SOMALIA - JOINT MEETING SURVEYS SOMALI SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002159 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019 TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PREL PTER EAID SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - JOINT MEETING SURVEYS SOMALI SECURITY SECTOR REF: NAIROBI 1798 Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Joint Security Committee (JSC) of Somali government security officials and international donors met in Nairobi on October 13. This was its third meeting under its current mandate to coordinate government and donors' security sector initiatives. At the meeting, the U.S.-led Security Sector Assessment (SSA) team briefed on preliminary findings of a workshop with government officials conducted in order to better understand the government's security structure and to formulate recommendations. The final report of the assessment team will be submitted mid-November via septel. At the briefing, Minister of Defense Abdullah Boss Ahmed praised the African Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) and the U.S. for their support to the TFG, but complained that international security sector assistance had been insufficient and sporadic. The TFG Minister of Interior and the AMISOM force commander each asserted that an investment by the international community in the TFG's security sector of a few million dollars now would save billions of dollars later. The SSA team reported among its key, preliminary findings that the TFG police were better organized and structured than the TFG military; that the TFG judiciary was moribund, and that financial systems were lacking across the entire security sector. End summary. Third JSC Convenes for Briefing by Security Sector Assessment Team ¶2. (C) On October 13, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) convened in Nairobi a Joint Security Committee meeting of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) security officials and international donors. (Note: The JSC is a product of that part of the Djibouti Peace Process, which merged the TFG with the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia in early 2009. End note.) The JSC has become a forum for TFG and donor security sector planning. This is the third time the JSC has met this year. The previous two meetings were in Mogadishu. ¶3. (C) UNPOS called the meeting so that the U.S. led-Security Sector Assessment (SSA) team could brief on its October 8 - 11 security sector workshop with TFG officials. The workshop has helped define the TFG's security structure and constraints, and to formulate draft recommendations for improvement. A formal SSA report will be issued by mid-November, and will be communicated septel. The JSC was attended by key Somali donors, including Italy, the UK, European Commission and France; African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) Field Commander General Mungisha; TFG Defense Minister Abdullah Boss Ahmed; Interior Minister Abdulkadir Ali Omar; National Security Agency chief Mohammed Sheikh; and several working-level police and military officials. TFG Complains of Lack of International Community Support ¶4. (C) In his remarks, TFG Minister of Defense Boss thanked AMISOM for its bravery in support of the government. He also thanked the United States, among others, for its financial and materiel support. Boss pointed out that the TFG was only nine months old, and was trying to rectify years of chaos in Somalia. He stated bluntly that international security assistance had not materialized as quickly as the TFG had expected. In fact, he said, the Islamic fundamentalists were likely enjoying greater international support than was the TFG. He said the TFG continues to hold 9 - 10 districts of Mogadishu (reftel),and that the TFG enforced law and order in the district it controlled through police and military patrols. ¶5. (C) Minister Boss said the Islamists were splintering badly. In Kismayo, al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam were fighting and, he said, some of the same tensions were beginning to emerge in Mogadishu. He said that the TFG has decided not to attack al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in Mogadishu, believing NAIROBI 00002159 002 OF 003 that a government attack would force the two groups together. Boss said that the Mogadishu port would soon be generating greater income as the seasonal current changed in the Indian Ocean. The TFG was monitoring information that al-Shabaab intended to disrupt the port, possibly by attacks on incoming ships. ¶6. (C) TFG Interior Minister Abdulkadir spoke briefly through a translator, and echoed Boss's praise for AMISOM request that donors do more. Abdulkadir stated that, as expensive an investment as the TFG seems now, this government's success would save billions of dollars in international aid later. While he understood that the international community was unhappy with the TFG's performance, the government would do better with international help. AMISOM Commander Sees Weakened al-Shabaab ¶7. (C) AMISOM Force Commander Mungisha seconded Abdulkadir's assertion donor engagement now would save billions later. He disagreed with Boss in asserting that the Islamist opposition remained divided, and that AMISOM and the TFG