SOMALIA - PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES TFG TROOP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002132

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL MOPS PINR SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES TFG TROOP
INTEGRATION PLANS AND SUPPORT TO JUBA

Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,
d).


1. (C) Summary: During an October 7 telecon, TFG Prime
Minister Sharmarke updated the Somalia Unit on Yemeni support
to the TFG, the status of TFG forces in Djibouti, and TFG
support to Ahmed Madobe's alliance in Lower Juba. Sharmarke
said the Yemenis have provided the TFG with AK47s, other
equipment, and uniforms that the TFG plans to give to Siad
Barre-era troops in Mogadishu. Sharmarke said the TFG plans
to incorporate the 560 TFG troops currently in Djibouti with
the former Barre forces. Sharmarke told us he talked to Ahmed
Madobe (reftel) on October 6 and sent $50,000 to Madobe via
an intermediary in Dubai. The Prime Minister said he was also
attempting to reach the Kenyan Minister of Defense in order
to discuss Kenyan support for a "second phase" in Lower Juba.
Sharmarke said he is planning to reduce the size of the TFG
Cabinet and told us the TFG probably will soon replace Police
Commissioner Qeybdid and Army Chief Dhumaal. End summary.

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Plan to Integrate Djibouti Forces
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2. (C) Sharmarke said the TFG on October 7 finalized a plan
to integrate the 560 TFG troops currently in Djibouti, upon
their return to Somalia in mid-October, with 700 Siad
Barre-era military forces. Sharmarke asked for USG salary
support for the 1,260 troops. Sharmarke said that the Yemenis
had provided the TFG with AK47s, other equipment, and
uniforms that the TFG plans to distribute, via AMISOM, to the
two battalions that will result when the returning TFG troops
are combined with the Barre-era soldiers, who are currently
based with AMISOM. (Note: Sharmarke did not know how many
weapons and uniforms were in the Yemeni shipment but said he
would speak to the TFG Defense Minister and send us a list of
what the TFG had received. End note.) Sharmarke said the
1,269 forces probably would be based at a pre-existing camp
at the end of the airport and would fall under the overall
command of the Medina force commander.

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TFG Support to Madobe and Juba
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3. (C) Sharmarke told us he talked to Ahmed Madobe on October
6 and sent $50,000 to Madobe via an intermediary in Dubai.
(Note: The intermediary, Somalia Unit contact and prominent
Ogaden-clan business figure Mohamed Sheikh, told us on
October 7 that the Prime Minister said the TFG would send him
the money, but that he was still waiting for the transfer.
End note.) Madobe told Sharmarke that he was running out of
ammunition and money and that al-Shabaab was reinforcing from
Merca. Sharmarke said he was attempting to arrange for a qat
flight out of Mogadishu to take ammunition to the Lower Juba
town of Afmadow. Madobe reportedly told Sharmarke that the
TFG can trust him and that he will work with other forces in
Lower Juba, if Kenyan-trained Somalis are able to organize
such forces.


4. (C) Sharmarke said he is attempting to reach the Kenyan
Defense Minister in order to discuss a "second phase" for
Lower Juba. Sharmarke said the TFG wants 36 troops who have
been trained in Kenya to return to Middle and Lower Juba in
order to organize reinforcements for Madobe's alliance.
(Note: Juba contacts in early October told us the 36 forces
in Kenya plan to organize forces from inside the northeast
Kenyan Dadaab refugee camp rather than from inside Juba. End
note.)

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Considering Internal TFG Changes
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5. (C) Sharmarke said he is planning to reduce the cabinet
and told us the TFG probably will soon replace Police
Commissioner Qeybdiid and Army Chief Dhumaal. Sharmarke
provided no additional detail regarding these potential
changes but said there was a short list of possible
replacements for both. (Note: President Sharif and Sharmarke
have, since the last cabinet reshuffle, told us repeatedly
that they intend to reduce the cabinet. End note.)

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NAIROBI 00002132 002 OF 002


Comment
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6. (C) We think that the TFG's efforts to devise a plan for
the integration of TFG forces in Djibouti is a positive
development and are working with the TFG in order to avoid
duplication of efforts regarding Yemeni and potential U.S.
support. We think the TFG's assistance in Lower Juba may
help to undercut Aweys' likely intention to hijack the
clan-based initiative, however, we remain concerned that the
Kenyans do not understand Juba clan politics well enough to
positively manipulate the situation and think recruitment out
of Dadaab refugee camp, if true, would only complicate an
already fluid and complex situation.
HOZA