Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NAIROBI1298
2009-06-29 04:12:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA - Diaspora in Dubai Meets DAS Wycoff

Tags:  PGOV PREL EAID ECON KWMN AE SO 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0011
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0198
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0134
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 001298 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ECON KWMN AE SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Diaspora in Dubai Meets DAS Wycoff

Ref: A) Nairobi 1173
B) 08 Nairobi 2618
C) 08 Nairobi 2619

NAIROBI 00001298 001.2 OF 005


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Summary
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 001298 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ECON KWMN AE SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Diaspora in Dubai Meets DAS Wycoff Ref: A) Nairobi 1173 B) 08 Nairobi 2618 C) 08 Nairobi 2619 NAIROBI 00001298 001.2 OF 005 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Between June 3 and 6, visiting Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (DAS) Karl Wycoff met with representatives of Somalia's dispora community residing in Dubai. DAS Wycoff held a series of small group discussions with community organizers, business leaders, industry groups and a question and answer session for 50 participants hosted by the Somali Consulate in Dubai. DAS Wycoff highlighted U.S. policy toward Somalia, focusing on our humanitarian and security priorities. Common themes expressed by the Somali representatives included: U.S. leadership is fundamental to achieving success in Somalia; the TFG and President Sharif must be supported; willingness to contribute to peace-making and reconstruction; public-private partnerships could allow the U.S. to work in inaccessible areas; business remains a uniting factor that trumps regional and clan differences. The Dubai-based diaspora also offered several recommendations for U.S. engagement on Somalia and for more regular exchanges with this influential community. DAS Wycoff announced that he would ask USAID representatives to return to Dubai to lead a training session on the certification process to become a grantee or contractor to enable partnerships with new organizations. End Summary. -------------- Outreach to UAE Somali Diaspora -------------- ¶2. (U) Between June 3 and 6, DAS Wycoff visited the United Arab Emirates and met with representatives of Somalia's diaspora community residing in Dubai. Another key aspect of the visit was DAS Wycoff's meeting with UAE officials who expressed their government's support for the TFG (ref a). In order to interact with representatives of this influential UAE-based Somali comunity, DAS Wycoff held a series of small group discussions with community organizers, business leaders, industry groups and a question and answer session for 50 participants hosted by the Somali Consulate in Dubai. ¶3. (U) One of the unique features of this community is that its representatives maintain strong business ties with Somalia, and have significant control of the commercial traffic in and out of the c
ountry (ref b). Because of their critical role in supplying basic goods and services in all regions of Somalia, as well as to the transitional government and other groups, these business leaders also have significant influence in the political arena (ref c). DAS Wycoff's visit enabled us to hear perspectives from this group and gave us the opportunity to explain U.S. policy toward Somalia. ¶4. (SBU) During his visit, DAS Wycoff met with approximate 100 Somalis living and working in the UAE. DAS Wycoff focused on our humanitarian and security priorities while encouraging increased engagement with Somali diaspora communities worldwide. He detailed U.S. initiatives, emphasizing the greater role that the United States can play when Somalia is ready for post-conflict stabilization. With representatives of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG),including TFG Ambassador to UAE Ahmed Mohamed Egal and TFG Consul General in Dubai Abdul Kadir Al-Hatimi, DAS Wycoff spoke of our effort to generate significant regional support for Somalia from the Gulf States. The TFG officials welcomed our initiative, stating that with U.S. encouragement, countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE would surely release promised donations and push the Arab League for a greater supportive role. -------------- U.S. Leadership Fundamental to Success -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Our interlocutors overwhelmingly welcomed U.S. commitment in Somalia, with one stating, "There is no better partner than the U.S." Another said, "As leader of the international community, the U.S. has a moral obligation to help Somalia." The most salient point made during all of the meetings was that increased U.S. NAIROBI 00001298 002.2 OF 005 involvement in Somalia will be critical to achieving peace, establishing stability and supporting a sustainable government in the country. Many told us that U.S. engagement was long overdue and encouraged increased financial and material support to the TFG, and more support directly to the people of Somalia. ¶6. (SBU) While they encouraged greater U.S. involvement, many in the diaspora also acknowledged that Somalis themselves are the problem. One Puntland-based businessman said that Somalis initially supported piracy and now they are paying the price. In several sessions, the participants told us they accept responsibility for the current state of affairs in the country and are committed to helping the situation. DAS Wycoff cautioned that while the U.S. is engaged in Somalia, no conflict can be solved by the U.S. and that ultimately, it is up to the Somalis to fix the country. He invited our interlocutors to think