SOMALIA - Somaliland Political Crisis Deepens

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001709 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Somaliland Political Crisis Deepens REF: A) Nairobi 1685 B) Nairobi 1670 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Since the July 27 announcement by the National Electoral Committee (NEC) that it will throw out the voter registration list and proceed with elections in a traditional manner, Somaliland's political crisis has deepened. The two opposition parties Kulmiye and UCID announced they would boycott any election that did not use the voter registration list. The ruling party UDUB has begun campaigning and many believe that President Riyale will try to proceed with a "traditional" presidential election on September 27, even if he is the sole contestant. On August 11, parliament passed a motion declaring the NEC decision to hold elections without the voter registration list as illegal and outside its mandate and that the NEC and President Riyale must immediately reverse the decision or face a possible vote of no confidence and possibly impeachment. At the eleventh hour, the EU "postponed" its August 12 mission to Hargeisa citing the political tumult. We are actively working with key Somaliland stakeholders among the political parties, administration, civil society, and business community to urge Riyale and the NEC to reverse their decision. All agree that Riyale must be forced back to the table to forge consensus on the way forward on elections that will likely be delayed yet again. So far, all involved have peacefully opposed the NEC and President Riyale. Both appear to have little support on the ground. End summary. -------------- Parliament Declares Move Illegal: Demands Immediate Reversal of NEC Decision -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Since the July 27 decision by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to throw out the voter registration list and proceed with a "traditional" presidential election (including election day voter registration and finger ink),the political crisis has deepened. President Riyale and his ruling UDUB party have become more entrenched. Many parliamentary representatives have voiced their opposition to the NEC announcement and to Riyale's subsequent public announcement of his intention to discard the voter registration list. On July 30, the parliament and Upper House held a joint press conference condemning this decision and the administration's decision to expel the lead Interpeace representative. (Note: Interpeace led the internationally funded voter registration project. End Note.) ¶3. (U) The lower, elected house of parliament has since convened to debate these issues and propose several motions. On August 11, after nearly a week of intense debate, parliament resolved (39 for, 2 against, 1 abstained): -- The NEC decision to conduct elections without the voter registration list is illegal and is outside the NEC's mandate; -- The NEC and President Riyale must reverse their decision and abide by the electoral and voter registration laws; -- The Somaliland parliament will take "constitutional steps" (a vote of no confidence and possibly impeachment) should the NEC and president Riyale fail to implement parliament's resolution; -- The Somaliland administration must desist from any action that might negatively affect Somaliland's good relations with the international community. Pro-government MPs reportedly stayed outside the parliament building in an attempt to prevent a quorum. Several of our interlocutors point to the vote as a clear reflection of public opinion and a reflection of the strength of Somaliland's democratic institutions. -------------- Civil Unrest Unlikely -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In the short term, most of our contacts believe that all participants are interested in peacefully resolving the current political crisis. We have been in touch with both opposition parties who remain firm in their insistence that the voter registration list must be used in any presidential election (ref a). Somaliland-based contacts told us that the public has largely NAIROBI 00001709 002 OF 003 boycotted UDUB's election campaign events. Opposition leaders seemed willing to re-establish a consensus on the way forward, if Riyale and UDUB agree to do the same. Some believe that if Riyale decides to act unilaterally, the opposition parties will likely stage demonstrations. It remains to be seen how the police and military will react. ¶5. (SBU) Ibrahim Musa of the Somaliland National Human Rights Network agreed that organized public unrest is unlikely. However, Musa told us that public fear of igniting conflict emboldens Riyale, because he has no fear of the consequences. Musa and others have told us the Somaliland public values peace above all else and their quest for international recognition for Somaliland causes them to tolerate "an undemocratic and oppressive administration." -------------- International Engagement Remains Critical -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In addition to the August 3 public statement and letter from the Ambassador to President Riyale (ref b),we have continued to express our disappointment at his decision to move forward on elections without the voter registration list. The Foreign Minister told us the administration