EAST AFRICA REGIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM OFFICERS

S E C R E T NAIROBI 002383 SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, EMBASSY ANTANANARIVO PASS TO COMOROS OFFICER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2034 TAGS: PTERDJ PREL PGOV ER ET KE SU TZ UG YM SUBJECT: EAST AFRICA REGIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM OFFICERS MEETING Classified By: POLOFF Samuel Madsen, reasons 1.4 b,d ¶1. (U) Counterterrorism action offices from nine East African posts plus the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) the USAID and the Office of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) met in Nairobi, Kenya on September 29 for in depth discussions on issues relating to countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. The conference was a follow-on to the Chiefs of Mission level meeting of the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) that was held in Nairobi on June 2. ¶2. (U) A principal focus for the meeting was how CT officers in the region's missions could work more effectively together and with S/CT to regionalize our counter extremism programs. The conference began with a briefing on S/CT's projections for funding for CT programs over the next three fiscal years. The participants were very pleased to learn that funding levels are expected to rise in the coming years and S/CT will seek to make the funding system easier to understand and use as well as be more flexible in meeting the needs of the posts in the field. ¶3. (C) The conference reviewed the recently finalized S/CT documents "East Africa Counterterrorism Strategy" and "East Africa Counterterrorism Strategy Recommendations." In discussing these documents the participants made several observations: Counterterrorism capacity building - The lack of law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial capability in the countries of East Africa and Yemen are well known. - The U.S. should focus on what the local police and courts can do and strengthen their existing capabilities where possible. - The U.S. needs to work with the countries of the region to identify areas of common interest. Related to this is the need to be careful about the terminology that we use. The political and security force leadership in many of the countries of the region are reluctant to become involved in programs identified as involving "counterterrorism." However, piracy, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, and the rule of law are areas in which there is a general enthusiasm for engagement and programming. With labeling as "counterterrorism," the training and assistance that 
would address these issues would also improve those nations' ability to confront violent extremism. Working with the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Participants with experience in working with IGAD made the following observations: - IGAD's capacity for effectively using resources is weak. USAID's regional office has pulled back somewhat from IGAD due to the organization's inability to utilize resources effectively. - There are disagreements and a struggle for influence among Ethiopian and Sudanese officials in the IGAD senior leadership. - IGAD has done some good work, particularly the Sudan peace deal. IGAD allows the international community to put an "African face" on efforts to confront issues in the East Africa region. Working under the IGAD banner offers regional legitimacy to international programs. However, IGAD must be partnered or contracted with other legitimate organizations in order to assure that the work is properly done. - S/CT should communicate with the USAID technical offices regarding how to work effectively with IGAD. - The IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) will cease to exist next year due to the expiration of its mandate. We expect IGAD will replace it with an agency dedicated to dealing with broader rule of law issues. ¶4. (S/NF) The participants from East Africa diplomatic missions described the state of CT cooperation in their individual countries: Ethiopia: - Cooperation with the police is good and growing. The ATA program is having a positive impact on relations and on the police's capabilities. - The possibility of extremist attacks remains an ongoing concern. The Embassy has on a couple of occasions canceled events due to threat reporting. - While relations with the host government are generally good the Ethiopians are known for being very slow to respond to demarches. Djibouti: - Cooperation with the Djiboutians is very good. There is a good two way flow of information regarding terrorist activities and threats. - The Government of Djibouti is very concerned about its neighbors. There is considerable concern about extremists entering the country from Somalia and Yemen. Border security is a principal security focus for the government. - Embassy Djibouti is anxious to reinvigorate the ATA program and is eagerly looking forward to the upcoming ATA assessment. Uganda: - The Ugandan People's Defense Force is the key player in the African Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) force that is supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. The Ugandans are concerned about the potential for extremist attacks inside Uganda as revenge for their key role in AMISOM. - The U.S. has good ties with the Ugandan police services. The Embassy does have concerns regarding corruption and human rights abuses within the Ugandan security services. - Uganda has a substantial population of ethnic Somalis, many of them 2nd and 3rd generation residents. The vast majority of Ugandan Somalis do not support extremism and are wary of new arrivals from Somalia who could potentially tarnish the reputation of the well entrenched Ugandan Somali community. - There are continued allegations that the Allied Democratic Front (ADF),which is currently located in eastern DRC but traditionally composed largely of Ugandans, may have ties to some Islamic extremist organizations. Yemen: - The U.S. has provided lots of training for Yemen's Special Operations Forces (SOF) as well as for their Counterterrorism Unit (CTU),with mixed success. The CTU still requires lots of hand holding. - The Embassy is working