insure grant funding is earmarked for follow-on support. Insufficient Foreign Military Financing funds limit our ability to assist these units at a critical point in their development. Like the Kenya Special Operations Force/Ranger Strike Force on land (see part two of the series septel),the Special Boat Unit is central to Kenya's national military strategy and directly supports our own peace and security goals in the region. However, our ability to continue to provide material support to these programs is in jeopardy if out year foreign assistance levels remain low. ¶9. Until recently, Kenya's army-centric Ministry of Defence has not robustly supported the development of KNAV's special operations capability to deal with this threat. More recent problems such as piracy and drug trafficking have increased the Government's level of attention on Kenya's navy and its potential to deal with these additional threats. We hope that an ongoing, Washington-led maritime security sector review, which will use Kenya as a case study for how to develop an effective U.S. interagency mechanism to assess the maritime sector, will generate new thinking on how we can help strengthen Kenya's maritime capacity in other ways. RANNEBERGER