SOMALIA - PM PREVIEWS EUROPEAN TRIP, HEARS OUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002241

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - PM PREVIEWS EUROPEAN TRIP, HEARS OUR
MESSAGE ON POLITICAL, SECURITY PROGRESS

Classified By: Political Officer Joe Trimble, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy Nairobi Somalia Unit met with
Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Prime Minister
Sharmarke on Sunday, October 25 to discuss key issues on
Somalia prior to the PM's departure for meetings in London
with the FCO and Brussels with the EU and donor community.
USAID East Africa Director Bob Heller and one member of the
USAID Somalia team were also present. The Somalia Unit
discussed with Sharmarke greater TFG communication with the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),the need for TFG
troops to remain unified upon return from USG-supported
training, TFG views of the Joint Security Committee (JSC),
and U.S. willingness to engage on current obstacles to TFG
access to European Union budgetary support. End Summary.

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TFG Communication with AMISOM Critical
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2. (SBU) The Somalia Unit raised strong concerns about
reported poor communication between TFG and AMISOM in
Mogadishu. We harkened back to recent AMISOM complaints that
the PM had publicly condemned AMISOM shelling in Mogadishu,
without consulting AMISOM beforehand. A simple phone call
alerting AMISOM of the forthcoming remarks would have gone a
long way to assuage AMISOM's view that it was unfairly
criticized, we asserted. In the wake of AMISOM,s October 19
shelling of civilian areas, we warned the PM to inform AMISOM
before he discussed the shelling publicly.


3. (SBU) Sharmarke agreed that the TFG and AMISOM must
improve communications efforts, especially between African
Union (AU) and TFG working level security officials in
Mogadishu, but also in Nairobi. Communication at higher
levels was better, the PM claimed: both he and President
Sheikh Sharif regularly consult AMISOM. However, Sharmarke
offered, the AU badly needs political officers in Mogadishu
and should be working to identify a replacement for AU
mission head Nicholas Bwakira when he reportedly steps down
in late November. We noted that while the AU removed some
staff following the September 17 suicide bombing at the
airport, AU political officers were expected to return.

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Message Delivered: Don,t Separate TFG
Troops Upon Return from U.S.-supported Training
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4. (C) We underscored Washington,s strong concerns that TFG
troops trained with U.S. support are sometimes divided up
between the TFG forces and the personal security teams of
some TFG ministers. Assuring proper chain of command is
essential to continued U.S. support for any training effort,
whether Ugandan or Djiboutian, given the importance we place
in vetting this chain of command for potential past human
rights violations. We cautioned that we are not able to
provide support to TFG command structures that have not been
Leahy vetted. (Note: Per AF/FO request, the Somalia Unit
will follow up with Somalia Ambassador Mohamed Ali Nur
"Americo" to have a written, signed TFG commitment not to
split TFG troops who have received U.S.-supported training.
End note.)

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...And Then What About Political Outreach?
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5. (C) Sharmarke agreed that political progress was as
important as security, but would only loosely refer to the
TFG,s "plan" for reaching out to the Juba and Bay/Bakol
regions. These regions, along with Hiraan, according to
Sharmarke, need a "bigger" approach. Sharmarke indicated
only that the TFG wishes to discuss these plans more
internally before sharing with the international community.
The Somalia Unit reiterated that regional outreach, such as
visits by prominent TFG members to the Hiraan region, would
send strong signals of engagement to political allies in the
field and are within the TFG's capacity. For example, we
pointed out that chartered flights from Mogadishu to any of

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the regions are less expensive than the TFG leadership's
all-too-frequent international trips. (Note: though we are
not certain, we believe the TFG pays for much of its
international travel. End Note). Sharmarke countered that the
TFG is reaching out to Hiran and plans on sending money to
TFG officials there. Sharmarke also referenced requests made
to Ethiopia to provide ammunition to border regions; however,
on that score, Sharmarke reports the Ethiopians are
pressuring the TFG to recognize and partner with Al Sunaa
Whal Jamma (ASWJ),something the TFG is not yet ready to
pursue formally.

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Confirming TFG Support for the
Joint Security Committee (JSC)
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6. (SBU) Sharmarke confirmed that the TFG is quite vested in
the JSC, but was struggling to determine with whom and how to
engage on JSC work. With the results of the U.S. co-led SSA
anticipated in mid-November, the SSA team is working with the
Djibouti Peace Process-mandated JSC to filter action items
and recommendations to TFG leadership. However, the we
expressed concern to the PM that some TFG interlocutors,
including the Ministers of Defense and of Post and
Telecommunications, have doubts about the SSA's utility.
Separately, at the October 19 JSC meeting, the PM publicly
agreeed that the SSA is useful and will guide TFG plans for
its security sector's reform. (Comment: Nevertheless, the
Somalia Unit sees growing indications that SSA
recommendations are not being delivered to PM Sharmarke by
the Ministers of Defense or Interior, or by the Head of
Internal Security, indicating there might not be sufficient
or appropriate TFG buy-in at the Ministerial level. The SSA
team in Nairobi will continue to engage with ministers, the
PM, and the President to ensure all appropriate TFG
representatives are informed. The Somalia Unit will continue
to monitor. End Comment.)

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Overcoming an Obstacle to EU
Budget Support: Cotonou Membership
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7. (SBU) In our meeting with the PM, and separately at a
dinner EU representatives hosted for the PM on October 24, we
offered to engage with the European Union (EU) over claims
that bilateral EU aid is stymied over Somalia's non-signatory
status in the Cotonou Agreement, a regulatory economic treaty
related to international assistance. The PM explained that
Somalia intends to accede to Cotonou, but the process
typically takes at least two years. The TFG, and our EU
counterparts, suggested the United States could urge EU
leaders to find a solution to help Somalia as the accession
process progresses.

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Comment
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8. (C) Sharmarke was typically subdued and brief in his
questions and responses. The TFG/AMISOM communication gap is
a significant issue and one that we hope will be rectified as
we continue to underscore its importance with TFG leadership,
but meanwhile it is contributing to significant mistrust
issues between the two organizations. We must be realistic
in our understanding that the TFG might be willing to sign a
letter of understanding that it will not separate troops who
have received U.S.-supported training, but this does not
guarantee such agreements will be or can be adhered to in an
environment where there is no U.S. presence, limited ability
to verify such details, and a chaotic security environment.
Sharmarke,s inability to articulate a regional outreach
approach at this point in his tenure is cause for concern,
although not surprising. We must continue to underscore the
need for regional TFG outreach to capitalize on popular
sentiment against al Shabaab throughout Somalia. The role of
the JSC in Somalia will be as important as the TFG wishes it
to be, but we must approach our security assistance
cautiously as a transparent JSC is a symbol of actual TFG

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buy-in to this otherwise internationally-led construct. The
emergence of the Cotonou Agreement as the latest obstacle to
direct EU assistance for the TFG is one we are gathering more
information on and will provide to USEU and AF/E counterparts
as we learn more. End comment.
RANNEBERGER