Pushing the Reform Process - Follow-up to the Secretary's

S E C R E T NAIROBI 001811 SIPDIS For AF A/S Carson and NSC Senior Director Gavin from the Ambassador E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM US KE SUBJECT: Pushing the Reform Process - Follow-up to the Secretary's Visit Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. In the wake of the Secretary's high impact visit, we are moving quickly to sustain pressure for implementation of the reform agenda. In concert with Washington, we are engaging intensively with key political leaders, while working to energize civil society, the private sector, religious groups, the media, grassroots youth movements, and ordinary Kenyans to press for peaceful change. This message discusses the impact of the Secretary's visit, lays out what we are doing, and contains recommendations for additional actions. End summary. -------------- -------------- The Secretary's Visit and U.S. Pressure for Reforms -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) The Secretary's visit constructively escalated pressure for implementation of the reform process. The visit was well-timed in the context of continuing USG efforts. We stepped up pressure at the beginning of this year, when it became clear that the coalition government was not prepared to move on the tough issues which would effectively challenge the culture of impunity. These key reform issues include, among others: meaningful constitutional revision; police reform, including the removal of the police chief; judicial reform, including the removal of the Chief Justice; broader rule of law reform, including the removal of the Attorney General and restructuring of his office; holding accountable perpetrators of post-election violence; establishing a permanent independent electoral commission; and serious anti-corruption efforts. The early May visit of A/S Carson and NSC Senior Director Gavin increased the pressure, particularly by making clear that President Obama is directly concerned about lack of progress in implementation of key reforms. A/S Carson's second visit in early July further intensified pressure. The U.S. approach involves direct pressure as well as encouragement of domestic-driven pressure for reform. This includes intensive private and public outreach to encourage reformist voices and concerted actions among civil society, the private sector, religious groups, youth, the media, and ordinary Kenyans. ¶3. (S/NF) The Secretary's visit underscored U.S. concerns about lack of progress on reforms and specifically emphasized President Obama's direct concerns. In addition to delivering a firm message to the coalition leadership regarding the need to move ahead expeditiously on key reforms, the Secretary's town hall meeting at the University of Nairobi, which was prominently covered by the media, carried our message widely to civil society and ordinary Kenyans. The Secretary's meeting with reform-minded parliamentarians has helped stimulate efforts to form a "reform caucus" within Parliament (septels report on these meetings). ¶4. (S/NF) Although the sustained U.S. pressure has not yet resulted in specific progress on the reform agenda, it has stimulated intense discussion within the coalition leadership regarding th way forward, and it has helped energize civil society and the Kenyan people to continue pushing for change. Particularly following the Secretary's visit, there has been more ferment within the coalition government regarding the need for at least some further steps to implement reforms. Commentary from the media, civil society, religious groups, youth, the private sector, and ordinary Kenyans indicate that our leverage and role as a catalyst remain crucial to bring about fundamental change. ¶5. (S/NF) At the same time, the vested interests - including much of the political class and coalition leadership - remain resistant to key reforms, because they realize that implementation of even some of the major reforms will start the process of unraveling the culture of impunity and thus threaten their political and economic interests. In addition, while it is clear that the Kenyan people want to see reforms implemented, continuing fragmentation within civil society, the media, and private sector mean that domestic-driven pressure for reform is not as concerted as it should be. We must, therefore continue to hammer home our message to the coalition leadership while seeking to energize and support more concerted domestic-driven pressure. Based on their actions during the post-election crisis, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga have demonstrated that they are, ultimately, pragmatic politicians, and we believe that the correct dosage of domestic and international pressure will probably induce them to move on at least some of the key reforms. We should exploit the complex relationships among Kenya's political leadership and work pragmatically with those who demonstrate willingness to push specific reforms. -------------- Follow-up Actions -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) We have a number of steps underway and planned to follow-up on the Secretary's visit. This message also contains recommendations for further actions. ¶7. (S/NF) Private Diplomacy. I and key members of the Mission team are meeting with a wide range of political actors, including the leadership of the coalition government, government ministers, and influential players. Since the Secretary's visit, I have met with a number of government ministers, advisers to the President and Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, and the head of the committee of experts overseeing constitutional review, among others (septels report on these meetings). Our message to these and others is that the U.S. will continue to intensify pressure for implementation of reforms; that we will recognize and support serious reform results; that we will not do business as usual if there is no progress; that U.S. actions will back up our rhetoric; and that this U.S. policy emanates from the highest levels of the U.S. Government. ¶8. (S/NF) Civil Society. We have planned a series of meetings with key civil society organizations. We are examining ways to use video teleconferences to bring together U.S. analysts and policymakers with civil society, the media, private sector, and parliamentarians. ¶9. (S/NF) Outreach to Youth and Ordinary Kenyans. I am continuing town hall public meetings with independent grassroots youth groups around the country, which are covered by the media. Planning is underway to launch by the end of September a major USAID-supported $45 million youth initiative (this is in addition to the significant youth-focused efforts already being carried out by the USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives). We will use this as an opportunity to hold a major public forum on the reform agenda, including youth groups, civil society, the private sector, and reform-minded parliamentarians. At the same time, planning is underway to launch a USAID-supported $15 million initiative targeted on empowering women. As part of continuing intensive public diplomacy efforts, we will ensure that these initiatives are seen as part of our overall efforts to push reforms. We have developed megatalkers on U.S. efforts and the reform process for use by key Mission team members in expanded public diplomacy. We continue to highlight the President's speech in Ghana and his other comments on Kenya, and the Secretary's recent remarks with