SOMALIA - SECURITY MINISTER ON MOGADISHU, HIRAAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001962

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR PINR PTER MOPS SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - SECURITY MINISTER ON MOGADISHU, HIRAAN,
AND TFG POLITICS

Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson for reasons
1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: TFG Security Minister Abdullahi Ali
"Sanbaloshi" confirmed to us that there are joint TFG and
AMISOM plans to mount an offensive in Mogadishu, but he
doubted that would occur by September 20, as advertised.
"Sanbaloshi" estimated that al-Shabaab had 4000 - 5000 troops
in Mogadishu, and said reports of a 1000 or less were
standard underestimates. He said the TFG had approximately
4000 troops, including newly-trained troops expected to
arrive soon from Djibouti. An additional 850 aging, Siad
Barre-era soldiers were awaiting weapons, and would
contribute to the offensive, "Sanbaloshi" predicted.
"Sanbaloshi" expressed doubts about Hiraan TFG police
commander Hussein Mukhtar Afrah's abilities and
trustworthiness. He mooted the possibility the TFG would
name a well-know Hiraan native, NOW living in Italy, as
Hiraan's governor and asked for USG help in paying TFG-allied
troops in the region. "Sanbaloshi" was optimistic that
al-Shabaab would be defeated in Juba and Gedo. He lamented
the distractions of petty internal TFG politics. End summary.

Mogadishu Offensive
--------------


2. (C) We met with Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
Security Minister Abdullahi Ali "Sanbaloshi" on September 16
to discuss the security situation in Mogadishu and in key
regions. The situation in Mogadishu was "difficult," he
said. He estimated that al-Shabaab forces numbered 4000 -
5000 in Mogadishu, rejecting other reports of 1000 or less as
underestimates. (Note: "Sanbaloshi's estimate seems high to
us. End note.) African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM)
and TFG preparations for a breakout offensive against
al-Shabaab tentatively scheduled for September 20 were going
slowly. AMISOM was concerned about potential problems in
distinguishing non-uniformed TFG troops and allied militias
during combat. The TFG was concerned in turn about the
commitment of some of its "front line" militia to hold any
captured territory. The TFG was anxiously anticipating the
arrival of Djiboutian- and French-trained recruits to bolster
TFG and allied forces, which would then number approximately
4000 troops.


3. (C) To bolster the offensive and help hold captured
ground, "Sanbaloshi" said the TFG was replacing some
company-level commanders and planning logistics. In addition
to the hoped-for 4000 troops, it was preparing roughly 850
Siad Barre-era military soldiers NOW gathering at a camp in
Mogadishu's Jazeera area, immediately west-southwest of the
international airport. These troops were not yet armed, but
"Sanbaloshi" said the TFG was, with difficulty, attempting to
equip them. These"grey troops" as Prime Minister Sharmarke
has called them, will be charged with holding key,
newly-captured locations if the breakout offensive succeeds.

TFG Has roblems in Hiraan Region
--------------


4. (C) "Sanbaloshi" told us that TFG Hiraan regional force
commander Police General Hussein Mukhtar Afrah was "not in
control" of the situation in Hiraan. Mukhtar was aloof, not
sufficiently popular, and did not have the political gravitas
to unite the region. "Sanbaloshi" said that he did not fully
trust Mukhtar. The TFG had sent $80,000 to Mukhtar and
then-Hiraan governor Abdirahman Ma'ow for Hiraan troops and
for goodwill gestures in and around Beledweyne. Both men had
misappropriated the funds, "Sanbaloshi" said, and only
$16,000 in the end reached Mukhtar's troops. (Note: Mukhtar
has told us the TFG only sent $16,000, all of which he spent
on his troops. End note.) Ma'ow reportedly met with
al-Shabaab leaders Mukhtar Robow and Abu Zubeyr "Godane"
shortly after receiving the money, and has since resigned
from the government.


5. (C) "Sanbaloshi" said Ma'ow was publicly questioning why
Hiraan's sons should battle al-Shabaab while no other TFG
forces were on the offensive. "Sanbaloshi" conceded that
this message was resonating in Hiraan because the TFG has
been absent from, and largely silent about Hiraan. When we
asked why the TFG had not traveled to Hiraan, "Sanbaloshi"

NAIROBI 00001962 002 OF 002


said the government had nothing to offer there. He thought an
empty-handed TFG delegation would only further discredit the
government and validate Ma'ow's criticism. "Sanbaloshi"
agreed that public statements of praise for those resisting
in the regions was useful, but could only do so much. He
asked for U.S. assistance in making salary payments to troops
in the regions.


6. (C) "Sanbaloshi" said that the TFG hoped that the
appointment of a new governor for Hiraan might help. The
government was considering Hassan Ali Queylow, a well-known
former Mogadishu police commissioner still popular in Hiraan,
but living NOW in Italy. Queylow is from Ma'ow's
Hawiye/Hawadle subclan, and could challenge Ma'ow locally and
among the Hawadle diaspora. Mukhtar would remain the TFG
ground commander, and would be expected to defer to Queylow,
his senior in age and in status.

Optimistic about Juba and Gedo
--------------


7. (C) Turning to the Juba region, "Sanbaloshi" said Ras
Kamboni militia leader Ahmed Madobe's uprising against
al-Shabaab could succeed. "Sanbaloshi" reported that the
most important Ogadeni and Marehan militia leaders in Juba
and Gedo were on board. Juba's population may need to hear
Ras Kamboni political leader Hassan al-Turki bless the
initiative. To counter the Ogadeni effort, al-Shabaab is
preparing itself, in part by recruiting Marehan militias in
and around Kismayo, and by preying on natural Marehan
insecurities about Ogadeni domination of the port.
"Sanbaloshi" thought that the Ethiopian government was not of
one mind about the Juba/Gedo offensive. He guessed that some
in the GOE would have concerns about Ogadeni control of
Kismayo.

Internal Politics Petty and Distracting
--------------


8. (C) "Sanbaloshi" said that the recent cabinet reshuffle
was largely ineffective. It had succeeded only in angering
demoted ministers and their clans. Recent parliamentary
criticism (mostly by Dir and Rahanweyne MPs) of the Prime
Minister would persist, but would go nowhere. It was a
needless distraction for a government already overwhelmed by
the crisis facing it, "Sanbaloshi" said. Contradicting
rumors, he said he had seen absolutely no evidence of a rift
between President Sheikh Sharif and the Prime Minister.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) "Sanbaloshi" seemed to doubt the rumored Mogadishu
offensive tentatively slated for September 20 would start on
time. His intention to travel to Washington for ten days
beginning September 20 seemed evidence of his skepticism. It
is certain that any Mogadishu offensive will rely heavily on
AMISOM support. The TFG's waning influence in Hiraan is
regrettable, and "Sanbaloshi" didn't seem to accept what the
regional leaders have told us: that even in the absence of
financial or material support, TFG public support and
encouragement was still a powerful motivator.
RANNEBERGER