SOMALIA - KISMAYO SITUATION MARKED BY COMPLEX

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002202

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND ACTING A/S CARTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MOPS SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - KISMAYO SITUATION MARKED BY COMPLEX
INTERESTS AND FRACTURING AL-SHABAAB

REF: A. NAIROBI 2149

B. NAIROBI 2141

C. NAIROBI 2132

Classified By: Somalia Unit Deputy Joe Trimble for reasons 1.4(b) and (
d)


1. (C) Summary: As of October 19 the situation in Lower Juba
was marked by an increasingly complex mosaic of interests and
a fractious al-Shabaab, reportedly divided over whether to
cooperate with the Darod/Marehan subclan in order to hold
Kismayo. (Note: The Marehan subclan represents a small
minority in Lower Juba and some Marehan appear to be
tactically working with al-Shabaab in order to retain some
influence in Kismayo. End note.) Our contacts tell us
al-Shabaab on October 18 pulled most of its militia into
Kismayo due to rain and deteriorating road conditions and
announced a new administration for the port town that
included a new alliance with some Marehan clansmen. However,
on October 19 one al-Shabaab faction reportedly assassinated
a key Marehan figure in the new administration when
al-Shabaab leaders disagreed over whether the group should
concern itself with local subclan interests. Meanwhile, Juba
Resistance Chairman Mohamed Amin on October 18 told us he was
en route to the Somali border to organize additional forces
inside of Juba to reinforce Ahmed Madobe and the
Darod/Kabalah clan alliance currently fighting al-Shabaab for
dominance in Lower Juba. TFG Minister for State Hidig told us
he does not trust Madobe and was putting together his own
force from within Lower Juba to move on Kismayo. Northeast
Kenya contacts continue to allege the Government of Kenya
and/or Somali officials are attempting to recruit Kenyan
Somalis and Somali refugees in northeast Kenya to fight in
Lower Juba (ref a). While Madobe's efforts to purge
al-Shabaab in Kismayo may not lead to success, we think a
TFG-Kenyan push that does not include Madobe's alliance would
almost certainly fail. Moreover, attempts by TFG
representatives or other parties to utilize militia from
outside Lower Juba or lesser militia in the region in an
effort to take Kismayo would most likely lead to intra-Darod
conflict, distracting all parties from the fight against
al-Shabaab. End Summary.

2. (C) Our contacts tell us al-Shabaab on 18 October pulled
most of its militia into Kismayo due to rain and announced a
new administration for the port town that included a new
alliance with some Marehan clansmen in the port town.
However, on October 19 al-Shabaab militia from one faction of
the group reportedly assassinated a key Marehan figure in the
new administration when al-Shabaab leaders disagreed over
whether al-Shabaab should concern itself with local subclan
interests. Multiple contacts in Lower Juba tell us some
Marehan in Kismayo have formed a tactical alliance with
al-Shabaab in order to retain some influence in the region.
However, the alliance between opportunistic Marehan leaders
and al-Shabaab was strained on October 19 when an al-Shabaab
faction assassinated prominent Marehan businessman Daud Dirir
who had made a deal with al-Shabaab over port revenues.
(Note: al-Shabaab has since late September been engaged in
fighting Ras Kamboni militia, the Anole faction, and other
Darod/Kabalah clan militia in and around the port town of
Kismayo. (ref a). Madobe's alliance, after moving into much
of Kismayo in late September, almost immediately retreated
to positions outside of the town. Since then fighting has
occurred mostly outside of the town. Al-Shabaab on October 7
suffered losses of personnel and supply trucks when they
were overwhelmed by Madobe's alliance in a town outside
Kismayo. End note. )

3. (C) Meanwhile, TFG MP and Juba Resistance Chairman
Mohammed Amin on October 18 told us he was en route to Juba
to organize additional forces inside of Juba to reinforce
Ahmed Madobe and the Darod/Kabalah clan alliance. A contact
close to Madobe told us Madobe's alliance had acquired
construction equipment from local businessmen that would
allow them to better navigate the roads and were encouraged
that the al-Shabaab's vehicles were bogged down by the rains.
(Note: The contact did not specify the number or exact type
of equipment. End Note.) TFG Minister for State Hidig told us
he does not trust Madobe and was putting together his own
force from within Lower Juba to move on Kismayo. (Note: Hidig
is from the Darod/Kabalah/Absame/Ogaden clan but is
reportedly a close associate of General Morgan and Barre
Hirale, figures who in recent months have attempted to work

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against the emergence of a Darod/Kabalah alliance in Lower
Juba. End note.). Other members of the TFG have for months
been in tenuous discussions with Madobe (ref c). And,
Northeast Kenya contacts continue to allege the GOK and/or
Somali officials are attempting to recruit enyan Somalis and
Somali refugees in northeast Kenya to fight in Lower Juba.
(ref b).

4. (C) Comment: While Madobe's efforts to purge al-Shabaab in
Kismayo may not lead to success, we think a push that does
not include Madobe's alliance would almost certainly fail.
Moreover, attempts by some TFG representatives or other
parties to utilize militia from outside Lower Juba or lesser
militia in the region in an effort to take Kismayo would most
likely lead to intra-Darod conflict, distracting all parties
from the fight against al-Shabaab.
RANNEBERGER