SOMALIA - JUBA OFFENSIVE MOVING FORWARD; POWERFUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001732 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: MARR PGOV MOPS PINR SOCI SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - JUBA OFFENSIVE MOVING FORWARD; POWERFUL INTERESTS PROBABLY WORKING TO UNDERCUT OGADEN CLAN REF: A. A) NAIROBI 1648 ¶B. B) NAIROBI 1552 ¶C. C) IIR 6 854 0327 09 Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary A TFG-backed Juba offensive, aimed at pushing al-Shabaab out of Kismayo, appears to be moving forward, but competing Ethiopian and/or Marehan clan interests could complicate matters. TFG Minister of Defense "Gandi" reports that the TFG is in contact with local players in Juba, including Ras Kamboni leaders Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri, in an effort to reconcile differences and obtain their cooperation. "Gandi" said President Sharif fully supports the plan, which remains closely held within the TFG. The force in Lower Juba will consist of Darod/Kabalah clan militia but will not include Darod/Marehan militia from the Gedo region. Madobe appears willing to cooperate with the TFG if Lower Juba's autonomy would be assured. "Gandi" told us that the TFG is in negotiations with the Government of Kenya over support for the plan. Several of our Lower Juba contacts tell us they think some Marehan leaders are attempting to confuse the Kenyans by telling them that the Marehan have agreed to cooperate with those in Lower Juba in order to take Kismayo. End summary. "Gandi's" Plan -------------- ¶2. (C) During an August 15 conversation with the Somalia Unit, TFG Minister of Defense "Gandi" confirmed TFG involvement in an evolving Darod/Kabalah/Obsame plan to take Kismayo and consolidate control of Lower Juba (refs a,b). "Gandi" said the TFG in March began to talk to local players in Juba, to include Ras Kamboni leaders Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri, in an effort to reconcile differences and obtain their cooperation. "Gandi" said that President Sharif fully supports the plan, and that it remains closely held within the TFG. "Gandi" said the offensive must take place before mid-October in order to take advantage of current weather conditions that complicate al-Shabaab's efforts to re-supply through the port of Kismayo. The force in Lower Juba will consist of Darod/Kabalah clan militia but will not include Darod/Marehan militia from the Gedo region. Gandi said Marehan involvement in the effort to take Kismayo would be "horrible" and stated firmly "the Marehan can not go to �A;Kismayo." Ogaden militia, in cooperation with Marehan militia leaders, might go to Gedo to assist Marehan militia against al-Shabaab in that region, but "Gandi" said this would be a last resort because of the long-standing tensions between the two Darod subclans. "Gandi" said Ethiopian-backed Marehan proxy Barre Hirale and Darod/Kabalah/Harti/Majerteen warlord General Morgan are not involved in the TFG's plan in Gedo or Lower Juba. "Gandi" said he had full confidence in Shukri's commitment to the TFG but described Madobe as a "complex" but militarily necessary participant. "Gandi" said that the TFG is in negotiations with the Kenyans regarding support for the plan. He declared that "the Kenyans are ready to help us," but said the plan would move forward with or without Kenyan support (ref c). "Gandi" hoped that AMISOM might be able to provide artillery or aerial support to the offensive. Madobe's Version of Events Reveals Ogaden-Centric Agenda -------------- ¶3. (C) On August 12 Somalia Unit PolOff met Abdi Ali Raghe, a close contact and kinsman of Ahmed Madobe, who had just returned from spending several days with Madobe in the Lower Juba town of Dhobley. Raghe relayed to Poloff Madobe's version of recent events. Approximately six months before Madobe's late-March return to Lower Juba, Ras Kamboni leader Hassan al-Turki orchestrated a power-sharing arrangement for the Kismayo port between al-Shabaab and Ras Kamboni/Hisbul Islam. (Note: Madobe was Governor of Kismayo under the Council of Islamic Courts CIC) and was captured and imprisoned by Ethiopian forces when the CIC fled Kismayo in ¶2006. He was released from jail after President Sharif interceded on his behalf during his maiden visit to Addis Ababa. Madobe was appointed an MP in Somalia's expanded Parliament in January 2009. He resigned as MP in April 2009 and remained in Lower Juba. End note.) Turki had placed non-Ogaden al-Shabaab in primary leadership positions in Kismayo, forcing Ogaden-clan Ras Kamboni leaders into deputy positions. This suggested to Madobe that Turki's primary NAIROBI 00001732 002 OF 003 allegiance was to al-Shabaab. The Kismayo port agreement called for revenues to be divided, with 30% going to al-Shabaab, 30% to a joint Ras Kamboni/al-Shabaab administration, 30% to Ras Kamboni, and 10% to the Anole group. (Note: The Anole group is a faction of Hisbul Islam comprised of Darod/Kabalah/Harti militia. End Note.) Ras Kamboni in the end, however, received only about 2% of the revenues over the following months and, as a result, Ogaden clansmen defected to al-Shabaab. ¶4. (C) When Madobe returned to Lower Juba in late-March he was welcomed by Ogaden clan leaders. At that time, al-Shabaab began a campaign to persuade Turki that Madobe could not be trusted. Al-Shabaab