A/S SCHWARTZ DISCUSSES FOOD AID IN SOMALIA WITH WFP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002361 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR PRM/AFR, AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019 TAGS: EAID KE PREF PREL SO SUBJECT: A/S SCHWARTZ DISCUSSES FOOD AID IN SOMALIA WITH WFP Classified By: Classified by Earl Zimmerman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PRM Assistant Secretary (A/S) Eric Schwartz met with World Food Program (WFP) Somalia, based in Nairobi, to seek clarification on how food aid is delivered in Somalia and the potential ramifications on WFP operations if the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) restrictions are not resolved. A/S Schwartz met on two occasions with WFP Somali Deputy Country Director Salman Omer and WFP Operations Head Jerry Bailey and once with Logistics Chief Matthew Dee during his five-day trip to Kenya. WFP recently released a $195 million appeal for the November-April time frame to feed 2.6 million people, but current food stocks and pledges will only provide food until mid-December. WFP acknowledged that over eighty-five percent (85%) of the food aid destined for south-central Somalia goes to Al-Shabaab territory or must pass through Al-Shabaab controlled checkpoints. WFP relies completely on contracts with local trucking companies to transport the food from port of Mogadishu to the final distribution points, with no concrete knowledge on the amount of tolls the truckers must pay at TFG or Al-Shabaab checkpoints. Alternate ports and preliminary WFP contingency plans were also discussed during these meetings. End Summary. -------------- ESTIMATED FOOD NEED -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The total food need in Somalia is currently estimated at 3.6 million people, but WFP only expects to be able to cover 1.8 million of the most vulnerable. The most vulnerable population include the approximately 500,000-600,000 IDPS in the Afgooye corridor who are completely dependent on food assistance. For example, in September, WFP had enough food to feed 1.3 million (22,000 metric tons valued at $23-24 million),almost but not quite reaching the target of 1.8 million. For the next six months (November-April),WFP released a $195 million appeal for 32,500 metric tons/month of food to feed 2.6 million Somalis. Historically, over fifty percent (50%) of food for WFP Somalia operations comes from the United States. Out of the current November-April appeal, only Canada has pledged $9 million. With current stocks and this Canadian pledge, WFP has enough food to last until mid-December but then expects a complete break in the food pipeline. While a ship carrying 29,000 metric tons of US food stocks is currently docked in Mombasa, the food cannot be released unless the OFAC issue is resolved. -------------- Al-Shabaab and Tolls -------------- ¶3. (C) WFP Somalia Deputy Country Director acknowledged that eighty-five percent (85%) of all food aid going into south-central Somalia goes to Al-Shabaab territory or must pass through Al-Shabaab controlled checkpoints. However, WFP asserted that is practically impossible to determine who really is Al-Shabaab, as allegiances shift daily or that those at checkpoints might identify themselves as Al-Shabaab to maximize toll collection. WFP also noted there is no way to know if or how much of the money collected goes to a central Al-Shabaab apparatus, if one even exists, or is used by the local militia at the checkpoint to purchase khat, food, or other items. The WFP logistics officer estimated, from the sketchy and periodic information they receive, that tolls range from $7-100 per truck. However, checkpoints are often clan-based; thus, it is possible for some truckers of the same clan to negotiate lower rates or sometimes even pass through without paying. UNOCHA is trying to implement a tracking system to gather information on the location of checkpoints and toll charges and hopes to present this information in its monthly humanitarian access report. -------------- Trucking Companies -------------- ¶4. (C) WFP relies completely on local transport companies to transport food stocks within Somalia. For monthly distribution of 30,000 metric tons, between 1,000-1,500 trucks are needed to transport food from the port to either an extended delivery point (EDP) warehouse or final delivery point (FDP). WFP currently has a short-list of 37 trucking companies in Somalia, many of whom have satellite offices in Nairobi, to whom they issue tenders for six-month contracts. NAIROBI 00002361 002 OF 002 WFP provides a flat-rate contract to the trucking companies to move food between the port to EDPs and/or FDPs and require that the companies deposit between $200,000-$250,000 in the WFP bank as a bond to prevent any looting or theft of the food. Contracts last six-months, and WFP does not permit contractors to sub-contract to other companies as the 37 accepted transport companies have been vetted against the United Nations 1267 terrorist list. However, individual drivers used by the transport companies (which seem to act as brokers who hire individual truckers) are not checked against the list. Any money that is paid along the way in tolls or other &facilitation8 costs is presumably taken out of the flat-rate given by WFP, and there is currently no requirement that the transporters notify WFP on the number of checkpoints passed or the amount paid in tolls. -------------- Alternate Ports -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Currently, Mogadishu port is the only port in south-central Somalia that WFP can use due to fighting in and around Kismayo. While parts of Mogadishu are within the control of TFG, once outside the city, all trucks must pay tolls to Al-Shabaab at checkpoints. The WFP examined the possibility of using Bossossa port in Puntland as an alternate off-loading site, but this would be a costly proposition ) and it would not enable food deliverers to avoid al Shabaab checkpoints in areas of great need. WFP estimates that rehabilitation of Bossossa could exceed $3 million in addition to the $2 million need to repair the road out of the port. The repairs would take nine months to one year to complete, and it is still not known whether that region has the trucking capacity to transport the tonnage of food needed to be moved. Given the distance from south-central Somalia, WFP gauges that transportation costs would increase 20 percent (20%). -------------- Contingency Plans -------------- ¶6. (C) While some discussions on contingency planning have occurred within WFP in case the OFAC issue is not resolved, WFP cannot currently clearly articulate or predict the effects that a withdrawal of USG assistance will have on the Somali population. One model predicts that up to 160,000 people will flee Somalia, primarily for Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, over a two to three month period after food aid is stopped within Somalia. Others questioned those numbers, given that the short rains are supposed to be good this year and that the local population will be able to rely on the next harvest. Other predications include an increase in IDPs and more conflict over the remaining few resources. According to WFP, the worst-case scenario would be a situation similar to 1991/1992 when there were around 300,000 deaths due to famine/starvation and over 1 million in a humanitarian emergency situation. This figure was also questioned by the OFDA representative, however, as Somalis now have much better coping mechanisms than in 1991/1992, including more remittances from abroad. It appears that WFP Somalia remains hopeful that the OFAC issue will be resolved and thus has not dedicated much attention to date on contingency planning. ¶7. (U) Assistant Secretary Schwartz has cleared on this cable. RANNEBERGER