Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NAIROBI2149
2009-10-09 11:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA - ALL SIDES REINFORCING IN JUBA; TFG

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PTER SO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002149 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ALL SIDES REINFORCING IN JUBA; TFG
DIVIDED OVER KISMAYO FIGHTING

REF: A. NAIROBI 2132

B. NAIROBI 2141

Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson for reasons
1.4(b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002149 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PTER SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ALL SIDES REINFORCING IN JUBA; TFG DIVIDED OVER KISMAYO FIGHTING REF: A. NAIROBI 2132 ¶B. NAIROBI 2141 Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: As of October 8, the battle for Kismayo was likely to continue as all sides in the conflict were seeking reinforcements. In an apparent effort to undercut Madobe, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys on October 6 called for an end to the fighting in Lower Juba and a Hisbul Islam (HI) official in Mogadishu on October 8 publicly said HI and al-Shabaab had reached a peace agreement. The TFG appeared increasingly divided over the question of Juba. TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke on October 7 told us he sent $50,000 to Madobe via an intermediary in Dubai and that he was attempting to organize a qat flight to carry ammunition from Mogadishu to Afmadow in Lower Juba. However, TFG Minister of State Hidig on October 7 told us he did not trust Madobe and was putting together a militia to head to Kismayo. End summary. ¶2. (C) Our contacts told us that al-Shabaab on October 7 suffered losses of personnel and supply trucks when they were overwhelmed by Madobe's alliance in a town outside Kismayo. According to our contacts, the Darod/Kaballa alliance, as of October 8, had blocked most roads into Kismayo but al-Shabaab had begun to receive supplies through the Merca port. A contact close to Madobe on October 8 told us Madobe intends to make another move on Kismayo on October 9 or 10. Contacts in Juba on October 8 told us Madobe's forces, made up of Ras Kamboni fighters, the Anole faction, and clan militia from the area, were struggling with financial and ammunition shortages. ¶3. (C) In an apparent effort to undercut Madobe, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys on October 6 called for an end to the fighting in Lower Juba and a Hisbul Islam official in Mogadishu on October 8 publicly said HI and al-Shabaab had reached a peace agreement. (Note: We think this is Aweys' effort to shape perceptions of the fight in Lower Juba, hijack the efforts of Madobe's alliance, and keep a disintegrating Hisbul Islam, with two of its four factions now largely preoccupied with regional and clan interests, under his Islamist umbrella. Our contacts tell us, however, that Aweys' forces have not actually been part of the fight in Kismayo. End note.) According to a contact close to events on the ground, former Ras Kamboni commander Sheikh Abdiqani played a large role in al-Shabaab's ability to outmaneuver Madobe's force on October 1. Abdiqani in late September reportedly shifted to al-Shabaab's side and began to encourage other Ras Kamboni defections by claiming Madobe had been a guest, rather than a prisoner, of Ethiopia and had secretly held discussions with the TFG in Mogadishu. End note.) ¶4. (C) The TFG appears increasingly divided over the question of Juba. TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke on October 7 told us he sent $50,000 to Madobe via an intermediary in Dubai and that he was attempting to organize a qat flight to carry ammunition from Mogadishu to Afmadow in Lower Juba (ref a). (Note: The intermediary in Dubai told us on October 8 that he was still waiting for the money transfer from Sharmarke. End note.) However, TFG Minister of State Hidig on October 7 told us he did not trust Madobe and was putting together his own militia in an effort to take Kismayo. (Note: Hidig would not specify where the militia was coming from or the degree to which it was meant to reinforce or compete with Madobe's alliance. Hidig, like Sharmarke, is from the Ogaden clan, but is reportedly a close associate of General Morgan and Barre Hirale, figures who in recent months have attempted to work against the emergence of a Darod/Kaballa alliance in Lower Juba. Numerous contacts have told us in recent months that Hidig was among other Somalis who attempted to influence a Kenyan plan for Lower Juba. Northeast Kenyan contacts in early October alleged the GOK and/or Somali officials were attempting to recruit Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees in northeast Kenya to fight in Lower Juba. (ref c) End note.) HOZA

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