was "stunned" by the strong language in the Embassy's statement. We have received many reports that the statement had a very positive impact on the ground, emboldening those (including the parliament) who insist that Riyale and the NEC reverse their decision. ¶7. (SBU) We are actively working with key members of the political parties, civil society, and the business community to urge Riyale to return to the table. All of our contacts agree that while the international community must remain resolute, ultimately it will only be intense pressure from elders and clan leaders that can move Riyale. We have continued to coordinate with the Somaliland Democratization Steering Committee, although after its most recent meeting on August 11, the group decided not to issue a public statement. The donor group decided to wait until the return of an EU mission to Hargeisa to collectively decide on next steps. -------------- EU Cancels Its Hargeisa Mission -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Well before this political crisis arose, the EU had planned an August 12 - 13 fact-finding mission to Hargeisa to update Brussels on the election process and its approximately 10 million Euro investment in voter registration. Although he has not taken the UK's and our calls over the last several days, President Riyale invited the entire EU delegation to dinner at the presidency. At the August 10 meeting of the international donor group, EU representatives made clear that theirs was a technical mission and that they did not plan to deliver a public message from the wider international community about our concerns with the political crisis. We cautioned the EU delegation that if it did not deliver a firm message, their visit would be spun by Riyale and his administration as an endorsement of their position. We made a call to the Swedish Special Envoy who was to lead the mission and expressed our concerns directly. We understand the EC Special Envoy, SRSG Ould-Abdallah and the UK ambassador in Addis Ababa made similar calls to EU Ambassadors indicating their concern that a visit at this juncture would embolden Riyale. ¶9. (SBU) On the evening of August 11, the Swedish Special Envoy informed us that the EU trip was postponed due to the current political climate and security concerns. On August 12, an EU representative was more specific when she told us that right now, the political situation in Somaliland was too tense, especially given the heated debate around the "impeachment of President Riyale." The delegation was under the impression that Riyale was given 48 hours to abide by the August 11 parliamentary decision and the EU mission did not want to be in country in the middle of impeachment proceedings. (Note: Our understanding is that while the parliament threatened a potential no confidence vote as the first step in possible impeachment proceedings, this process would entail a much more complicated process and does not have a 48-hour deadline. End note.) -------------- Engaging with the Diaspora -------------- NAIROBI 00001709 003 OF 003 ¶10. (SB) In addition to engaging with our diplomatic counterparts, on August 11 we made several calls to influential Somaliland businessmen in the Diaspora. We re-engaged with the Somalilanders who had met with DAS Wycoff during his June visit to Dubai, and underlined the key role they could play in helping to mediate the crisis. Mohamed Djirde, a key Dubai-based businessman from one of Somaliland's oldest and wealthiest families, expressed his deep concern at the political impasse and the "irreparable" damage that Riyale was causing the country. Djirde and others have been in close touch with the Riyale's clan elders and plan a mission to Somaliland the week of August 16 to break the impasse. On August 9, a variety of UK-based Somaliland-focused organizations concluded that the government must only move forward with a presidential election based on the voter registration list and that the political crisis has undermined Somaliland's chances for recognition. The UK groups' recommendations were broadcast on Somaliland web sites. -------------- Riyale Under Pressure: Forcing Some Concessions -------------- ¶11. (SBU) It appears that Riyale is beginning to feel the pressure. The morning of August 12, we received several calls, including from the Nairobi-based Somaliland representative who told us that the cancellation of the EU mission was a heavy blow to Riyale. Our contacts told us the administration had hoped to spin the EU visit as support for elections without the voter registration list, and is now panicked. On August 12, Foreign Minister Abdillahi Duale called us to ask why the EU mission had been cancelled and that he had not received a clear explanation. Since August 6, Riyale's office had been dodging a telephone conversation between President Riyale and AF PDAS Carter, refusing to give a time when the Somaliland President would be available. In a sudden about-face, on August 12, Duale offered to speak immediately with PDAS Carter and proposed a time on August 13 when Riyale would be available for the PDAS's call. ¶12. (SBU) Comment: Consistent pressure from all sides will be critical in getting Riyale to move. We will continue to engage with key stakeholders and with a strategic communication strategy to include television and radio interviews with key U.S. officials. RANNEBERGER