SOMALIA - AL-SHABAAB TAKES KEY MIDDLE SHABELLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 001010 DEPT FOR AF/E, A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR EAID SOCI PINR SO SUBJECT: SOMALIA - AL-SHABAAB TAKES KEY MIDDLE SHABELLE TOWN; POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS REF: NAIROBI 986 Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d). 1.(C) Summary: Following a May 16 meeting with allies near the city of Afgoye, al-Shabaab forces seized control of the Middle Shabelle capital of Jowhar early May 17. Control of Jowhar places al-Shabaab between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu and potential Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a allies in Hiran region and Central regions. The setback was partially offset by warlord Indha Adde's return to the TFG fold May 17. As of mid-afternoon May 17, the quiet in Mogadishu had been interrupted only by the exchange of a few mortar rounds between the TFG at Villa Somalia and al-Shabaab forces near the Bakara Market. Mogadishu was quiet as of the morning of May 18. ¶2. (C) Embassy has been attempting to persuade ASWJ contacts to cooperate more closely with the TFG. The TFG Prime Minister told us May 18 that he was meeting with ASWJ in Mogadishu in an effort to bring it into an alliance. The TFG Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Security are traveling to Addis Ababa May 18 in order to get the GOE to use its influence on ASWJ and to meet with ASWJ representatives there. See paras 12 - 15 for action taken and recommended next steps. End summary. Spoilers Meet in Afgoye -------------- ¶2. (C) On May 16, Al-Shabaab confederates Muhtar Robow, Hassan al-Turki, Ahmed Abdi Godane abu Zubeyr, and Fuad Mohamed Qalaf "Shangole" were joined at "Villa Afgoye," about thirty kilometers from Mogadishu, by Hisbul Islam's Hassan Dahir Aweys and Omar Imam, and others for a meeting presumably convened in order to agree on strategy prior to an expected offensive on the TFG in Mogadishu. ¶3. (C) Contacts told us May 17 that the al-Shabaab contingent at the Afgoye meeting insisted that Aweys disavow an earlier comment, reported in the press, critical of Osama bin Laden before he would be allowed to formally join forces. Aweys reportedly agreed, and the group devoted the rest of the meeting to agreeing a strategy for a widely-expected offensive on the TFG in Mogadishu. Deputy Prime Minister Hassan and Minister of Security Hashi told Ambassador May 18 that Aweys had been given money and weapons by Eritrea, remained "hungry for power" and would not back down. He was cooperating with al-Shabaab, but was not part of the movement and could part ways with it at any time. ¶4. (C) Following the May 17 meeting, warlord Yusuf Mohamed Siyad "Indha Adde," who had joined the TFG opposition following the arrival in Somalia of Aweys, returned to the TFG. Contacts ascribed the reasons for Indha Adde's return to the warlord's unhappiness at losing control of his men and technicals to al-Shabaab and/or to rumors that the TFG was better able to pay him and his troops than al-Shabaab. Although Indha Adde's allegiances could shift yet again, the TFG was reportedly happy with this minor piece of good news. Al-Shabaab Takes Jowhar -------------- ¶5. (C) On the morning of May 17, al-Shabaab forces took control of the Middle Shabelle "capital" of Jowhar. Some sources reported that Jowhar was captured without a fight, while others say that TFG-loyal forces provided cover as members of the TFG abandoned the city. Still others reported associated TFG - al-Shabaab fighting in Garasley, a town between Balad and Jowhar. The TFG Prime Minister told us May 18 that plans were being made to re-take Jowhar. TFG Deputy Prime Minister Hassan and Minister of Security Hashi told Ambassador May 18 that the attack on the TFG in Mogadishu and the capture of Jowhar had been preemptive strikes, designed to interrupt TFG progress in organizing its joint security forces. The taking of Jowhar was intended to distract public attention from al-Shabaab's inability to make further progress in Mogadishu. They predicted that the TFG would be able to push al-Shabaab from Jowhar "quickly." Jowhar is important because it separates Mogadishu from Hiran Region, where potential TFG ally Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a has been engaged in fighting with al-Shabaab in Maxaas as recently as May 17. It is also a traditional Abgal stronghold. (President Sharif's sub-clan.) Shelling in Mogadishu -------------- ¶6. (C) May 17 saw scattered shelling of Villa Somalia, the Police Academy, and other locations in Mogadishu. Several children were reported killed by rounds that hit near the Police Academy while President Sharif was officiating at a ceremony. ¶7. (C) In spite of the fall of Jowhar, the spoilers' meeting in Afgoye, and the scattered fighting in Mogadishu, TFG members were outwardly calm. Contacts in Mogadishu described a business as usual atmosphere. Others reported, however, that the TFG's ability to respond meaningfully to the attacks was hindered by stalled negotiations over pay with potential militias, including Indha Adde's. The TFG was insisting that the militias be paid after the soldiers had demonstrated their battle-worthiness, while the militias wanted to be paid first. President Sharif told the Ambassador in a May 17 telephone