SOMALIA - THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MOGADISHU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001798 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019 TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MOGADISHU REF: A. NAIROBI 1794 ¶B. NAIROBI 1796 Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On August 19-20, Embassy political officers met with several key Somali officials including Mohamed Osman Ali "Dhagaxtur", the Governor of Banadir Region and Mayor of Mogadishu, and Mohamed Omar Ahmed "Wayel," Protocol Officer in Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Sheikh Sharif's office. In separate meetings Political Officers met with Abdi Hassan Awale "Qeybdid" (Hawiye/Haber Gedir/Sa'ad), the TFG Police Chief, and with Members of the Somali Parliament on the Security Committee. The discussions focused on the current security situation in Mogadishu, where the TFG and aligned forces are attempting to re-gain territory after a joint al-Shabaab/Hisbul Islam offensive in May-July threatened to topple the TFG. "Dhagaxtur" and our contacts reported the TFG is currently either holding or controlling most of 6 of Mogadishu,s 16 districts, and has partial control over sections of 6 additional districts. Information from the other officials generally corroborated that the TFG had made some important, albeit limited gains since July 12. The meetings provided current insight into the ongoing struggle for control in the various regions of Mogadishu. Territorial Control in Mogadishu -------------- ¶2. (C) According to Mayor "Dhagaxtur," and others, including the TFG Police Commissioner "Qeybdiid", National Intelligence Chief Mohamed Sheikh, and MPs, TFG aligned forces currently control roughly half of the city of Mogadishu, with the rest controlled by al-Shabaab and intermixed Hizbul Islam forces, of which al-Shabaab is significantly more powerful. Specifically, the Mayor reported the TFG fully controls the districts of Dharkenley and Wadajir (in the Western Mogadishu neighborhood of Medina),as well as Waberi, Hamar Jabjab (variants: Xamarjajab, Hamar Jab-Jab),Hamar-Weye, and Shingani. "Dhagaxtur" also claimed that the TFG controls most of Abdi Aziz and Bondhere (variant: Doondheere) districts, roughly half of Shibis, Hodon, and Wardhigley districts, and only 20-25 percent of Hawl-Waddag. The rest of Mogadishu was controlled by the insurgents. (Note: while Mayor "Dhagaxtur", Protocol Officer Wayel, and Police Chief "Qeybdid" were generally in agreement about the districts under firm TFG control, they differed on the extent of TFG control in districts split between TFG and insurgent control. We also note that territorial control in Mogadishu is subject to frequent changes as TFG and insurgent forces vie for supremecy. End Note.) Al-Shabaab Fighter Movements -------------- ¶3. (C) Mayor Dhagaxtur estimated that, of the al-Shabaab/Hizbul Islam forces in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab has significantly reduced its number of fighters from an estimated 3,500 al-Shabaab, and 1,000 Hizib al-Islam at the height of the May/June fighting, to an estimated 1,000 al-Shabaab and an unknown but reduced number of Hizbul Islam today. Representatives from the Parliament and others corroborated this insurgent exodus from Mogadishu, and believed that the majority of al-Shabaab fighters remaining in Mogadishu were locals. "Qeybdiid" reported annecdotal accounts of al-Shabaab dismantling its guns from technicals in order to hide them for use later. He claimed this was a sign al-Shabaab was preparing to go into hiding. ¶4. (C) The cause for the withdrawal of many al-Shabaab forces from the capital was subject to debate among our contacts. The MPs believed this was due to pressure on al-Shabaab and allied insurgents caused by fighting in regions outside Mogadishu, most notably operations by ASWJ and the fighting in Bula Hawa and Luq in Gedo region, and similar efforts in Galgadud and Hiraan in mid-August (Ref B). These operations were seen as relieving pressure from the TFG in Mogadishu, and prompting the withdrawal of many al-Shabaab fighters, who were relocating to their regions of origin or traditional strongholds in southern Somalia (ref A). General "Qeybdiid" cited internal divisions within al-Shabaab, and between Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, exacerbated by the Islamic NAIROBI 00001798 002 OF 002 credentials of President Sheikh Sharif,s government, AMISOM,s defense of the TFG in mid-July, and President Sharif,s meeting with the Secretary of State in August. According to "Qeybdiid," these latter two events signify the international community,s new strength of commitment to the government, which has demoralized violent Islamist extremists. However, Mayor "Dhagaxtur" believes al-Shabaab is sending forces back to Kismayo, Lower Shabelle, and Bay and Bakool regions, not primarily because they are being challenged elsewhere, but in an effort to reorganize and gather additional fighters for a renewed future (timing unspecified) assault on the TFG in Mogadishu. AMISOM, the TFG and Aligned Forces -------------- ¶5. (C) Mayor "Dhagaxtur" complained about the unreliability of many government forces. He pointedly quipped that there are 6,000-7,000 thousand TFG soldiers on payday, yet only 2,000-3,000 when it is time to fight. He also downplayed AMISOM's offensive contribution in the July 12 fighting. He noted that AMISOM engaged in a half-day of fighting, but more importantly, AMISOM,s tanks in the streets had a major psychological impact, boosting TFG morale and demoralizing the extremists. Separately "Qeybdiid" echoed this point, saying AMISOM tanks fired little on July 12, but their backing of the TFG advance was sufficient to send al-Shabaab fleeing, and to give the TFG courage to break out of its defensive positions. Somali MPs believed that AMISOM had been essential in repelling the al-Shabaab/Hisbul Islam offensive in mid-July, invigorating the TFG and intimidating the insurgents, who now recognize the TFG is secure as long as AMISOM provides military protection (Ref A). ¶6. (SBU) AMISOM has also been involved in recent reconnaissance. For example, on August 20 Burundian troops briefly scouted the route to the Defense Ministry building, which is located in an area of Mogadishu previously held solidly by al-Shabaab/Hibul Islam. The reconnaissance mission reportedly encountered no resistance. The mission may be in preparation for AMISOM,s reputed effort to establish a new base along Industrial Road. TFG leaders called the mission a test of al-Shabaab resistance on the city,s northwest quadrant, the results of which were encouraging. ¶7. (SBU) Somali officials noted a growing public hatred for al-Shabaab, which is seen as brainwashing and recruiting local youth into violence. MPs say that this public resentment is contributing to the formation of local TFG-aligned militias in Mogadishu neighborhoods such as Medina, and in regions outside the capital. Other reports from our contacts suggest al-Shabaab leaders still in Mogadishu may be encountering growing resentment and lack of cooperation from their local hosts. RANNEBERGER