SOMALIA - ANTI-SHABAAB EFFORTS LANGUISH IN HIRAAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001565 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR PINR SOCI SO ET SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ANTI-SHABAAB EFFORTS LANGUISH IN HIRAAN REGION Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Since TFG Minister of National Security Omar Hashi's June 18 murder in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, the Transitional Federal Government's efforts to challenge al-Shabaab in Hiraan have seemingly stalled. A large number of anti-Shabaab fighters are reportedly present, but they may not have the means to oust al-Shabaab, which enjoys some support among minority disadvantaged clans in the region. Powerful former Islamic Courts Union Governor Sheikh Abdirahman Ma'ow, a potential TFG ally, has left Hiraan, and Hashi's replacement may not have the political or military clout necessary to pick up the pieces after Hashi's untimely death. End summary. -------------- Hashi's Death a Setback -------------- ¶2. (C) Al-Shabaab,s assassination of Minister of National Security Omar Hashi on June 18 in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, has set back the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) political and security efforts both in Mogadishu and in Hashi,s home region of Hiraan. According to pro-TFG Hiraan political and security leaders in Nairobi, Hashi had significant success in building cross-clan support for the TFG in Hiraan. This initiative has apparently stalled since his death. Nonetheless, they tell us that Shabaab enjoys only minority support in Hiraan. ¶3. (C) Hashi,s efforts to unite Hiraan against the Shabaab hinged on his clan outreach, but also on a growing force of anti-Shabaab fighters in Hiran. Hashi was in Hiraan in June to rally the force to fight al-Shabaab in an effort to reduce al-Shabaab's pressure on Mogadishu. Multiple sources claimed that in Hiraan there are still 1500 - 1800 anti-Shabaab fighters in various stages of training and preparation. (Note: Although they are certainly anti-Shabaab, it is less clear to us if these fighters are loyal to the TFG, to former ICU leaders, or to other clan leaders. End Note.) -------------- Al-Shabaab Capitalizing on Clan Divisions -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Al-Shabaab, as is typical, seems to be exploiting inherent clan differences to destabilize the region. The Hawadle, Hashi's sub-clan, are economically, politically and socially dominant in Hiraan, but they are reportedly resented by other Hawiye subclans in the region, and it is in those non-Hawadle areas that al-Shabaab finds some community support. Beledweyne itself is split along clan lines by the Shabelle River. Beledweyne,s eastern half, dominated by the Hawadle, has resisted al-Shabaab, which has had more success in the western part of the city among the Hawadle,s rivals, the Hawiye/Gaaljaal. -------------- A Leadership Vacuum in Hiraan? -------------- ¶5. (C) Since the bombing, Hiraan,s still-popular former-Islamic Courts Union (ICU) governor, Sheikh Abdirahman Ma'ow (Hawiye/Hawadle) has left the region for Mogadishu, reportedly to lobby for military supplies for his forces. Ma'ow,s influence may be waning in his absence, aided by rumors that he knew of the plot against Hashi. (A contact insisted to us that Ma'ow took a telephone call, and was conspicuously not at Hashi's side, at the time when the Beledweyne hotel Hashi was in was bombed.) Also affecting Ma'ow's fortunes has been the appointment of Abdullahi Ali "Sanbaloshi," the Prime Minister's former Chief of Staff, as Hashi's replacement. ("Sanbaloshi" is from the same Hawadle subclan as Ma,ow and observers tell us it is unlikely Ma,ow will be appointed the TFG governor in Hiraan as long as another Hawadle of the same subclan holds the key post of security minister.) There have been rumors that Ma'ow's loss of influence has triggered defections from his camp, with the media reporting on June 30 that a former ICU notable had resigned from his leadership position in Ma'ow's administration, and that an ICU militia commander previously NAIROBI 00001565 002 OF 002 loyal to Ma'ow had defected to Hisbul Islam. ¶6. (C) Gaining influence is the TFG-appointed regional Police General Mukhtar Hussein Afrah (Hawiye/Hawadle),who is reportedly still in Beledweyne and controls the anti-Shabaab forces. Some of his fighters are said to be located in a training camp near the border town of El Gal. A second group, having finished their training, has reportedly infiltrated Beledweyne and is reportedly waiting for sufficient arms and financing to fight al-Shabaab. (Our contacts frequently ask us to assist these troops.) ¶7. (SBU) As evidence that Afrah,s men are a significant force in Beledweyne and its environs, contacts recount a recent attempt by al-Shabaab to rescue three of its members from an eastern Beledweyne police station. Shabaab failed to liberate the three, and instead had four killed in the firefight and pursuit that ended well outside the town. -------------- Ethiopia Looms Large -------------- ¶8. (C) Ethiopia's current role in Hiraan is not clear. Contacts allege that the GOE helped to arm some of the estimated 1,500 anti-Shabaab troops in Hiraan, but have been less active since Hashi,s death. A security chief under Hashi told us that the GOE had planned to back Hashi's planned attack on al-Shabaab. Like so much since Hashi,s death, that plan has not been realized. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Al-Shabaab faces considerable resistance in Hiraan, but Hashi,s death has disrupted TFG hopes to open another front in the region and perhaps dashed them all together. Few in Hiraan are directly connected to the embattled TFG in Mogadishu, and Hashi,s demise has unfortunately strained links that bound the region, however tenuously, to the central government. It is unclear at this juncture if "Sanbaloshi" has both the clout within the government and enough influence in the region to fill Hashi,s shoes. ABELL