SOMALIA - LOWER JUBA FORCES STEPPING UP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001648 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS MARR PINR SOCI SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - LOWER JUBA FORCES STEPPING UP ANTI-SHABAAB EFFORTS; JUBALAND STEERING COMMITTEE FORMS REF: A. NAIROBI 1552 ¶B. NAIROBI 1444 Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary. In late July anti-Shabaab forces in Lower Juba were preparing for stepped up attacks against al-Shabaab militia, most likely encouraged by support from regional business leaders and an evolving Ogaden-clan led Jubaland administration. These developments follow reports from numerous contacts that Ras Kamboni commanders and Ogaden clan heavyweights Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri in early-mid July had joined with other Juba leaders and were maneuvering to defeat al-Shabaab, marginalize Ras Kamboni leader Hassan al-Turki, and work toward the formation of a Jubaland state (ref a). (Note: The Ras Kamboni group, under the leadership of al-Turki, has been working to overthrow the TFG. Our contacts tell us al-Turki, sensing declining support among his Ogaden subclan, is moving closer to al-Shabaab. End Note.) While some TFG leaders appear supportive of developments in Lower Juba, others are clearly more skeptical. We are encouraging various Juba leaders to work together to confront al-Shabaab and to continue dialogue with the TFG. End summary. ¶2. (C) Our contacts, to include TFG Minister of Defense Ghandi, tell us skirmishes have begun between Ras Kamboni commanders and al-Shabaab forces in Lower Juba. Ras Kamboni forces in recent days reportedly overpowered al-Shabaab militia en route to Afmadow. Additionally, al-Shabaab dismissed its deputy DC in Kismayo following intensified disputes between Ras Kamboni and al-Shabaab leaders. Our contacts among political, military, and financial players in Lower Juba tell us stepped up fighting between anti-Shabaab forces and al-Shabaab militia in Lower Juba will most likely occur over the next week to ten days. ¶3. (S) The Darod/Ogaden Suldan and al-Turki's son-in-law told us Darod leaders, following ongoing discussions regarding the establishment of a Jubaland administration (ref a),on July 25th established a 27 person Steering Committee for the Lower Juba region. (Note Al-Turki's son-in-law is a prominent Ogaden businessman and appears to view al-Turki as a threat to his interests. End Note.) Leaders from most Darod subclans, supporters of Madobe and Shukri, and Juba Resistance Movement (JRM) Chairman Mohamed Amin (ref b) reportedly participated in the meeting. Our contacts tell us deliberations over positions within the Steering Committee are ongoing. During meetings with Somalia Unit PolOff in Dubai on July 24 Chairman of Somalia Telcom Mohamed Sheikh, a major Ogaden business figure and former financier of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC),expressed interest in using his influence to encourage military and political leaders in Lower Juba to link their efforts to the TFG. The next day Mohamed Sheikh told us he had begun communication with TFG Ministers of Defense and Finance in an effort to garner TFG support for Lower Juba developments. (Note: Somalia Telcom is also often referred to as Olympic Telcom and is reportedly the second largest telecom operation in Somalia. Mohamed Sheikh is from the same clan as TFG Defense Minister Ghandi and likely has business ties to TFG Finance Minister Sharif Hassan. End Note.) ¶4. (C) TFG Minister of Defense Ghandi on July 28 told us Madobe and Shukri had "flipped" and were willing to support the TFG. However, other TFG officials have expressed greater skepticism regarding Madobe's willingness to move far enough away from al-Turki. During a UN forum in Nairobi on July 29, TFG Minister of National Security Abdullahi Mohammed Ali said the TFG is supportive of recent ground-level efforts in Galgaduud, Hiraan, and Gedo, notably leaving out the Lower Juba region. ¶5. (C) Comment. The growing pushback against al-Shabaab and al-Turki is a positive development in Lower Juba. We are encouraging Juba leaders to work together to confront al-Shabaab and to continue dialogue with the TFG. However, many challenges confront a would-be Jubaland state, to include the question of Gedo (ref a). Additionally, Juba leaders primarily appear to be seeking support from fellow Ogaden TFG figures. Many within the TFG remain skeptical of NAIROBI 00001648 002 OF 002 apparent Ras-Kamboni defectors Madobe and Shukri, who have a track record of shifting alliances quickly. SLUTZ