call that he was cautiously optimistic about his government's prospects for success in these difficult circumstances. The Ambassador phoned Sheikh Sharif to assure him of our support and to obtain a firsthand assessment of the situation. Prime Minister Sharmarke told us by telephone May 18 that he was "trying to be confident." Both Sheikh Sharif and Sharmarke, as well as Sharif Hassan and Omar Hashi, were grateful for the monetary assistance provided by the U.S. the week of May 11. Ahlu Suna Wal Jama'a, al-Shabaab Fighting in Hiran Region -------------- ¶8. (C) Fighting resumed May 17 in the town of Maxaas, Hiran Region, between Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a and al-Shabaab. Unlike the May 15 fighting, reports indicate that al-Shabaab got the upper hand on May 17, although it is widely expected that ASWJ will resume its efforts to take Maxaas on May 18. Foreign Fighters -------------- ¶9. (C) Hassan and Hashi joined other TFG contacts in worrying about the large number of foreign fighters entering the fray. They are well trained and equipped, they said. The Ambassador told them to supply us with passport data, photographs, or any other evidence so that the USG could investigate. ¶10. (C) In response to Ambassador's question, Hassan and Hashi asked USG help in pressing Somalis, including disaffected MPs, to stop discrediting the TFG. They promised to provide a list of the chief spoilers for Embassy use. They also alleged that some foreign fighters continued to enter Somalia via Nairobi, and asked that the USG intercede with the Government of Kenya. The Ambassador asked that the TFG provide the Embassy with any concrete information, like aircraft tail numbers and airport of departure, that could be used with the GOK. Hassan and Hashi also asked that the USG lobby key members of the Ayer, Murosade, and Ogadeni to cease their support for al-Shabaab. The Ambassador told them that the Embassy had already had extensive conversations with the Ayer, and would reach out to the other clans as well. Reaching Out to Addis and ASWJ -------------- ¶11. (C) Hassan and Hashi told the Ambassador they were traveling to Addis Ababa in order to attend the May 20 IGAD Extraordinary Ministerial on Somalia and to urge the GOE to pressure ASWJ to cooperate with the TFG. They would also lobby for indirect GOE military support for their government. (The GOE has been providing material, logistical, and intelligence assistance to ASWJ.) The TFG officials asked that the USG intervene with the GOE on this issue as well. Hassan and Hashi also planned to meet with ASWJ representatives in Addis. Preliminary discussions with ASWJ representatives, they said, have been promising. Embassy Action -------------- ¶12. (C) Ambassador got GOK Foreign Minister Wetangula's agreement May 15 to issue a statement in support of the TFG and critical of Eritrea. The Ambassador also urged that Wetangula work to ensure that IGAD publicly condemns Eritrea and calls for sanctions at its May 20 Ministerial on Somalia. ¶13. (C) Over the weekend, the Embassy contacted members of ASWJ to urge their cooperation with the TFG. We were also in contact with influential Ayer sub-clan members both in Somalia and around the region to urge their support for the TFG. ¶14. (U) The Embassy followed the Department's helpful press statement on the week of May 11 with a statement of its own (reftel) that highlighted the role of foreign fighters and re-stated USG backing for the TFG. Next Steps -------------- ¶15. (C) In addition to those actions outlined in this message, possible steps that could be taken to support the TFG include: -- Aweys's two wives and children reportedly live in Egypt. USG could lobby Cairo to tell Aweys that their continued good status in Egypt is contingent on his more constructive behavior in Somalia; -- The Department could ask the GOE to urge ASWJ to ally or cooperate more actively with the TFG. -- We could attempt to accelerate movement in forming a serious security force and highlight international support for the TFG by asking that the SRSG, accompanied by an AU representative, lead a mission to Mogadishu to meet the President, Prime Minister, and other TFG representatives. We believe that Sheikh Sharif should name Minister of Security Omar Hashi the key commander of the joint security forces, and that any further aid to the forces should be funneled through him. Hashi has considerable military experience, he is reportedly respected by all others in the TFG, and his clan affiliation --Hawadle-- makes him less threatening to other clans participating in the TFG. -- We should urge the engagement of Arab states and others to provide money or, better, highly visible equipment supply flights (by Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and perhaps Jordan). The flights would resonate well with the Somali public in Mogadishu. -- We should provide another tranche of security force funding, but only after assuring accounting for the funds already disbursed. The accounting should include how the port and airport revenues are being used. The Ambassador stressed this in his meeting with Hassan and Hashi. -- We could explore imposing sanctions on those in Eritrea like the Eritrean Ambassador in Nairobi and Colonel Teame who, we are told, appear to have played a significant role in supporting Aweys and undermining the TFG. RANNEBERGER