SOMALIA - CONTRASTS: MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND SEES

UNCLAS NAIROBI 001047 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER MARR SOCI SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - CONTRASTS: MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND SEES SUICIDE BOMBING AND UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOGADISHU REF: NAIROBI 1037 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The May 22 - 25 weekend in Mogadishu began with an unsuccessful counterattack by TFG forces (reftel), and ended with a surprise visit by UN Special Representative Ould-Abdallah. Sandwiched in between was a suicide bombing near the Police Academy that claimed the lives of six policemen. In a May 26 telephone conversation, TFG President Sharif told the Ambassador that "things (in Mogadishu) are better than what they seem, no matter what the press says." Sharif thanked the USG for its assistance to his government. End summary. Logistical Problems Undercut TFG Counterattack -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The May 22 - 25 Memorial Day weekend began in Mogadishu with an initially successful counterattack by Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces (reftel) that, however, lost momentum in an afternoon retreat that saw virtually all of the TFG's gains erased. According to SRSG Ould-Abdallah, who paid a surprise visit to Mogadishu May 25, and spoke with the TFG, as well as the Ugandan and Burundian force commanders, gains during the counteroffensive were erased by TFG communication and logistical problems. The SRSG was told that the inability to supply the TFG forces with food and water was at the heart of the logistical problems. ¶3. (SBU) The TFG retreat to its initial positions on May 22 has not been followed by an insurgent attack, which some have seen as an encouraging sign. The May 24 suicide bombing about 150 meters from the Police Academy, with rumors in Mogadishu of more such bombings to come, has suggested to some that the AMISOM-backed TFG's relative stable control of nine Mogadishu districts had caused its opponent to change tactics. (The May 24 bombing reportedly killed six policemen and wounded several others.) The SRSG told the Ambassador May 25, immediately following his return from Mogadishu, that the morale of the TFG leadership was "high," but that TFG security forces were still contending with discipline and resource problems. In a separate telephone conversation May 26, TFG President Sharif told the Ambassador that "things are better than what they seem, no matter what the press says." A More Robust AMISOM -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The TFG leadership also told the SRSG that they would like to see AMISOM's rules of engagement changed to allow for more aggressive action, and they pushed for rapid deployment of additional AMISOM troops. ¶5. (SBU) On the same day as the SRSG's Mogadishu visit, President Sharif used a press conference to call for international help in fighting "foreign militants," praised the May 20 IGAD communique on Somalia as "correct," and defended the role of AMISOM as African fighters helping a "fellow African country." ¶6. (SBU) In their May 26 telephone conversation, the Ambassador urged President Sharif to carefully consider the optics of traveling to Libya May 27 while his rival, Hassan Dahir Aweys, still stocked Mogadishu. A relaxed Sharif promised to consider the Ambassador's advice, but countered that staying in Mogadishu might create the impression that the TFG was worried about the outcome of the struggle with its opponents. Comment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The opposition's recourse to a suicide bombing may indicate that it does not have the strength at this juncture to attempt a direct assault o the TFG. By the same token, the TFG's increasing public and private support for a more robust AMISOM presence and mandate may suggest that the African troops are becoming more central to its strategy as the stalemate in Mogadishu continues. RANNEBERGER