urged Turki not to let Madobe join the Ras Kamboni leadership for three months, arguing that he may have been influenced by Ethiopia while in captivity. For their part, Ogaden clan elders told Madobe he must put clan interests before relations with al-Shabaab. Madobe subsequently traveled to Kismayo to begin to mobilize support among the subclans. In order to counter al-Shabaab's accusations against him as he worked to mobilize Ogaden support, Madobe resigned from the TFG. When al-Shabaab in Kismayo began to take the "converted" Ras Kamboni militia to Mogadishu to participate in the May offensive, Madobe's Ogaden clan complained that al-Shabaab was using Ogaden militia to ensure safe passage to Mogadishu, then was abandoning them once there. Madobe believed their grievances presented a good opportunity to convince his former militia in Mogadishu to return to Lower Juba for an attack on Kismayo. Madobe claimed that as many as 80% of his supporters have returned to Lower Juba from Mogadishu. After a one month meeting in Afmadow, Ras Kamboni restructured and appointed Madobe its head and Shukri as head of internal affairs. Madobe, Shukri and their allied militias claim to control Afmadow (including Dhobley),Badadee, and west Jilib, and are now in a position to defeat al-Shabaab in Kismayo, Jimaame, and east Jilib. ¶5. (C) Madobe reportedly wants to push al-Shabaab out and win leadership of an autonomous Lower Juba linked to the TFG. According to Raghe, Madobe said he does not think the TFG understands Madobe's decision to go to Mogadishu, even though Madobe assured "Gandi" he did not go to Mogadishu to fight the TFG. Raghe told us Madobe would accept a minister position within the TFG, but would demand control of a semi-autonomous Jubaland administration if he stayed in the region after delivering Kismayo. Madobe said he does not want to publicly announce his intention to join or support the government too soon because it would give al-Shabaab propaganda material, but told Raghe that Darod/Kabalah clan militia will support his plan to do so once the port is taken and the clan imperative met. Evolving Jubaland Administration Retains Cautious View Of Madobe -------------- ¶6. (C) On August 12 Darod/Kabalah clan leaders who had been working toward a would-be Jubaland administration met with PolOff and added nuance to earlier statements about their relationship with Madobe (refs a,b). They said their goal is a regional administration, linked to the TFG. They were willing to have Madobe at its head if he was successful in taking Kismayo. (Note: In earlier comments the same contacts indicated to us that Madobe had already been appointed leader of the evolving Jubaland Administration. End note.) The Darod/Kabalah leaders said the day Madobe captures Kismayo he will have to announce that he is part of and/or supports the TFG or he will loose clan support. Ogaden leaders reportedly believe that Ogaden-led control of Kismayo will translate into greater Ogaden representation in the TFG at the ministerial level and that political negotiations regarding a greater Jubaland to include Gedo should for now remain unaddressed. Growing Concern Over Ethiopian-Backed Marehan Involvement -------------- ¶7. (C) "Gandi" told us he is worried that Ethiopia is giving ammunition and support to Barre Hirale's troops. He said he views recent meetings in Nairobi between General Morgan, Barre Hirale, Ali Gedi and others as dangerous. "Gandi" urged us to explain to Ethiopia that the TFG, like Ethiopia, wishes to counter and defeat al-Shabaab. "Gandi" worried that Ethiopian meddling could undercut the Kismayo offensive. NAIROBI 00001732 003 OF 003 ¶8. (C) Several of our contacts in Lower Juba tell us they think that some Marehan leaders are attempting to confuse the Kenyans by telling them that the Marehan have agreed to cooperate with the Lower Juba players in an effort to take Kismayo. (Note: A Marehan push toward Kismayo would almost certainly be strongly rejected by Madobe, Shukri, and the Darod/Kabalah clan base of Lower Juba, sparking intra-Darod warfare in the Jubas. End note.) Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The Juba Offensive described by "Gandi," despite obvious differences in emphasis and motivation, appears to have in common with Madobe's initiative an understanding that any push into Kismayo should be predominantly Ogaden-led. "Gandi's" plan and reports from Juba contacts close to Madobe and Shukri have much in common with Kenya's plans to support a Juba offensive (ref c). The Kenyan plan, however, contains the added element of an Ethiopian-backed Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a push into Baidoa that would be designed to draw al-Shabaab out of Lower Juba and Gedo. This would be followed by a Marehan pushback against al-Shabaab in Gedo (ref c). That part of the plan does not appear to be in conflict with the Lower Juba initiative. However, it appears increasingly likely that Ethiopia is backing Darod/Marehan proxies as insurance against an Ogaden-led Lower Juba. Against this backdrop, it seems likely that parties representing Marehan and/or Ethiopian interests are presenting the Kenyans, who we believe have a limited understanding of clan dynamics in Juba, with misinformation about the likelihood of Marehan/Ogaden cooperation in an effort to take control of Kismayo. RANNEBERGER