about what the U.S. can do with them, not for them. -------------- TFG and President Sharif Must be Supported -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Many Somalis and seasoned Somalia-watchers identify the business community as being at the root of Somalia's political upheavals and violence. They charge that business leaders benefit from an operating environment with no government intervention and are profiting in the chaos. When we asked the Dubai representatives about these critiques, they all shot back that these charges could not be farther from the truth. The business leaders said that in the absence of government, it is they who have helped the people, providing all the public goods and services that have sustained Somalia over the last two decades. Many maintained that in the current environment, they pay taxes to the government, but are also forced to pay other "taxes" to various groups in areas where they seek to do business, pay exorbitant security costs, incur prohibitive insurance fees to ship goods into Somalia, and other unforeseen fees which make it impossible to accurately estimate transaction costs. All the business leaders agreed that their interests would be better served with a stable government. ¶8. (SBU) While they voiced certain critiques of President Sharif and his cabinet, all agreed that this TFG was the best opportunity that Somalia has enjoyed in a long time and they are committed to its success. When DAS Wycoff discussed the financial and material support the U.S. has given the TFG, many representatives voiced concern over transparency and accountability. They said that while they believed that President Sharif was honest, "those around him are corrupt." Many made the case that while Sharif may not be ideal, al-Shabaab is not a viable alternative. They were highly critical of al-Shabaab, Hassan Dahir Aweys, and the "radical" influence taking hold in Somalia to "foment violence and recruit Somali youth to support terrorism." ¶9. (SBU) DAS Wycoff underscored U.S. commitment to the TFG while emphasizing that, at the same time, the spoilers must be prevented from undermining the TFG. He asked for the cooperation of the business leaders in helping us identify these spoilers by providing actionable information. -------------- Accepting Responsibility for Peace-making and Reconstruction -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Many of the participants complained that the TFG does not reach out to them. (Note: Several of the businessmen we met were active during the Djibouti Process. They came to Djibouti to support favorite candidates and provided financial backing for their campaigns. End Note.) While many were very close to Sheikh Sharif during his days with the Islamic Courts Union, now, they said, Sharif no longer comes to us. "We only see ministers when they come through Dubai for money." They said that while they have many areas of expertise, the TFG does not ask for advice or call on them for strategic assistance. Instead, our contacts maintained that they only receive ad hoc requests for funds and to pay for the hotels, meals, and the expenses of TFG representatives when they come through Dubai. NAIROBI 00001298 003.2 OF 005 ¶11. (SBU) When we emphasized that there must be more open lines of communication between the business leaders and the transitional government, they acknowledged that both sides share the blame. One businessman frankly stated that politicians and business people are sharing commercial successes while "living on the blood of the people." He acknowledged that all of them are guilty of selling to people on all sides of the conflict and that they own (and profit) from the hospitals where others are treated. One stated, "If we do not do something now, Somalia as we know it will cease to exist." -------------- Public-Private Partnerships and New Paradigms for U.S. Engagement -------------- ¶12. (SBU) When we emphasized the U.S. priority toward the humanitarian crisis, and that the U.S. was the largest donor in this area, the Dubai-based community was unimpressed. While they stated an appreciation for U.S. efforts, many believed that the benefits of our enormous humanitarian investment did not reach the people who need it most. Several made the point that humanitarian assistance would be better used in more sustainable development projects where Somalis could "see" U.S. efforts on the ground. They recommended infrastructure projects like school renovations, repairs of fields and courts for youth to engage in sports activities, and other initiatives they claimed would better serve their communities. They insisted that because they know how to operate in these inaccessible environments, they are well-placed to help implement these initiatives. ¶13. (SBU) Several of the Dubai-based leaders with whom DAS Wycoff met were also present at the workshop for private sector leaders in Djibouti that took place on April (ref d). They re-iterated their commitment to help provide opportunities for youth employment and engagement. They raised the idea of establishing public-private partnerships in some of the more stable areas of the country where they could launch employment-generating activities. They indicated a strong desire to work directly with the United States on these efforts. Our interlocutors heavily criticized the "Nairobi mafia" of UN agencies, NGOs and donors, who have grown too accustomed to the status quo. They invited us to think more creatively and to support new ideas coming from Somalis themselves. ¶14. (SBU) DAS Wycoff emphasized that we are indeed not interested in "business as usual" and are actively looking for new partners to help us implement projects and programs. Responding to the critique that Somali and international NGOs working with the international community in Somalia have made it impossible for new entrants, DAS Wycoff announced that he