SOMALIA-TFG-ALIGNED FORCES STRUGGLING TO HOLD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002069

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: MOPS MARR PTER PINR SOCI SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA-TFG-ALIGNED FORCES STRUGGLING TO HOLD
BELEDWEYNE AFTER SEPTEMBER 27 CAPTURE; OPPOSITION
REINFORCING

Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b,d
).


1. (C) Summary: On September 27, TFG-aligned forces again
moved into eastern Beledweyne but may not be able to hold the
strategic town due to risk aversion and lack of ammunition
and reinforcements. TFG General Mukhtar on September 28 told
Somalia Unit Poloff that al-Shabaab forces retreated from
Beledweyne in advance of Mukhtar's forces and, with the
exception of a few remaining al-Shabaab militia in western
Beledweyne, remained approximately 25 kilometers outside of
the town. Former TFG governor of Hiraan and recent defector
to Hisbul Islam General Ma'ow reportedly left Beledweyne and
took his forces to Buulo Burte to await reinforcements.
Hiraan leaders said they are frustrated by lack of support
from the TFG and Ethiopia and think their allies, such as
ASWJ, are too engaged in their own fights against al-Shabaab
to assist Beledweyne forces. Mukhtar said he does not know
if his forces will be able to hold the town in the event of a
counter attack from al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam. End
summary.

2. (C) On September 28, TFG General Mukhtar, Member of
Parliament Duqane, and Hiraan forces' spokesman Mohamed Nur
told Somalia Unit PolOff that TFG-aligned forces on September
27 again moved into eastern Beledweyne but may not be able to
hold the strategic town due to lack of ammunition and
reinforcements. (Note: The September 27 capture of Beledweyne
by TFG-aligned forces represents the fourth time the town has
changed hands in the past two months. End note). General
Mukhtar said al-Shabaab forces retreated from the town in
advance of Mukhtar's forces and, despite a few remaining
al-Shabaab militia in western Beledweyne, remained
approximately 25 kilometers outside of the town. However,
former TFG governor of Hiraan and recent defector to Hisbul
Islam General Ma'ow reportedly left Beledweyne and took his
forces to Buulo Burte to await reinforcements from Hisbul
Islam leader Musa Arale. Mukhtar said he does not know if his
forces will be able to hold the town in the event of a
counter attack from al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam forces.

3. (C) Duqane, Mukhtar, and Nur expressed frustration over
lack of support for their efforts in Beledweyne. MP Duqane
said he was in touch with the TFG Speaker of Parliament and
the Prime Minister yesterday but had little except statements
of support. Mukhtar said more worrying is the fact that his
forces have not received the additional ammunition that
Ethiopia usually provides and that the Ethiopians have not
come across the border to bolster his forces. Mukhtar said
he was in communication with an Ethiopian General today but
that he did not know if or when support would come from the
Ethiopians. Mukhtar, Duqane, and Nur said they attended a
follow-up meeting with their ASWJ allies on September 21.
All parties confirmed their commitment to work together to
confront al-Shabaab. However, Mukhtar said ASWJ was not able
to provide any support to his forces at that time because
ASWJ had its own battle to fight in central Somalia against
forces loyal to Sheikh Dahir Aweys. (Note: Mukhtar and other
Hiraan leaders met with predominately northern Galgaduud ASWJ
leaders earlier this month. End note.)

4. (C) Mohamed Nur told us that he fears Ma'ow's message of
non-support to the TFG will begin to resonate with the local
community if the town again changes hands because the people
will think the TFG is not interested in their fate. He said
he is attempting to use the media more proactively to counter
Ma'ow's messaging. As an example, he said he convinced a
local media outlet to retract a false story about TFG-aligned
forces looting shops in western Beledweyne. He said media
outlets in the region are very balanced and admitted that the
TFG has been outpaced and outmaneuvered by Hisbul Islam and
al-Shabaab when it comes to messaging.

5. (C) Comment: We are encouraging TFG-aligned leaders in
Hiraan to step up their efforts to counter al-Shabaab and
Hisbul Islam media campaigns and to continue to reach out to
the TFG for whatever support --political or financial-- the
TFG may be able to provide. However, we think that the TFG's
limited resources, coupled with lack of political will by
some within the TFG, make it very unlikely the TFG will
provide significant support to Hiraan. We think Beledweyne
will continue to periodically switch hands due to Somalis'
risk averse and long-standing tradition of using the threat
of force, when faced with a stalemate, to open space for
political machinations. Against this backdrop, Ma'ow will

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continue to attempt to position himself in the region as a
political alternative to the TFG.
RANNEBERGER