with the Yemeni Navy and Coast Guard on maritime security. These services still have only very limited patrolling capability, mostly around ports. - USAID is redrafting its strategy for Yemen. They are shifting their primary targets for assistance to those regions considered to be most vulnerable to extremism. Yemen continues to suffer from water and food shortages. - The Government of Yemen talks the talk on counterterrorism but tends to be more talk than action. The Yemeni government is currently distracted by lots of other issues, including tribal and secessionist rebellions that absorb all of the Yemeni military's efforts and resources. The Yemeni government disagrees with the Embassy over whether the rebels should be defined as terrorists (the Yemeni's say yes while the U.S. disagrees). - The Yemenis are reluctant to use their well-trained forces for difficult missions. They need to be "pushed from the nest." - The Yemeni government maintains relationships with individuals of ill-repute, some of whom are linked to various extremists. Sudan: - U.S. relations with the Government of Sudan are tense and our bilateral relationship can be frustrating. The International Criminal Court indictment against President Bashir complicates the situation. However, we do enjoy generally good cooperation and information exchanges on counterterrorism. - Khartoum itself is characterized as generally safe for U.S. personnel. However, southern Sudan is much more dangerous. This stems from basic instability and lawlessness rather than terrorism. - There continue to be rumors of extremist cells operating within Sudan but most appear to be moribund. The consensus is that foreign terrorist group cells that operate inside Sudan are tolerated as long as they don't conduct any operations within the country. - The new Sudanese intelligence chief is much less forthcoming with information than was his predecessor. - The Sudanese police are capable of investigating terrorist cells if the government wants them to. - The political and security situation within Sudan remains volatile. Elections are scheduled for April 2010 and the south is to hold a referendum on independence in 2011. There is a substantial likelihood of an implosion within Sudan that could affect the entire region. Kenya: - Our relations with Kenya remain generally good, although some within the government and political elites have expressed irritation at the U.S. government's continuing push for government implementation of fundamental political reforms. - Many within the government continue to view terrorism as a foreign problem. They see the 1998 Embassy bombing and the 2002 attack on the Israeli owned hotel and airliner as being directed at the U.S. and Israel rather than at Kenya. - We are working to develop good relations with the new chief of the Kenyan Police Service. Early indications are positive. We continue to provide training for the Kenyan military and security services, but human rights concerns have limited some of these efforts. - We have had some success with helping the GOK establish a basic maritime security program. The ATA program in Lamu is producing well qualified mariners. Current efforts include selecting some of the better qualified Kenyan graduates to serve as trainers. - The GOK remains very concerned about the situation in Somalia and supports efforts to strengthen the TFG. Extremists within Somalia, including al-Shabaab, allegedly continue their efforts to recruit ethnic Somali Kenyans for fighting within Somalia (For additional reporting on al-Shabaab activities in Kenya see IIR 7 733 0119 09, TD-314/043516-09, TD-314/037675-09 and TD-314/007864-09). Cross border raids and kidnappings are likely to become more frequent as the militants perceive such actions to be low risk and highly profitable. - The Kenyan Parliament continues to resist passage of needed Counterterrorism and Anti-Money Laundering legislation, although on the latter there may be movement in the current session of Parliament. Corruption continues to hinder CT and rule of law efforts. Eritrea: - There is no CT cooperation between the U.S. and the Government of Eritrea. - The GOE has actively sought to reduce the USG presence in Eritrea, including suspending public outreach programs, arresting local staff, and restricting in-country travel. - The GOE supports a variety of external rebel and terrorist groups that are hostile to Eritrea's enemies. These include Ethiopian rebel groups (OLF and ONLF), Sudanese rebel groups (JEM, SLA/Unity and other smaller Darfuri groups),Somali rebel groups (Hizbul Islam) and at least one unnamed group opposed to the Djiboutian government. - The top GOE leaders apparently believe their government is invulnerable to internal opponents or terrorist groups. However, there has recently been an increase of violent attacks within the country. Tanzania: - CT cooperation is good. The Tanzanian government would like to work with the U.S. to increase regional CT efforts, particularly in training. There is a regional immigration center in Moshi, Tanzania funded by the International Organization for Migration. The Tanzanians would like to see regional efforts to counter smuggling, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, etc. ¶5. (U) Due to time limitations the participants were not able to discuss extensively regional forensics. However, there was general agreement that most of the countries in the region would very much like training and equipment on a variety of forensics disciplines. However, there are likely to be legal and practical obstacles to extensive sharing of forensics information among the countries of the region. Additional training and legal modernization is needed before the police, prosecutors and courts in the region can effectively process, present and evaluate forensic evidence. ¶6. (U) Comment: Participants found the conference generally useful. Most indicated they felt future meetings would be valuable and they would be interested in participating. The EARSI coordinator will work with S/CT to obtain funding for similar events in the future. Future planners should consider making this a two day event. This report was cleared by Embassies Addis Ababa, Asmara, Dar es Salaam, Djibouti and Nairobi. RANNEBERGER