regard to Kenya. We are also calling attention to then Senator Obama's forceful and still remarkably relevant speech on the reform process and the role of youth delivered at the University of Nairobi in August 2006. ¶10. (S/NF) Social Networking Technology to Expand Outreach. I am starting a facebook page and twitter campaign to expand outreach. Since the Secretary's visit, I have delivered clear messages on the reform process at three public civil society events. As announced at the Secretary's town hall meeting, we established a link to the Mission web site for follow-up questions. Following the Secretary's visit, I conducted an hour-long web chat with the Kenyan public. (Regular web chats were begun over a year ago, and will be held monthly.) ¶11. (S/NF) Parliament. We are encouraging reform-minded parliamentarians to form a "reform caucus" of like-minded members. The reform-minded leadership of the American Chamber of Commerce here is working closely with us in this effort. We have indicated that, if a credible caucus is formed, we will provide some direct support for it through our USAID parliamentary strengthening program. I am inviting reform-minded parliamentarians to join me when I hold town hall meetings with youth groups. We are reaching out to the heads of all parliamentary committees to push our reform message. (Parliament must play a key role in implementation of all the reforms, but there are also specific legislative measures that will advance reform, including passage of anti-money-laundering legislation.) The Speaker of Parliament, one of the leading reform voices in the country, strongly supports our actions across the board. We should continue to associate ourselves closely with him and his pro-reform statements, and continue to look for ways to bolster him. (His recent visit to Washington was helpful in that regard, as has been our support to him to open a Parliament media center.) ¶12. (S/NF) Private Sector. My team and I met with key reform-minded private sector players. They want to intensify collaboration with us to push reforms, including through coordinated outreach to parliamentarians, civil society, the media, and youth groups, and we are working on a plan of action. ¶13. (S/NF) Media. The Public Affairs Counselor and I met with the major media owners to discuss the Secretary's visit, to delineate our thinking and approach, and to encourage them to work together to highlight and help drive reform implementation issues. We are also encouraging - and will consider supporting -- key media to sponsor town hall meetings throughout Kenya to highlight public support for implementation of reforms. ¶14. (S/NF) Annan's Role. Under the aegis of the African Union and African Eminent Persons group, Kofi Annan remains engaged to support the reform process. He is planning a visit to Kenya in September, which will include both private meetings and public outreach to civil society, the media, the private sector, religious groups, and others to maintain pressure for implementation of the reform agenda. ¶15. (S/NF) UK and EU. Following the Secretary's visit I debriefed UK and EU counterparts. As previous reporting has indicated, Kenyans clearly look to the U.S. as their key partner and our leverage is paramount, but we should continue to coordinate closely with the UK and EU on efforts to push reforms. ¶16. (S/NF) Travel Bans and Warning Letters. As discussed, we are developing 212F packages on Attorney General Wako, Minister of Energy Murungi, and Minister of Industry Kosgey. Proceeding with these as quickly as possible will send a clear message of our intent to back with action our declared intent of "no business as usual" with those who are obstacles to reform. Wako has consistently blocked anti-corruption prosecutions. Murungi and Kosgey are both notoriously corrupt. They are also, respectively, the Secretary General of Kibaki's Party of National Unity and Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement; taking action against them will send a clear message that we hold both sides of the coalition government accountable. We are also working on draft letters (for Washington's review) to key political figures making clear that their future relationship with us depends on their providing strong support for implementation of reforms. ¶17. (S/NF) Other Issues. We should continue to engage with the coalition government and the Kenyan people to support positive steps on issues not directly connected to the reform agenda. These issues, among others, include supporting steps to end environmental degradation of the key Mau Forest water catchment; the urgent need to counter drought and food insecurity; and steps to address insecurity linked to traditional ethnic clashes (mainly over cattle rustling and related issues). The point here is to ensure that we remain connected to the day-to-day issues that most affect the average Kenyan. If there are successes in these areas, we will want to acknowledge them and, if not, we will want to remain on the side of ordinary Kenyans. Food security, for example, will be a focus area in our public outreach and actions tied in to Ramadan events. Septels report on these issues. -------------- Recommendations for Additional Steps -------------- ¶18. (S/NF) I recommend that the following additional steps be considered: -- Invite a combined group of grassroots youth leaders, civil society, private sector, and perhaps reform-minded parliamentarians as well, for a well-publicized visit to Washington within the next 4-8 weeks. In addition to appropriate meetings, we could arrange useful public fora. -- Separately, invite a delegation from the parliamentary reform caucus, once it is formed and has demonstrated commitment to reform. -- On an ongoing basis, look for opportunities for Washington-based policymakers to comment on Kenya and the reform process. -- Following announcement of travel bans and issuance of letters, consider appropriate follow-up by the Secretary as well as a presidential statement and/or letters/calls to the coalition leaders. Intervention by the Secretary and President should be timed to push decisive movement on key issues. -- Timed with announcement of travel bans and issuance of letters, publicly indicate our intention to intensively scrutinize IFI programs being considered for Kenya (i.e. a possible IMF program that may be requested in the next month or so). -- Move immediately to identify funding to provide concrete support for actual implementation of major reforms (specifically with respect to support for implementation of police and judicial reforms, and restructuring of the Attorney General's office). We should work with the EU, UK, World Bank, and others to coordinate efforts and address burden-sharing. ¶19. (S/NF) I believe that intensified pressure by the U.S., coupled with domestic-driven pressure and Annan's continuing engagement, will yield significant results on implementation of reforms over the coming months. Although our goal must remain full implementation of the reform agenda, we must be realistic that we may well not achieve the maximum; however, implementation of even a significant part of the reforms would constitute a turning point and, potentially, the beginning of the end of the culture of impunity. Achieving fundamental change is crucial to U.S. regional interests as well as to the future democratic stability and economic prosperity of Kenya. The window to bring about key reforms is narrow, so we must continue to move with a sense of urgency. RANNEBERGER