SOMALIA - ALL SIDES REINFORCING IN JUBA; TFG

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002149

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ALL SIDES REINFORCING IN JUBA; TFG
DIVIDED OVER KISMAYO FIGHTING

REF: A. NAIROBI 2132

B. NAIROBI 2141

Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson for reasons
1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: As of October 8, the battle for Kismayo
was likely to continue as all sides in the conflict were
seeking reinforcements. In an apparent effort to undercut
Madobe, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys on October 6 called for an
end to the fighting in Lower Juba and a Hisbul Islam (HI)
official in Mogadishu on October 8 publicly said HI and
al-Shabaab had reached a peace agreement. The TFG appeared
increasingly divided over the question of Juba. TFG Prime
Minister Sharmarke on October 7 told us he sent $50,000 to
Madobe via an intermediary in Dubai and that he was
attempting to organize a qat flight to carry ammunition from
Mogadishu to Afmadow in Lower Juba. However, TFG Minister of
State Hidig on October 7 told us he did not trust Madobe and
was putting together a militia to head to Kismayo. End
summary.

2. (C) Our contacts told us that al-Shabaab on October 7
suffered losses of personnel and supply trucks when they
were overwhelmed by Madobe's alliance in a town outside
Kismayo. According to our contacts, the Darod/Kaballa
alliance, as of October 8, had blocked most roads into
Kismayo but al-Shabaab had begun to receive supplies through
the Merca port. A contact close to Madobe on October 8 told
us Madobe intends to make another move on Kismayo on October
9 or 10. Contacts in Juba on October 8 told us Madobe's
forces, made up of Ras Kamboni fighters, the Anole faction,
and clan militia from the area, were struggling with
financial and ammunition shortages.

3. (C) In an apparent effort to undercut Madobe, Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys on October 6 called for an end to the
fighting in Lower Juba and a Hisbul Islam official in
Mogadishu on October 8 publicly said HI and al-Shabaab had
reached a peace agreement. (Note: We think this is Aweys'
effort to shape perceptions of the fight in Lower Juba,
hijack the efforts of Madobe's alliance, and keep a
disintegrating Hisbul Islam, with two of its four factions
now largely preoccupied with regional and clan interests,
under his Islamist umbrella. Our contacts tell us, however,
that Aweys' forces have not actually been part of the fight
in Kismayo. End note.) According to a contact close to
events on the ground, former Ras Kamboni commander Sheikh
Abdiqani played a large role in al-Shabaab's ability to
outmaneuver Madobe's force on October 1. Abdiqani in late
September reportedly shifted to al-Shabaab's side and began
to encourage other Ras Kamboni defections by claiming Madobe
had been a guest, rather than a prisoner, of Ethiopia and had
secretly held discussions with the TFG in Mogadishu. End
note.)

4. (C) The TFG appears increasingly divided over the
question of Juba. TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke on October 7
told us he sent $50,000 to Madobe via an intermediary in
Dubai and that he was attempting to organize a qat flight to
carry ammunition from Mogadishu to Afmadow in Lower Juba (ref
a). (Note: The intermediary in Dubai told us on October 8
that he was still waiting for the money transfer from
Sharmarke. End note.) However, TFG Minister of State Hidig on
October 7 told us he did not trust Madobe and was putting
together his own militia in an effort to take Kismayo. (Note:
Hidig would not specify where the militia was coming from or
the degree to which it was meant to reinforce or compete with
Madobe's alliance. Hidig, like Sharmarke, is from the Ogaden
clan, but is reportedly a close associate of General Morgan
and Barre Hirale, figures who in recent months have attempted
to work against the emergence of a Darod/Kaballa alliance in
Lower Juba. Numerous contacts have told us in recent months
that Hidig was among other Somalis who attempted to influence
a Kenyan plan for Lower Juba. Northeast Kenyan contacts in
early October alleged the GOK and/or Somali officials were
attempting to recruit Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees in
northeast Kenya to fight in Lower Juba. (ref c) End note.)
HOZA