SOMALIA - LOWER JUBA FORCES STEPPING UP

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001648

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS MARR PINR SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - LOWER JUBA FORCES STEPPING UP
ANTI-SHABAAB EFFORTS; JUBALAND STEERING COMMITTEE FORMS

REF: A. NAIROBI 1552

B. NAIROBI 1444

Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,
d).


1. (C) Summary. In late July anti-Shabaab forces in Lower
Juba were preparing for stepped up attacks against al-Shabaab
militia, most likely encouraged by support from regional
business leaders and an evolving Ogaden-clan led Jubaland
administration. These developments follow reports from
numerous contacts that Ras Kamboni commanders and Ogaden clan
heavyweights Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri in early-mid
July had joined with other Juba leaders and were maneuvering
to defeat al-Shabaab, marginalize Ras Kamboni leader Hassan
al-Turki, and work toward the formation of a Jubaland state
(ref a). (Note: The Ras Kamboni group, under the leadership
of al-Turki, has been working to overthrow the TFG. Our
contacts tell us al-Turki, sensing declining support among
his Ogaden subclan, is moving closer to al-Shabaab. End
Note.) While some TFG leaders appear supportive of
developments in Lower Juba, others are clearly more
skeptical. We are encouraging various Juba leaders to work
together to confront al-Shabaab and to continue dialogue with
the TFG. End summary.


2. (C) Our contacts, to include TFG Minister of Defense
Ghandi, tell us skirmishes have begun between Ras Kamboni
commanders and al-Shabaab forces in Lower Juba. Ras Kamboni
forces in recent days reportedly overpowered al-Shabaab
militia en route to Afmadow. Additionally, al-Shabaab
dismissed its deputy DC in Kismayo following intensified
disputes between Ras Kamboni and al-Shabaab leaders. Our
contacts among political, military, and financial players in
Lower Juba tell us stepped up fighting between anti-Shabaab
forces and al-Shabaab militia in Lower Juba will most likely
occur over the next week to ten days.


3. (S) The Darod/Ogaden Suldan and al-Turki's son-in-law told
us Darod leaders, following ongoing discussions regarding the
establishment of a Jubaland administration (ref a),on July
25th established a 27 person Steering Committee for the Lower
Juba region. (Note Al-Turki's son-in-law is a prominent
Ogaden businessman and appears to view al-Turki as a threat
to his interests. End Note.) Leaders from most Darod
subclans, supporters of Madobe and Shukri, and Juba
Resistance Movement (JRM) Chairman Mohamed Amin (ref b)
reportedly participated in the meeting. Our contacts tell us
deliberations over positions within the Steering Committee
are ongoing. During meetings with Somalia Unit PolOff in
Dubai on July 24 Chairman of Somalia Telcom Mohamed Sheikh, a
major Ogaden business figure and former financier of the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC),expressed interest in using
his influence to encourage military and political leaders in
Lower Juba to link their efforts to the TFG. The next day
Mohamed Sheikh told us he had begun communication with TFG
Ministers of Defense and Finance in an effort to garner TFG
support for Lower Juba developments. (Note: Somalia Telcom is
also often referred to as Olympic Telcom and is reportedly
the second largest telecom operation in Somalia. Mohamed
Sheikh is from the same clan as TFG Defense Minister Ghandi
and likely has business ties to TFG Finance Minister Sharif
Hassan. End Note.)


4. (C) TFG Minister of Defense Ghandi on July 28 told us
Madobe and Shukri had "flipped" and were willing to support
the TFG. However, other TFG officials have expressed greater
skepticism regarding Madobe's willingness to move far enough
away from al-Turki. During a UN forum in Nairobi on July 29,
TFG Minister of National Security Abdullahi Mohammed Ali said
the TFG is supportive of recent ground-level efforts in
Galgaduud, Hiraan, and Gedo, notably leaving out the Lower
Juba region.


5. (C) Comment. The growing pushback against al-Shabaab and
al-Turki is a positive development in Lower Juba. We are
encouraging Juba leaders to work together to confront
al-Shabaab and to continue dialogue with the TFG. However,
many challenges confront a would-be Jubaland state, to
include the question of Gedo (ref a). Additionally, Juba
leaders primarily appear to be seeking support from fellow
Ogaden TFG figures. Many within the TFG remain skeptical of

NAIROBI 00001648 002 OF 002


apparent Ras-Kamboni defectors Madobe and Shukri, who have a
track record of shifting alliances quickly.
SLUTZ