Constitutional Debate 2 - PNU seeks Strong Presidency,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002531 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/22 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KJUS KE SUBJECT: Constitutional Debate 2 - PNU seeks Strong Presidency, Equality in Representation REF: NAIROBI 2514 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael E. Ranneberger, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (U) Summary. This cable is part two of a five part series on the contentious issues and political landscape surrounding the debate on Kenya's Harmonized Draft Constitution. Cable one provided a snapshot of the outstanding contentious issues in the draft constitution: executive authority, devolution, judicial reform, and the Kadhi's courts. This cable analyzes the influential voices, political position, and strategy of President Kibaki's Party for National Unity (PNU) in respect to the draft; an analysis of Prime Minister Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) follows in cable three. Cable four reports on the efforts of moderates, both within and outside of the two major parties to broker a compromise between hardline ODM and PNU positions. Cable five assesses the dynamics of public opinion and special interest groups in the context of the upcoming national referendum on the draft constitution. For an exhaustive analysis of the provisions contained within the Harmonized Draft Constitution, please see Ref ¶A. ¶2. (C) Summary Continued: PNU recognizes the disadvantages to their party contained in the Harmonized Draft Constitution as currently written, and are pushing hard for a compromise position with ODM. The PNU's fallback position may be to generate opposition to the draft constitution if agreement is not reached. The PNU is most concerned with maintaining a powerful presidency, equalizing parliamentary constituencies in order to regain an advantage in parliament, and limiting devolution of powers to local government. While the party appears to be negotiating in good faith, possible cooperation with Minister for Agriculture William Ruto's faction of ODM parliamentarians could tempt PNU to try to strong-arm a new draft through parliament (which would require a two-thirds majority vote). Such a strategy would lead to a divisive and possibly violent national referendum. In short, PNU wants to retain much of the current structure of government, while blunting ODM's current parliamentary electoral advantage. End summary. ¶3. (C) Members of President Kibaki's PNU party, composed primarily of Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu communities from Central and Eastern Provinces, are heirs to the Kenyatta-era system of Kikuyu political dominance and are thus pushing for adherence to much of the status quo. Under this system, alliances were struck with smaller parties and ethnic groups to retain executive power, control of provincial governments, and management of financial resources in Nairobi. The PNU coalition's core constituency, having benefited from this system for decades, is thus opposed to the current draft constitution which keeps most executive power in a Parliament they do not control and devolves power to local governments outside of the central government's umbrella. ¶4. (C) The draft constitution contains many clauses that PNU finds unacceptable. First, executive power is vested primarily in a prime minister (PM) and a cabinet appointed by the PM. ODM controls Parliament and has an advantage in the current distribution of constituencies; this inequity in representation is driving PNU concerns that they will be under-represented in any system where Parliament is dominant. Although the draft provides that the President would be directly elected, he would lose to the Prime Minister the power to direct government functions, and head the civil service. Second, it does not create specific provisions to equalize constituency size, which currently disadvantages PNU. Third, devolution provisions would further dilute central power as control over regional and local government structures would be given to elected assemblies rather than the current system of direct control through the Office of the President. ¶5. (C) PNU leaders would like to amend the draft in three respects: by concentrating power in a single executive (the President), enshrining a system of representation that would equalize population among constituencies (and thus advantage densely populated Central Province),and limiting the devolution of power and resources to local government. The power of the executive is paramount in their calculations. The PNU old guard is still smarting from the 2008 National Accord that awarded Raila Odinga and ODM the newly-created post of executive prime minister. Arguing that a dual executive structure will lead to deadlock, the PNU is arguing forcefully for the retention of an executive presidency, or at least a president with the ultimate authority to appoint and remove a prime minister running the affairs of government. ¶6. (C) Believing that current population disparities between constituencies result in the over-representation of minority ethnic groups, PNU negotiators are also seeking changes to the electoral system and the size of parliamentary constituencies. Currently, the most populous constituency in Kenya contains eighteen times more voters than the least populous. The most populous constituencies NAIROBI 00002531 002 OF 002 are in PNU strongholds, and PNU leaders are convinced that the current electoral system is structurally biased so as to consistently under-represent their constituency. PNU leaders are campaigning for a "one-person-one-vote" scheme which would require the equalization of constituency sizes; the PNU believes that this result in fewer constituencies in semi-arid regions (which in the past election supported the ODM) and additional constituencies for Central Province. ¶7. (C) PNU also wants to limit devolution of power to local government. Publicly, they are opposed to proposals in the draft that cede substantial power from the central government to the regional and county levels, arguing that the financial burden of running a multi-tiered government with regional assemblies could bankrupt the country. Instead, PNU leaders are arguing for the preservation of the current Provincial Administration structure, which administers provinces with substantial oversight from Nairobi. ¶8. (C) A compromise which accommodates PNU hardliners is likely unobtainable. PNU supporters recognizes that ODM has a clear electoral advantage in the current constituency system, which could be entrenched should the current draft be passed without clear guidelines for redistricting. Therefore, many in the party believe that ODM has advantages with both the current system and the draft proposal. PNU negotiators allege that ODM is refusing to negotiate in good faith and have failed to discuss viable compromises as ODM seeks to protect the draft from amendment. If the draft constitution fails altogether, Raila Odinga will likely run for president in 2012, while the term limits on President Kibaki means that the PNU has no clear presidential candidate. 9.(C) Realizing they do not have sufficient numbers to block the draft constitution on the floor of Parliament, PNU leaders are working with a dissident faction of ODM loyal to Agriculture Minister William Ruto. Ruto controls roughly half of all ODM members of parliament (as many as 60 to 80 MPs),and key votes on the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) as well. ¶10. (C) If PNU is unable to reach an agreement with Prime Minister Odinga and his deputies, they will seek to amend the draft in the PSC before it comes to the floor of Parliament. With Ruto's support, the PNU would control nearly two-thirds of votes on the PSC, and could amend the draft to include a powerful presidency, weakened devolved local governments, and an equalized "one-man-one-vote" system of representation. As PSC chairman Hussein Abdikadir (a PNU ally) recently commented to sources privately, "I don't care what happens in the constitutional debate; we will amend the draft to suit our purposes when it comes before the committee." Though such a strategy could succeed in amending the draft, it risks sparking a public backlash. Many voters would perceive the PNU to be defending their ethnic base rather than acting in the national interest to promote a constitution that addresses important unresolved issues that contributed to the 2007-2008 post-election violence (see cable 4 in this series). ¶11. (C) Failing a compromise or amendment of the draft in Parliament, PNU leaders would likely seek to generate opposition to the draft in the public referendum. Although unlikely to have the popular support to defeat the draft singlehandedly, a number of PNU leaders are quietly mobilizing church leaders to oppose the draft due to the inclusion of Muslim Kadhi's courts in the draft (see cable 5 in this series for analysis of the Kadhi courts issue). ¶12. (C) Comment: The PNU position is a significant departure from the current draft, and hardliners are publicly opposed to any significant compromise. However, some moderates in the party realize if PNU pursues a unilateral strategy of forcing amendments through the PSC it risks a public backlash that could damage its prospects for the 2012 elections. We continue to urge both PNU and ODM leaders to reach consensus positions on the outstanding contentious issues. End comment. RANNEBERGER