would ask USAID representatives to return to Dubai to lead a training session on the certification process to become a grantee or contractor. The Dubai-based interlocutors positively responded to the idea of a workshop on this subject. -------------- Business Remains a Uniting Factor -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The industry-specific groups emphasized that operating businesses inside Somalia forces them to work in all regions. The shipping companies told us that they bring commodities (including U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance) into all markets, and therefore negotiate and interact with all the authorities on the ground. They asserted that while politicians benefit from clan differences, the role of the clan is limited by profit and loss calculations in the world of business. The TFG Consul General told us that for the Somalis in Dubai, money comes first, then clan alliances, and then religion. He did note that the majority of the community tends to closely adhere to Islamic practices and beliefs. (Note: During all of our meetings, the participants took a break for prayers. End Note.) ¶16. (SBU) The participants in one group agreed with the assertion by one of the most prominent representatives that each has achieved individual success, but that they have been a collective failure. They acknowledged that in some cases, money has been at the root of conflict. The group of business leaders from Somaliland volunteered to provide technical guidance for Sharia-based investment options for Somalis in the diaspora and others from Gulf states seeking to NAIROBI 00001298 004.2 OF 005 invest in Somalia. They discussed starting an umbrella organization and developing a mechanism to ensure accountability for smaller local NGOs to provide direct benefits in their communities. -------------- Women's Voices Are Silenced -------------- ¶17. (SBU) In all of the meetings, only men were present. The business leaders and the TFG officials recommended a separate meeting for women to engage with DAS Wycoff in a setting where "they would feel more comfortable sharing their ideas." Two outspoken women leaders from the Somali diaspora community ended up representing a larger group, many of whom could not attend the session due to prior commitments. (Note: Many of the Somali women in Dubai own or work in shops and are involved in smaller-scale trade. Some of these women have become very successful and like their male counter-parts, are highly diversified, operating companies across industry. End Note.) ¶18. (SBU) The women expressed frustration with events and opportunities targeting the "business community," where they are given no role. One said that all of the men fuel and are involved in the conflict and should not be trusted with any money from the U.S. They lamented that the international community has focused too much on warlords and businessmen without consideration for Somali intellectuals. They also cautioned us not to make decisions on clan-based criteria, emphasizing that the 4.5 formula for clan representation should be abolished. ¶19. (SBU) The women community leaders asked that we encourage the Somalis to build civil society in Dubai and in other diaspora communities. They said that Somalis are willing to work hard for the benefit of their country, but that the transitional government is only giving a selected few the opportunity to serve. They recommended that President Sharif outline a clear agenda for his government and said the Dubai-based community is willing to help him in this effort. Other ways that the women felt they could contribute include: empowering local organizations by providing oversight and accountability for aid, encouraging other groups who have remained outside of the political process to participate, bringing a focus on women in Somalia and the diaspora. -------------- Recommendations for Future Engagement -------------- ¶20. (U) During the course of the discussions, the representatives shared with us the following recommendations for U.S. engagement on Somalia: -- Significant U.S. financial support needed, especially for security sector assistance and reform -- Support the development of a national military through training and equipment -- Demand transparency and accountability for any financial resources provided -- Sustained political and diplomatic support -- Open a Somali embassy in Washington as an important signal of U.S. support to the TFG -- Continue a Somali-led reconciliation process, where the U.S. and others are not attempting to "pick winners" -- International organizations and diplomatic missions must re-locate to Somalia -- Shift to more small-scale development projects, instead of focusing on large long-term initiatives which inevitably stall -- Focus on public-private partnerships with business leaders in areas difficult for the U.S. and others to access -- Reward Somaliland for embracing democratic norms and processes -- Shift development efforts to areas where there are effective regional administrations -- Communities living in peace should receive "peace dividends" to encourage other areas to work toward peaceful settlements -- Expand secular education, including vocational and technical schools -- Provide opportunities for teacher training and exchanges with U.S. universities -- Involve Somali intellectuals in the nation-building process NAIROBI 00001298 005.2 OF 005 -- Create quick impact opportunities for youth in all regions to reduce violence and stop flow of illegal migration -- Support the media, educational organizations, and non-governmental institutions -- Strongly address the negative role that Eritrea is playing in Somalia ¶21. (U) Post appreciates the assistance of Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General Dubai in arranging DAS Wycoff's visit. RANNEBERGER

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