SOMALIA - SOMALILAND OFFICIAL URGES TOUGH STANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001719 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - SOMALILAND OFFICIAL URGES TOUGH STANCE AGAINST RIYALE REF: NAIROBI 1709 Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On August 12, we met with Mohamed Omar Arteh, senior policy advisor with the Somaliland Ministry of the Interior. Arteh requested the meeting to discuss his concerns with the current election crisis. His primary message was that the United States and the rest of the international community need to remain tough on President Riyale, otherwise the political stalemate could lead to civil unrest. End summary. -------------- Official Believes Elections Unlikely: Riyale Too Entrenched in Position -------------- ¶2. (C) In an August 12 meeting, senior policy advisor with the Somaliland Ministry of the Interior Mohammed Omar Arteh described President Riyale as willing to do anything to keep his hold on power. (Note: Arteh is a longtime contact who Embassy has found to be reliable interlocutor. He is close to Somaliland's powerful Minister of Interior.) Arteh requested the meeting with us to discuss his concerns with the current election crisis (reftel) that he said if left unresolved, could lead to civil unrest. Arteh argued that with his decision to proceed with elections without the voter registration list, President Riyale had "dug himself in a ditch" with very little opportunity to find a face-saving way out. ¶3. (C) Arteh believed there is little or no chance that elections will take place and the likely scenario is a showdown on whether an additional extension in office is granted to Riyale or a caretaker government instituted. (Note: In its first public reaction to the August 12 vote by Parliament to condemn Riyale's decision to stage elections without use of the voter registration list, a representative from the President's office said in a media interview that Parliament had acted illegally and insisted that the National Election Commission (NEC) did in fact have the authority to reject the voter list. Riyale's representative argued that elections could take place, even without the participation of opposition parties.) -------------- Need for Targeted Sanctions and International Pressure -------------- ¶4. (C) Arteh said the only way to pressure Riyale was to threaten targeted sanctions against his close circle of advisors and acquaintances. He believed that these individuals are responsible for Riyale's tough and uncompromising stance. Arteh divided the group into "tier one" (those closest to the President) and "tier two" (influential members of the government or his party). ¶5. (C) "Tier One" Influencers of President Riyale: -- Huda Barkhad ) Riyale's very powerful wife has long been accused of corruption and influence peddling. There are rumors that the President and his wife recently purchased a home in France to add to a collection of homes in Cairo and the Emirates. Arteh said that in his experience with the President, it was clear that Huda's influence goes beyond finances to political policies. -- Dr. Omar ) married to Huda Barhkad's sister and head of the public finance management unit in the Ministry of Finance -- Abdullahi Duale ) Minister of Foreign Affairs -- Hussein Awil Duale ) Minister of Finance -- Jama "Sweden" Mohamoud Omar ) Chairman of the Somaliland National Electoral Commission and a member of UDUB (the ruling political party) -- Said Sulub ) Minister of Public Works NAIROBI 00001719 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) "Tier Two" Influencers of President Riyale: -- Abdisheikh Osman ) legal advisor to Riyale and a U.S. citizen -- Ali Mohamed Piccolo ) Deputy Chair of the Somaliland National Electoral Commission -- Jama Yassin ) Deputy Chairman of UDUB -- Osman Hindi ) Campaign Chairman for UDUB -- Abdullahi Ismail Cirro ) Minister of the Interior -- Mohamed Saqadi ) Police Commissioner -- Ahmed Hassan ) Minister of Justice ¶7. (C) If his key associates were pressured, Arteh believed President Riyale would be more amenable to a negotiated settlement. The international community and the U.S. in particular needed to be firm and consistent in their messaging, he said. Arteh advised use of media, especially radio, to get out the international community's message. According to Arteh, the opposition parties needed to hear the message that movements towards impeachment would only lead to polarization and potential civil unrest. He told us that there did not seem to be a sense of urgency on the part of the opposition parties to engage in dialogue since they are confident in growing pressure on Riyale by both local and international actors. -------------- Negotiation Is the Way Forward -------------- ¶8. (C) Like many others Somalilanders (reftel) Arteh said that in the short term there was little likelihood of civil unrest, but if the President forced elections on September 27, the communities associated with the various political parties might engage in conflict. He warned of disastrous consequences if civil conflicts erupt in Somaliland, including a flood of refugees into Ethiopia - many of whom are already currently internally displaced from south-central Somalia. Arteh said he is in the process of pulling together "eminent" personalities to serve as technical advisors for a possible negotiation between the key stakeholders should that be possible. Arteh believed a durable solution would require a strong enforcement mechanism, international witnesses, and ownership of the process by Somalilanders. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Arteh joins other government officials who are privately encouraging the international community to take a tougher stand against Riyale. The Somaliland representatives in Nairobi and Washington have also expressed their dismay with the actions of the government and concerns about the potential consequences of continued political deadlock. The fact that government officials express deep concern with Riyale's actions suggests that his support is patchy and perhaps diminishing, except among his "tier one and two" supporters. One course of action might be to explore discussing consequences, such as targeted sanctions, with some of those in Riyale's close circle in order to create uncertainty about next USG steps. In the meantime, we will continue to send a tough and consistent message about the importance of Somaliland returning to its democratic roots. RANNEBERGER