should capitalize on al-Shabaab weakness. As the opposition weakened, it would increasingly resort to unconventional attacks on the TFG and AMISOM, including hit-and-run attacks, assassinations, bombings, for-cash kidnappings, and using civilians as human shields. Mungisha pledged to work with the TFG to provide newly-trained government troops with seminars, induction courses and facilities before they deploy to Mogadishu. However, these services would require an increase in AMISOM staffing. General Mungisha also called for quick-impact projects, in order to show the local population that the TFG was delivering services. AMISOM Commander More Critical of TFG in Private Meeting ¶8. (C) In an October 14 breakfast meeting, Mungisha amplified on his JSC assertion that the TFG should capitalize on al-Shabaab's weaknesses. The TFG remained extremely disorganized, he said, and was in desperate need of re-structuring. He had told President Ahmed this, in a frank conversation before the President traveled to UNGA. Ahmed had promised a government re-shuffle and increased accountability. ¶9. (C) Mungisha's hopes lay with a contingent of about 700 Siad Barre-era troops who, although not presently equipped, would bring military experience, Somalia patriotism, and a relative lack of affiliation with their own clans to the mix. Mungisha endorsed the Prime Minister's plan to merge these troops with returning French and Djibouti-trained forces to create two battalions that he hoped would be the core of better-performing TFG security forces. The forces had little equipment, he said, and he urged that UNSOA be allowed to provide additional equipment to AMISOM that in turn could be used to jump-start the new battalions. ¶10. (C) Mungisha believed that the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) forces were the best of the activated part of the TFG forces. They were ably lead, he said, by a Siad Barre-era officer, Colonel Agey. Agey retained tight discipline over his troops and, unlike their TFG counterparts, the whereabouts of the ARS forces were known at all times. ¶11. (C) TFG Land Forces Commander Dhumaal, Mungisha said, because of his police background was not taken seriously by the security forces he led, was very frustrated, and was contemplating resigning. The forces of Minister of State for Defense Indha Adde were uneven, but Indha Adde himself was committed to the TFG, largely because he had burnt his bridges with other potential allies, Mungisha thought. Other TFG contingents, like the "Darwish," Mungisha said, were of unknown effectiveness on the battlefield. (Note: the "Darwish" are ICU remnants that reportedly number about 1,200. They entered the TFG with Sheikh Sharif's election as President and report to General Gobale. End note.) SSA Reviews Preliminary Findings NAIROBI 00002159 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Following opening statements, the SSA presented preliminary findings from its Naivasha workshop. (Note: Again, a full report is expected by mid-November. End Note). Among the key findings were that the Somali national police's command, organization and administration were relatively stronger than the military's. Unlike the police, the military had no recruitment and training guidelines in place, lacked coherent and agreed-to command and control over its soldiers and allied militias, and relied heavily on AMISOM, the United States, and other donors for its sustainment. Nevertheless, assessors had found that the deputy chief of staff and other military officials were professionally trained and competent, although they lacked the financial and staffing capacity to undertake a sweeping development of the military. Initial recommendations for the military from the assessors included activating a planned, JSC military working group and helping the TFG to define its soldiers' recruitment, training, and equipment requirements. ¶13. (C) Assessors found that the national police force had no presence outside Mogadishu. Its estimated force size was 5,000 men and women. It planned, with support from UNDP and AMISOM, to expand its force to 10,000 police by July 2010. The police force had little sense of its operational and infrastructure requirements. Senior police officials were competent but lacked the capacity to produce sweeping plans for the force's reform and development. Among the SSA team's initial recommendations were: reliable salary payments for the police with, one international police expert suggested an international community commitment to fund two years of salaries for the new police. The SSA team also suggested that the development of community policing programs, as well as justice and detention facilities should also proceed in parallel with expanded policing. The SSA team had found, unsurprisingly, that Somalia was almost completely lacking key components of its judiciary: there were no functioning government courts, bar, or law schools. Prisons existed, but did not meet international standards. Recommendations included: drafting codes of conduct for judges, prosecutors, prison guards, and police; organizing prison populations by age and gender. In addition, also unsurprisingly, the assessors had found that financial controls and accountability were weak across all TFG security sectors. RANNEBERGER