SOMALIA - TFG, KENYA ASK HELP OUSTING SHABAAB IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001861

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AND A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM MOPS SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG, KENYA ASK HELP OUSTING SHABAAB IN
THE FAR SOUTH

REF: A. IIR 6 854 0328 09

B. IIR 6 854 0327 09

C. IIR 6 854 0340 09

D. IIR 6 854 0342 09

E. IIR 6 854 0343 09

F. NAIROBI 1732

G. NAIROBI 1710

H. NAIROBI 1648

I. NAIROBI 1552

J. NAIROBI 1851

K. NAIROBI 1771

L. NAIROBI 1669

M. NAIROBI 1665

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (S//NF) Summary: This is an action request. See
paragraph six. Somali and Kenyan officials are working in
concert to support a locally-driven effort in Lower Juba and
Gedo to expel al-Shabaab. Somali President Sheikh Sharif and
the Kenyan government have asked us to support the plan with
weapons, medical supplies, communications and intelligence.
Lower Juba's and Gedo's key clan leaders and most powerful
militia commanders are reportedly behind the initiative. The
Kenyans are supporting the effort, in coordination with the
TFG, by training 36 Somalis and ethnic Somali Kenyan retired
military officers for insertion into Somalia. The Kenyans
are also procuring transportation and weapons to assist a
coordinated Somali attack on Shabaab in Juba and Gedo
beginning late September or early October, though local
realities will ultimately dictate the time table. This
effort will be coordinated with TFG-led offensives in other
parts of the country as well. End Summary.


2. (S//NF) Reftels A-I detail Somali and Kenyan plans to
oust al-Shabaab from the Somali regions of Lower Juba and
Gedo, and the Somali politics behind the effort.
Transitional Federal Government President Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed (on September 2),and numerous of our contacts
over the past weeks tell us Ras Kamboni leaders Ahmed Madobe
(Darod/Ogaden/Mohamed Zubeir) and Ibrahim Shukri
(Darod/Ogaden/Mohamed Zubeir) intend to attack al-Shabaab in
Lower Juba in the coming days or weeks. In a coordinated
attack the Darod/Marehan, led by among others, associates of
TFG-allied former member of parliament Barre Hirale
(Darod/Marehan/Rer Dini),are expected to strike al-Shabaab
in the Gedo region. It is hoped the simultaneous attacks
will overwhelm al-Shabaab's reported inferior numbers in both
regions. Madobe and Shukri likely will attempt to capture
the key Lower Juba port town of Kismayo from Shabaab. (Note:
Kismayo serves as an important foreign fighter entry point,
logistical hub, and source of revenue and possibly weapons
for al-Shabaab, which has controlled the town since ousting
an unpopular Marehan administration in August 2008.)


3. (S//NF) Separately, the Kenyan National Security and
Intelligence Service Director Michael Gichangi, Deputy Army
Commander Major General Njuki Mwaniki, and Director of
Military Intelligence (DMI) Brigadier Phillip Kameru have
given us details of the GOK plan to assist the Juba and Gedo
uprisings with retired ethnic-Somali Kenyan military
advisors, trained Somalis from the region, as well as roughly
70 armed technicals, weapons, ammunition, communications and
logistics. The Kenyans tell us 36 Somalis from Gedo and
Lower Juba on September 4 completed a six-week training as
tactical advisors. In the coming days they and their Kenyan
advisors will return to Somalia with communications, and, if
available, weapons and equipment, and link up with local
militia leaders to provide tactical guidance and help liaise
with the GOK. The Kenyans tell us they anticipate the
Somalis will launch attacks in late September or early
October. DMI Kameru and the Kenyan government have requested
we assist the joint TFG-Kenyan effort with weapons, medical
supplies, communications and imagery intelligence.


4. (S//NF) President Sharif confirmed to the Ambassador on
September 2 that he requested and approves of Kenyan
assistance to TFG-aligned forces in Juba and Gedo. He sees
this as a TFG-led effort, and confirmed Ahmed Madobe is in
close touch with the TFG. President Sharif urged us to
respond positively to the Kenyan request for materiel and

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intelligence support. President Sharif said this initiative
in the south is part of a larger TFG effort to foment
anti-Shabaab uprisings in multiple regions simultaneously, in
order to overwhelm Shabaab's smaller, but more mobile forces.
Already in Galgaduud and Hiran, al-Shabaab is under pressure
(reftels J-M). Likewise, we have heard from multiple sources
that Shabaab has reduced its number of forces in Mogadishu
and may be vulnerable there.


5. (S//NF) In their separate meetings with us, the Kenyans,
President Sharif and his Ogadeni Minister for Transport (and
former Minister of Defense) Mohammed Abdi "Ghandi" assured us
they are mitigating the risk that southern Somali clan
dynamics might derail an otherwise militarily sound plan.
"Ghandi" is in discussions with Marehan and Ogadeni leaders,
urging cooperation and unity. The 36 Somali trainees were
chosen by the Marehan and Ogadeni military leaders to whom
they will report. Our contacts tell us the Prime Minister
and Ghandi are speaking to Madobe about his intentions and
how the TFG and Kenya can help. The Kenyans tell us they are
meeting regularly with Shukri, who is committed to their
plan.


6. (S//NF) Comment and Action Request: We believe the
Kenyan and TFG requests for assistance should be seriously
considered. The Kenyan DMI told us they would welcome
weapons, medical supplies, communications and intelligence
support immediately. Intelligence support could be provided
through existing liaison with the DMI, Kenyan Intelligence
Service, and TFG intelligence services. Simple
communications, such as satellite phones, could be quickly
provided to the TFG, to enable them to communicate with the
Kenyan advisors.


7. (S//NF) Comment and Action Request Continued: We should
also consider how best to capitalize on the possible success
of this initiative. If this plan accomplishes its goal of a
TFG-allied capture of Kismayo, we can help the TFG to
capitalize on the move by assisting them with their public
diplomacy efforts. We should also plan for an immediate
surge of humanitarian and development assistance into Lower
Juba and Gedo, should there be success, in order to show the
population the benefits of resistance to al-Shabaab. A rapid
reaction from the donor community would give other
communities confidence to reject extremists. The question of
whether and how elements of the Africa Union Mission for
Somalia contingent might go to Kismayo to assist with
stabilization should also now be considered.


8. (S) In considering possible assistance, we should ensure
both accountability and vetting of those receiving support.
While making no commitments, we remain in close contact with
the Kenyans and TFG on this and await Washington guidance on
possible next steps.
RANNEBERGER